Governing Urban Diversity: Creating Social Cohesion, Social Mobility and Economic Performance in Today’s Hyper-diversified Cities

Urban Policies on Diversity in London, United Kingdom

Work package 4: Assessment of Urban Policies
Deliverable nr.: D 4.1
Lead partner: Partner 6 (UCL)
Authors: Mike Raco, Jamie Kesten, Claire Colomb
Nature: Report
Dissemination level: RE
Status: Final Version
Date: 4 August 2014

This project is funded by the European Union under the 7th Framework Programme; Theme: SSH.2012.2.2.2-1; Governance of cohesion and diversity in urban contexts
Grant agreement: 319970

This report has been put together by the authors, and revised on the basis of the valuable comments, suggestions, and contributions of all DIVERCITIES partners.

The views expressed in this report are the sole responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of European Commission.
Contents

1. Introduction .............................................................................................................................................. 4

2. Overview of the political system and governance structure ................................................................. 5
   2.1. Governance structure and institutional map ........................................................... ................................ 5
   2.2. Key shifts in national policy relating to migration, citizenship and diversity ................................. 8

3. Critical analysis of policy strategies and assessment of resource allocations ............................... 11
   3.1. Dominant governmental discourses of urban policy and diversity ................................................. 11
   3.2. Non-governmental views on diversity policy ................................................................................... 22

4. Conclusions ............................................................................................................................................... 27

References .................................................................................................................................................. 30

Appendix 1: List of policy documents and strategies reviewed for Work Package 4 ............................ 32
Appendix 2: Work Package 4 Interviewees ................................................................................................. 38
1. Introduction

London is the most ethnically diverse city in the EU. The 2011 census revealed that out of a total population of 8.17 million, 2.6 million (31%) were born outside of the UK. Moreover, 55% of respondents defined themselves as other than White British (this includes both residents who hold a foreign passport and British citizens from Black and Minority Ethnic backgrounds). This proportion rose from 31% in 1991. The city is home to 41% of all non-White British residents of England and Wales, to 37% of all residents born outside the UK and to 24% of all non-UK nationals1. It has subsequently been described as ‘the world within a city’ (GLA, 2005) and the most ‘cosmopolitan place on Earth’ (Vertovec, 2007). In terms of socio-economic diversity, levels of inequality in London are strikingly high, and comparable with cities in the Global South. Dorling (2011) shows that the richest 10% of London’s residents have 273 times the income and assets of the poorest 10%. Despite London’s economic strength, 28% of the population live in households that are in poverty (after housing costs)2 compared with the UK figure of 22%, meaning more than two million Londoners are in poverty (Leeser, 2011). Half of these are in working households. It is, therefore, a truly hyper-diverse city and one in which policy-makers, planners, politicians, and civil society groups have been compelled to address broader questions of diversity. Any attempt to use urban policy to promote enhanced competitiveness, cohesion, and/or social mobility is directly confronted with the relatively extreme opportunities and challenges of diversity that are found in the city.

In this chapter we explore some of the dominant narratives of diversity that shape policy. We argue that the term is highly contested and that in order to reduce potential conflicts, it is presented in highly consensual, technical, and instrumental terms. However, within London there are very different views of what the term means and how it can be used to develop alternative forms of urban development and urbanism. We examine these through the framework of policies for ‘recognition’, ‘encounter’, and ‘redistribution’ developed by Fincher and Iveson (2008) and show that at the national and London scales much of the focus has been on recognition, allied to a secondary concern with the promotion of diverse encounters. Questions of redistribution are left to the vagaries of market mechanisms and individual action, within the context of a ‘responsibilisation agenda’ that sees the role of the state as one of an enabler rather than a direct manager of social change. The current UK government argues that it is up to individuals to navigate their way through the challenges that they face and to take responsibility for their own social mobility and broader integration into the ‘mainstream’. At the sub-metropolitan scale very different narratives and strategies have emerged, however. Thus despite attempts to establish consensual agendas, the term has been fiercely contested and has generated much division across the city. There are also signs that a new emphasis on ‘convergence’ and individualism is eroding some of the core differences that make London’s politics of diversity different.

The research was conducted between July and December 2013. It consisted of two stages: a systematic analysis of national and city-wide strategies on diversity and the governance of urban

1 A self-identifying question on ‘ethnic group membership’ was introduced in the census for England and Wales in 1991. For an overview of how ethnicity and identity is measured in the UK, see http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/census/2011-census/key-statistics-for-local-authorities-in-england-and-wales/rpt-ethnicity.html#tab-Measuring-ethnicity. In the 2011 Census 18 ‘ethnic’ categories were defined. Additionally, the 2011 Census included questions on religious affiliation, language spoken at home, and national identity. To define international migrants, the census used country of birth and passport held.

2 In the UK the poverty threshold for a household is defined as an income after tax which is below 60% of the average (median) household income for that year. It can be measured before or after housing costs.
policy; and 17 interviews with policy-makers, planners, government officials, business organisations and civil society representatives. The discussion of the findings begins by examining the decision-making structures that frame urban policy making in London. It shows that the Mayor’s powers are relatively limited given the strong centralisation of government power that exists in England. The chapter then moves on to a critical analysis of the narratives and discourses that exist in formal national and city-wide policies and the views of different actors on the form and character of governance in London. We highlight the positive characterisation of diversity within such plans and its growing fusion with notions of equality of opportunity. We also highlight some of the themes that policy-makers are reluctant to discuss, such as racism and other structural barriers to social cohesion and equality of outcomes. We point to the high degree of managerialism that pervades policy-making discussions and its effects. We then turn to the views of non-governmental actors and their reflections on these strategies and narratives. We document a high degree of scepticism and frustration with policy and a broader attempt to re-politicise discussions around diversity and equality.

2. Overview of the political system and governance structure

2.1. Governance structure and institutional map

London’s governance structures are complex and dynamic. In Figure 1 we outline the key institutions involved in the governance of urban policy and diversity in the city. It shows that its formal structures are two-tiered, with a Mayor (with strong powers by UK standards), a London Assembly and 33 sub-metropolitan local authorities (32 boroughs and the Corporation of London). National government also plays a direct role in many decisions. It is a democratically vibrant city with NGOs working at all levels to influence and shape policy. Some of the most significant of these are also highlighted in Figure 1. For some commentators, these arrangements are so complex that London remains ‘ungovernable’ (Travers, 2006). Whilst this is an exaggeration, it is clear that effective policy-making in such circumstances is difficult to achieve and requires a relatively high degree of co-ordination and integration.

National-level - Ministerial Departments and Non-Departmental Public Bodies (NDPBs)
In the UK the Prime Minister leads the government with the support of the Cabinet and ministers. Several ministerial departments play a role in shaping urban policy, most notably the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG, 2013a: p. 1) which aims ‘to achieve more integrated communities and to create the conditions for everyone to live and work successfully alongside each other’. It is responsible for: community and society, economic growth, housing, local government, planning and building, and public safety (DCLG, 2013b). In addition, a dedicated Centre for Social Action, situated within the Cabinet Office, supports programmes that encourage people to create positive change through social action (Cabinet Office, 2011; 2013). Also directly relevant, the Department for Culture, Media & Sport (DCMS) aims to ‘protect cultural and artistic heritage’ and ‘freedom and equality’ as well as helping ‘businesses and communities to grow by investing in innovation’. DCMS also hosts the Government Equalities Office (GEO, 2010b; 2012) which is responsible for equality strategy and legislation across government. Other relevant departments include: the Department for Business, Innovation & Skills (BIS) which helps people to start and grow a business; the Department for Education (DfE) which is committed to equal educational opportunities for children and young people, ‘no matter what their background or family circumstances’; the Department for Work & Pensions (DWP) which seeks to tackle child poverty and social mobility; and the Home Office (and within it the UK Border Agency) leading on immigration policy, with a current focus on reducing immigration. Working alongside these ministerial departments are executive and advisory non-departmental public bodies (NDPBs) such as the
Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC) which has a statutory remit to ‘promote and monitor human rights and to protect, enforce and promote equality’. Important advisory NDPBs include: Equality 2025 (E2025) which advises the DWP on disability issues; the Migration Advisory Committee (MAC) which provides independent, evidence-based advice on migration to the Home Office; and the Social Mobility and Child Poverty Commission (SMCP) which monitors progress on improving social mobility and reducing child poverty.

Third Sector and Non-Governmental Organisations
Other key organisations seek to influence discourses on issues of diversity and urban policy on national, city-wide and local scales through research, lobbying, and campaigning. These include Race on the Agenda; Stonewall; Runnymede Trust; the Citizenship Foundation; and Migrants’ Rights Network. Other business groups, such as the Institute of Directors and the Confederation of British Industry have also been vocal contributors to policy debates, along with trade unions. Critical organisations and policy think-tanks also influence policy debates. Migration Watch UK, for example, has been highly critical of what it sees as unmanaged and unsustainable migration policies. Others include the Policy Exchange, the New Economics Foundation, and the IPPR.

Governing Agencies in London: City-Wide and Local Bodies
The Greater London Authority (GLA) is the top-tier administrative body consisting of a directly elected executive Mayor responsible for the strategic government of Greater London and an elected 25-member London Assembly which scrutinises the activities of the Mayor and holds him publicly accountable. The GLA is a strategic regional authority, with powers over transport, policing, economic development, and fire and emergency planning. Three functional bodies - Transport for London, the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime, and the London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority - are responsible for the delivery of services in these areas. Whilst the Mayor is responsible for setting the overall vision for London, it is the 33 boroughs that are responsible for providing the majority of the day to day services for their local residents in areas such as education; housing; licensing; local planning; waste collection; as well as the arts and environmental, leisure and social services. The boroughs work with local businesses via Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs) and are represented by the organisation London Councils which lobbies government collectively on their behalf. A vast number of local community organisations are also active in providing services and lobbying, for which there is no official data. There are relatively few city-wide third sector agencies, with the notable exception of an employer’s organisation named London First that lobbies to influence national and local government policies and investment decisions to support London’s global competitiveness. Other agencies have London offices (e.g. the London Chamber of Commerce) or are London-focused in much of their work.

The Mayor’s work on migration is co-ordinated by the London Strategic Migration Partnership (LSMP) which is funded by the Home Office and whose members include pan-London organisations such as London Councils, London First and NHS London as well as representatives from the UK Border Agency, the Refugee Council and the Migrant and Refugee Advisory Panel (MRAP). The LSMP published the Mayor’s Refugee Integration Strategy (GLA, 2009a; 2009b; 2009c), which was later expanded to apply to all migrants (GLA, 2011a). Its business plan covers key areas of integration for refugees and migrants and also monitors and responds to the impact of national immigration policies. It is not uncommon for the Mayor to oppose central government with regards to issues of migration, housing, citizenship, and diversity. For example, he has criticised Home Office visas policies restricting non-EU students’ right to study in the UK and to remain to work post-completion on the basis that London (and in turn the UK) benefits from attracting talent from overseas and that limiting this will limit economic growth (GLA, 2011b).
Figure 1: Map of Key Institutional and Governance Structures in London
2.2. Key shifts in national policy relating to migration, citizenship and diversity

The UK has experienced decades of immigration and, as a result of its imperial past, has long possessed an ethnically and culturally diverse population. The pace of immigration quickened in the post-war period of economic growth, with large-scale immigration from the then British colonies with the majority of the Black Caribbean and South Asian settlement taking place in the 1950s, 1960s and early 1970s. Policy approaches to issues of migration, citizenship and diversity over the past decades can be framed using three identifiable phases.

Pluralist and Multicultural Approaches: The 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s:
Pluralist policies were adopted by local authorities in the UK from the early 1970s and 1980s onwards but were never adopted as an official national policy. Nevertheless there was a marked shift towards an engagement with multicultural approaches to policy-making (even if the word ‘multiculturalism’ only appeared in political discourse in the late 1990s), most notably in the field of education, but also other areas such as the health service and in the proliferation of language provision and translation programmes. However, riots broke out in several urban areas in 1981, principally Brixton in London and the Toxteth area of Liverpool. They were sparked, in large part, by perceptions of racial discrimination by the police and the persistence of socio-economic inequalities within minority and ethnic groups. They prompted attempts to develop more proactive approaches to tackling issues of racism both within government and wider society (Scarman, 1981). Pluralism and a multicultural politics of recognition pervaded discourses, along with a reductionist neo-liberal faith in the trickle-down benefits of economic growth.

New Labour and the Rise of Integrationist-Community Cohesion Approaches: 1997-2010
When elected in 1997, the Blair government gradually shifted from its early emphasis on ‘multiculturalism’ to a focus on ‘community cohesion’ policies that were principally concerned with minimising disorder and promoting greater responsibility amongst citizens and communities. This was a response to the intense criticism voiced against multicultural approaches following new inter-ethnic disturbances which took place in the UK’s northern towns, principally Bradford, Oldham and Burnley, in 2001. A series of reports (Cantle, 2001; Clarke, 2001; Denham, 2001; Ouseley, 2001; Ritchie, 2001) identified a lack of clear community and religious leadership and a climate of ignorance, fear and division between different racial, ethnic and religious groups living in each area (see also: Amin, 2002, 2003; Jahn-Kahn, 2003; Kundnani, 2001; Phillips, 2006). The reports argued that pluralist approaches focusing on respecting and celebrating the differences between self-identified groups or communities had resulted in a lack of emphasis on shared common bonds and had unwittingly served to divide urban society along racial, ethnic and religious lines. They portrayed residential segregation and the so-called ‘parallel lives’ of different ethnic groups within each locality as leading to a lack of social and community cohesion, triggering disorder. The reports aimed to promote social cohesion and foster common national and local identities and shared values by emphasising commonalities over perceived differences (Putnam, 2003). Such agendas took on a new urgency following the terror attacks on London in July 2005 which had a significant impact on policy discourses and prompted the introduction of a national Preventing Violent Extremism programme that was later criticised for its divisive approach of focusing its efforts and funding solely on Muslim communities (DCLG, 2007).

Table 1 summarises the key milestones in the rolling out of policy under New Labour. It demonstrates how the discourses of community cohesion, sustainable communities, and integration became the dominant policy narratives of the 1997-2010 period.

Table 1: Some key milestones in national policy relating to migration, citizenship and diversity since 1997
Alongside these policy statements, new institutions were set up in the 2000s to establish ‘problem-centred’ policy approaches and to promote cohesion. A Commission on Integration and Cohesion (COIC) was founded in 2007 with a mandate to reflect on, ‘how local areas can make the most of the benefits delivered by increasing diversity – [as well as to] consider how they can respond to the tensions it can sometimes cause’. It was expected to ‘develop practical approaches that build communities’ own capacity to prevent problems, including those caused by segregation and the dissemination of extremist ideologies’. It recommended avoiding ‘one-size-fits-all’ national-level approaches in favour of locally tailored solutions. It valued the specificity of ‘place’ in generating a sense of cohesion via an acknowledgement of the significance of ‘millions of small, everyday actions’ (and interactions) between people (COIC, 2007: p. 4). The report made recommendations emphasising: what ‘binds communities together rather than what differences divide them’, a new model of rights and responsibilities focused on strengthening a national sense of citizenship via ceremonies and education; a principle of mutual respect and civility recognising that the ‘pace of change across the country reconfigures local communities rapidly’; and around the principle of visible social justice in order to tackle myths and build trust in the institutions that arbitrate between groups such as local authorities (Ibid, pp. 43-44). Community cohesion represented an attempt to combine the ‘bridging’ or ‘coming together’ associated with earlier assimilationist expectations with the pluralist ‘bonding’ and valuing of cultural diversity of multiculturalist approaches. Many of its core proposals were undermined by a combination of economic recession (and a subsequent lack of funds for state programmes), and political changes following the defeat of the Labour government in the election of May 2010.

*The Coalition Government’s Integrationist and ‘New Localist’ Approaches: 2010 - Present*

The Coalition government of Conservatives and Liberal-Democrats, under the leadership of David Cameron, has focussed on integration rather than cohesion. More effective policy, it is claimed, will result from less central government control and the promotion of ‘new localism’ in governance arrangements. Under the *Localism Act 2011*, it has championed public sector reform through the decentralisation of power from central to local government as well as directly to communities, neighbourhoods and individuals. In place of state agencies, voluntary organisations, faith communities, friendly societies, co-operatives and social enterprises, are encouraged to take greater responsibility. Good policy-making, it is claimed, originates in the ‘natural’, local communities in which everyday encounters take place. Answers to the problems raised by diversity are to be found by ‘rebalancing activity from centrally-led to locally-led action and from public to the voluntary and private sectors’.
This has been underpinned by austerity reforms that have seen major cut-backs in public spending (see Section 3.1).

Table 2 shows that the dominant national policy discourse towards migration, citizenship and diversity has remained predominantly integrationist in nature, albeit with more of an emphasis on assimilation (see Syrett and Sepulveda, 2012; Tasan-Kok et al., 2013). However, in keeping with the focus on localism, there is a greater emphasis on individual responsibility and core British values ‘underpinned both by opportunities to succeed and a strong sense of personal and social responsibility to the society which has made success possible’ (DCLG, 201a2; p. 4). Rather than seeing integration as something that can be planned for and implemented, the emphasis is on cultural and aspirational changes within, what one interviewee termed, the “lived places” of diversity. There is little appetite for in-depth state-funded research or data collection on the characteristics or potential problems associated with diversity. This reflects a broader scepticism within government concerning the ability of experts to determine policy objectives in an effective manner (DCLG, 201a2a). As will be discussed in Section 3.1, this differs markedly from the arrangements that persist in London.

**Table 2: Some key milestones in national policy relating to migration, citizenship and diversity since 2010**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May 2010</td>
<td>Coalition government election pledge to bring down annual net immigration to less than 100,000 by 2015 (APPG Migration 2011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr 2011</td>
<td>Reforms to international student route (Tier 4) – aimed towards a wider reduction in immigration levels (APPG Migration, 2011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr 2011</td>
<td>Annual limit on non-EU economic immigration under Tiers 1 and 2 introduced plus New English language requirement for non-EU migrants applying to enter or extend their stay in the UK as spouses and partners of citizens or settled residents (APPG Migration 2011).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 2011</td>
<td>‘Localism Act 2011’ introduced – aiming to devolve more decision making powers from central government to individuals, communities and councils particularly in areas such as community rights, neighbourhood planning and housing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb 2012</td>
<td>DCLG (2012a) Creating the conditions for integration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul 2013</td>
<td>DCLG (2013a) Bringing people together in strong, united communities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep 2013</td>
<td>Cabinet Office (2013) Promoting social action: encouraging and enabling people to play a more active part in society.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This new localism, therefore, presents opportunities for local government to create tailored locally-specific solutions to addressing issues of diversity and integration which acknowledge the specificity of local context and experiences. Yet a lack of financial backing for local initiatives because of austerity has been criticised as hugely problematic (CLES, 2011). It also fails to acknowledge the socio-economic (and other) factors that affect the ability of local people to access existing services, let alone have a stake in delivering them themselves (CLES, 2010: p. 6). Issues of structural inter-territorial disparities between and within English regions and metropolitan areas are also ignored. The anticipation being that it is those in society with the most social capital and with the desire, skills and leadership to take control of the places they live in that are most likely to get involved in running local services while other ‘passive’ citizens will be left out. Moreover, immigration policy as a whole remains highly contentious as the government has sought to cap numbers of in-migrants to the country and politicians, the media, and new political parties such as the UK Independence Party have made immigration a ‘priority issue’. Citizenship remains
prescriptively linked to testing and, as mentioned above, there is little overarching guidance on issues of diversity. The implications of this approach for the politics and practices of public policy in London are particularly significant given the city’s hyper-diversity and governance complexity and it is to debates in the city that the chapter now turns.

3. Critical analysis of policy strategies and assessment of resource allocations

3.1. Dominant governmental discourses of urban policy and diversity

In this section we explore the form and character of dominant policy discourses on diversity in London, on the basis of an analysis of key policy documents (listed in Appendix 1) and interviews with public officials (listed in Appendix 2). We develop the analysis through the three dimensions of diversity policy and planning identified by Fincher and Iveson (2008): recognition, encounter, and redistribution. We will show that there are significant degrees of difference between policy agendas in London and those of the UK government outlined in Section 2 but also some areas of consistency, particularly in relation to resource allocations. We then move on to Section 3.2 where we discuss non-governmental perspectives and alternative discourses.

In this section we develop three principal arguments. First, dominant narratives of diversity at the London scale have taken on a consensual, rather than contested, form and emphasise London’s wider ‘success’ as a leading global city. They have been used to legitimate policies that promote an ‘equality of opportunity’ for all of London’s citizens, whilst deflecting attention away from more structural forms of inequality that would require radical forms of intervention to resolve. Little attention is, therefore, given to questions concerning the redistribution of economic resources and the increasing, or new, forms of inequality. Second, diversity governance has been characterised by a pragmatic managerialism and an emphasis on legal compliance and individual responsibility which, in some ways, differs markedly from national policy agendas. And third, there are significant variations in policy within London as it is at the sub-metropolitan level where some of the most innovative approaches are to be found. The primary focus of policy narratives at the city level is on fostering recognition. Much less attention is given to tangible interventions that re-design urban spaces to promote diverse encounters or to the redistribution of economic opportunities for different groups. This differs markedly with the practices of the boroughs and other civil society organisations working in neighbourhoods across the city who have become increasingly critical of wider narratives and have sought to develop their own policy initiatives. Efforts to convert diversity and equality into a consensus-based agenda around which all can agree have failed to prevent wide-spread disagreements across the city, as will be illustrated in Section 3.2.

Selective Recognition and Diversity Policy in London

The main emphasis of diversity policy in London is a pragmatic concern with selective recognition. There has been a strong emphasis on the quantitative changes that have taken place in the city’s demographic profile and labour market in recent decades and the qualitative impacts of migration on its cultural and social character. The geography of ethnicity in London shows clear areas of concentration of ethnic minority populations, but with rare exceptions, these areas remain usually very ethnically mixed and are not dominated by one single group. Patterns of clustering and concentration differ between groups, with some (e.g. the Bangladeshi or Indian) displaying stronger patterns of concentration than others which are characterised by more spatial dispersion (e.g. Black Caribbeans and Black Africans) (GLA, 2005). This ethnic geography is explained through a combination of structural-economic factors (income, position in the labour market and characteristics of the housing supply), ethnic-cultural preferences and legacies of ethnic
discrimination in labour and housing markets (see Galster, 2007). It has important implications for urban policy interventions given the GLA’s recognition that:

‘areas of most intense poverty and deprivation are often in close geographical proximity to areas of extreme wealth and affluence. BAME3 are over-represented in the poorest sections of London’s population…[and] houses headed by a member of certain ethnic minority communities are more likely to have low incomes’ (GLA, 2012a: p. 4).

Mayoral strategies highlight some of the ‘realities’ created by globalization and argue that policymakers and citizens have little choice but to adapt to their new circumstances. The (co)presence of diverse and entrepreneurial citizens from all over the world is something to be celebrated and nurtured. The document Equal Life Chances for All, for instance, openly claims that:

‘London is a great world city and its strength continues to be its dynamism and the diversity of its constantly changing population. London has always, and will always, welcome migrants. It is migrants that have made this city great over many decades, and successive generations bring new energy, skills, enterprise, opportunities, prosperity, and a rich and varied culture’ (GLA, 2012b: p. 3).

A new discourse of ‘talent’ is now used to justify policy. This view was supported by a GLA interviewee who noted that it represents a “positive view of diversity and immigration as being driven by talent, and we need this talent to come in. You can’t close the borders and say ‘no-one can come in’ because we benefit from it, specifically London”. An emphasis on talent is presented as a discourse that all can agree on. It is difficult to oppose such an agenda without appearing to have an ulterior motive. We will return to this topic directly in Section 3.2.

Diversity is something to be promoted as a commodity, as a factor that gives London a decisive edge in the competition for global investment, the attraction of international events (such as the Olympics), and the image of the city as a creative centre for highly skilled professionals and creative workers. In the words of a GLA representative, policy discourses are “looking at how to keep London competitive and attractive to international students, or high skilled migrants…as an enabler of jobs and growth”. This is a very different narrative to that of the current UK government that openly rejects more pluralist views of multiculturalism and emphasises the importance of ‘common ground’ based on ‘a clear sense of shared aspirations and values, which focuses on what we have in common rather than our differences’ (GLA, 2012b: p. 5). National integration policy under the Coalition government is founded on a values-based agenda, with much less interest in evidence-based policy. This means that the Mayor has often stood in contradiction or opposition to the central government agenda, despite being from the same (Conservative) political party. He has, for example, voiced public support for an ‘earned regularisation scheme’ for irregular migrants already living in the UK on the grounds that this would offer significant economic benefits from increased tax revenue (GLA, 2009d). There is also a Mayoral programme, Diversity Works for London (DWfL), which encourages and supports businesses to realise the competitive advantage of London’s diversity, an area given more attention on the city-wide than national scale.

On a broader canvass, the Mayor’s London Plan 2011 gives a broad definition of diversity as:

‘The differences in the values, attitudes, cultural perspective, beliefs, ethnic background, sexuality, skills, knowledge and life experiences of each individual in any group of people constitute the diversity of that group. This term refers to differences between people and is used to highlight individual need’ (GLA, 2011e: Annex 5, Glossary).

---

3 BAME or BME are terms commonly used to refer to Black and Minority Ethnic groups.
A series of commitments are made that seek to give recognition to the ways in which public policy can discriminate against different groups, individuals and communities in unintended ways. The Plan claims that policy needs to strike a balance between collective needs and the diversity of individuals and citizens. It states, for example, that ‘the Mayor is committed to securing a more inclusive London which recognizes shared values as well as the distinct needs of the capital’s different groups and communities, particularly the most vulnerable and disadvantaged’ (Ibid., paragraph 3.2), although how this is to be achieved remains under-specified.

Diversity as a narrative has become elided with a pragmatic politics that claims to be focused on a non-ideological and problem-based approach to governing the city. This extends to both Mayoral and borough levels. A number of interviewees emphasised this aspect of recognition. As one civil servant noted in interview, “the difference is that the national [agenda] is driven by values, the London [agenda] is driven by pragmatism … and values as well”. This pragmatic view of diversity, it was claimed, emphasises:

“the financial benefits to the city, the fact that it gives the city kudos, the fact that the city’s not like any other city, and be [the Mayor] realises equality and diversity is actually something that you can sell the city on…be [the Mayor] knows that his constituency is a diverse community and he will engage with local people”.

It is driven by the electoral politics of London. As noted by one interviewee any Mayoral candidate can only gain support through the promotion of “very different kinds of value[s] that…champion the underdogs and the oppressed”. It is pragmatically important to be seen to be positive about the make-up of the city’s population, as a large part of the Black and Minority Ethnic population of London is of British nationality and therefore potential voters, in addition to all EU migrants who can vote in the London elections.

More significantly, the narrative of diversity has become elided with wider discourses surrounding equality and the stated intention to ‘mainstream equalities’ in the planning of welfare across the city. This recognition is partly pragmatic but is also driven by wider processes of judicialisation that are occurring in governance systems across the EU with the growing importance of legal codes and regulations that stipulate how it is that government agencies should act (see Rios-Figueroa and Taylor, 2006). In the UK this process culminated in the Equality Act 2010 in which a duty was placed on all public bodies to consider how their practices and policies impact on the equality of different groups. Clause 1 states that:

‘An authority to which this section applies must, when making decisions of a strategic nature about how to exercise its functions, have due regard to the desirability of exercising them in a way that is designed to reduce the inequalities of outcome which result from socio-economic disadvantage’ (GEO, 2010a).

The legal framework requires local authorities and the Mayor to address the specific needs of diverse groups. If they fail to do so they can be taken through costly and prolonged judicial reviews and even sued by community groups, individuals, or other agencies for a lack of due diligence. In the words of one GLA interviewee, the consequence of this is that, “we never talk about diversity as immigration, or ethnicity, whereas I know a lot of other EU cities seem to…when we talk about diversity we put it in the context of the Equalities Act for us to think about”.

---

4 The so-called ‘protected characteristics’ included in the Act are age, disability, gender reassignment, race, religion or belief, sex, sexual orientation, marriage and civil partnership, and pregnancy and maternity.
However, the focus on rights and equalities has ushered in some new tensions in policy thinking. As one GLA interviewee noted, this is reflected in a shift towards a mainstreaming approach in which “we don’t target communities” and think more about how policies treat individual citizens as equals. The longer term objective of policy is becoming integrationist as it seeks to eliminate diversity as a meaningful construct. Thus despite the pragmatic and positive discourse promoted within many policy frameworks, there is also a gradual erosion taking place in the targeting of groups for additional support and the recognition that diversity exists as a specific policy problem to be accounted for, recognised, and acted on.

Mainstreaming in this way is fuelling more technocratic and managerial approaches to governance. Organisations are compelled to report on the quantitative impacts their actions have on wider policy objectives surrounding cohesion, competitiveness, and mobility. In the strategy document London Enriched (GLA, 2009a; 2009b; 2009c; 2011a), for example, ‘managing migration’ is presented as ‘essential to maximising its benefits and supporting integration vital to minimising its costs’. As the Deputy Mayor notes in the foreword, the strategy ‘acknowledged that there are sometimes specific barriers which exist that prevent refugees and migrants making a substantial and valued contribution’. The need for targeted intervention in a complex ‘global city’ is powerfully made. The strategy has been broken down into seven Core Objectives, each of which is given targets, budget lines, and management controls. Researchers from the University of Oxford were hired to provide a thorough assessment of the dynamics of migration in London in order ‘to inform policy development, communication and marketing activities [and] also highlight significant differences by demographic groups’. Moreover, ‘references to research and media monitoring’ will be used to provide a ‘robust evidence base for policy-makers’ (GLA, 2012b: p. 31; see COMPAS, 2010). Policy-making therefore combines a compartmentalised approach, in which specific areas of intervention are targeted and acted on, and a more strategic overview of how these different fields interact to create a more coherent form of intervention. Visible targets are set and monitoring procedures put in place to evaluate effectiveness. This stands in sharp contrast with the shift to value-based policy-making and the move away from government-funded policy research within Central Government since 2010 (see Section 2.2).

Other examples of this managerialism include the first Equal Life Chances for All (Mayor of London 2009) strategy which fused national requirements under the Equality Act 2010 (GEO, 2010a) and city-wide objectives incorporated from consultations undertaken with different agencies. In terms of community engagement, the strategy states two objectives:

‘to engage with London’s diverse communities to effectively inform, develop and deliver Mayoral strategies, priorities and programmes; [and]…to use traditional forms of social research and innovative digital engagement and social media monitoring to establish how Londoners see the world around them and respond to policy proposals’ (GLA, 2012b: pp. 30-31).

Local authorities are required to have baseline data available for planning purposes to both facilitate the effective management of policy and to limit the potential for legal challenges to their decisions. There has been an attempt to make diversity ‘visible’ and construe it as both a policy problem and an opportunity. In the Mayor’s terms, ‘we have now developed a more holistic approach to minimising disadvantage, one which brings Londoners together rather than separating and pigeon-holing people as had been done in the past’ (Johnson, 2012: p. 1). It is, in part, is a response to some of difficulties in distinguishing between different groups in London. As one GLA interviewee noted, the EU approach to recognising diversity “does not fit with the London reality…there are new migrants yet there is no recognition at the European level that these are migrants, they are just people exercising free movement”.

5 These are: Language; Housing; Employment, Skills and Enterprise; Health; Community Safety and Cohesion; Children and Young People; and Community Development.
Managerialism has also been used to justify the mainstreaming approach highlighted above that, in theory, should generate increased integration which in the longer term reduces social and economic diversity. The former GLA Director of Equalities and Policing saw this as a way of dealing with the ‘unique set of opportunities and challenges’ posed by London’s position as ‘undoubtedly one of the most diverse cities in the world’ (Jasper, 2007: p. 4). Supplementary Planning Guidance for equality and diversity planning was published in 2007 and it still officially remains part of the body of guidance documents which are supposed to shape the implementation of planning and urban policy across the city. The Guidance explicitly aimed to ‘promote social inclusion and to help eliminate discrimination by ensuring that the spatial needs of all London’s communities are addressed’ (GLA, 2007: p. 5). Local boroughs are required to ‘identify the needs of the diverse groups in their area…address the spatial needs of these groups, and ensure that they are not disadvantaged both through general policies for development and specific policies relating to the provision of social infrastructure’ (Ibid, p. 7). There has been continuity in the approach of the previous administration that explicitly argued that:

‘in a city as diverse as London it is essential that an accurate picture of the population involved is created when considering approaches to promote equality and diversity….Effective provision for communities cannot be made if their specific needs have not been recognised and understood’ (GLA, 2007: p. 15).

Moreover, there is also a requirement ‘to encourage developers and planners to consider equality issues at the earliest stages of applications’ (Ibid, p. 7).

To summarise, the politics of diversity in London differs markedly from that found at national level. There is a greater sense of electoral and managerial pragmatism in policy discussions and a more positive interpretation of the economic and cultural value of a diverse population and workforce. It is claimed that selected and identified problems can be managed and tackled in a pragmatic way that becomes removed from the contested arena of political debate and conflict. Moreover, rather than focusing on the structural problems faced by communities, the emphasis is on individuals who are ‘enabled’ to take on new responsibilities and to take control of their own lives. There is also some evidence that national policies are having some effect on local discourses. The outcome of individualisation and what many respondents term a ‘mainstreaming’ of intervention is a de facto policy of integrationism. This has two implications. First, it shies away from more interventionist forms of collective governance. It is an approach that in Bauman’s (2001, p. 88) terms sets ‘claims for recognition free from their redistributive content’. Second, it creates tensions with the more pragmatic, instrumental view of diversity as a ‘good thing’ and a boost to competitiveness. The logic of mainstreaming is for diversity to disappear and for policy to become immune to the politics of difference.

Diversity and the Politics of Everyday Encounters in London
The politics of encounter plays a much less significant role in London-wide diversity discourses than that of recognition, although it is increasingly significant at the local level. There are three prevailing narratives: the building of mixed and balanced communities which facilitate diverse encounters; the promotion of urban order in public space; and the devolution of governance responsibilities to the neighbourhoods in which ‘natural communities’ exist and everyday encounters take place. Each of these is now discussed in turn.

First, there has been some continuity with Mayor Livingstone’s emphasis (and that of the previous Labour government, see Colomb, 2007) on the building of mixed and balanced communities at the

---

6 Ken Livingstone was Mayor of London 2000-2008. He was an Independent, then a Labour Party candidate. He was succeeded by Conservative Party candidate Boris Johnson in 2008.
local level through tenure mix and the affordability, choice, and quality of housing. The London Plan 2011 explicitly states that:

‘Communities mixed and balanced by tenure and household income should be promoted across London through incremental small scale as well as larger scale developments which foster social diversity, redress social exclusion and strengthen communities’ sense of responsibility for, and identity with, their neighbourhoods. They must be supported by effective and attractive design, adequate infrastructure and an enhanced environment’ (GLA, 2011c: Policy 3.9).

The rationale of the London Plan 2011 is familiar. The objective of ‘mix’ has been perceived as desirable by UK policy-makers since the late 1990s for various reasons. It is based on the sociological notion of ‘neighbourhood effects’ which hypothesises that a high concentration of poor, or ethnic minority, people in specific areas is bad, as it reinforces and perpetuates poverty and exclusion and reduce opportunities for social mobility (see Tasan-Kok et al., 2013: Section 3.2). The policy implication of this is that by introducing a form of social mix in poor areas (getting higher income groups to live there), poverty will be spatially dispersed and the life chances of the poor will be improved. Mixed and balanced communities, it is argued, encourage co-presence and social encounters, which in turn can also facilitate social mobility and creativity through new interactions and the formation of diverse social networks. There is also specific temporal imagination embedded in these understandings. Many respondents in London and beyond referred to the de-stabilising effects of rapid change on community cohesion. Encounters in the city are, it is claimed, increasingly ephemeral and transient and this undermines a sense of social cohesion and the prospects for social mobility. Mixed communities are put forward as a way to redress this and facilitate more positive encounters.

More rarely does the policy discourse on mixed communities talk about the necessity to bring lower income residents to rich neighbourhoods, or to ‘protect’ the existing social composition of urban areas which are mixed but have become rapidly gentrified as in many parts of London. The London Plan 2011 states that,

‘New social housing development should be encouraged in areas where it is currently under represented. These are essentially local matters for boroughs to address in light of their local circumstances because the key concern is the concentrations of deprivation in individual, or groups, of mono-tenure estates rather than the overall level of social renting in a borough’ (GLA, 2011c: p. 87).

At the same time changes in the Plan are running directly counter to this discourse. Requirements for affordable housing have been lowered in order to boost construction activity in London and despite the rhetoric of pragmatism, there exists an ideological unwillingness to enable local authorities and others to borrow the necessary capital to invest in the large-scale construction of social housing projects.

It is important to note, in relation to diversity, that the policy discourse on mixed communities in the UK and in London never explicitly targets ethnic mix (Colomb, 2011), as this would be politically too sensitive (see Phillips and Harrison, 2010; Thomas, 2008). There is also much academic work in London that is sceptical about the effectiveness of such tenure mix policies (Arbaci and Rae, 2012; Tunstall and Lupton, 2011). They seem to have had, at best, small positive effects, and more often no effects in terms of improving the life conditions and opportunities of poor urban residents or BME groups. If and when they have had a positive impact, it was most likely caused by the improvements to facilities and services (health, education, training or retail provision) which accompanied interventions for more mixed tenures. The scarce evidence about the positive effects of tenure and social mix policies has led some to question their rationale and
necessity, both in the UK (e.g. Cheshire, 2009) and in other European countries (Galster, 2007; Kleinhans, 2004; Musterd and Andersson, 2005; Musterd et al., 2006)

Alongside this there is greater recognition given to the importance of inclusive urban design and its impacts on diversity thinking and practice. Existing policies often fail to account for the needs of diverse groups and constitute one of the most significant forms of discrimination. If, for example, certain ethnic minority groups have larger families, then the provision of family housing becomes directly connected to more just forms of diversity planning. Local planning authorities are encouraged to make provision for the needs of different groups when deciding on development plans. This should include the provision of community facilities or other assets such as accessible places of worship. And yet, there is little capacity in policy systems to engineer the places in which individuals live. Interventions are co-ordinated and organised on the level of individual development projects and their ‘viability’ for private developers (see GLA, 2011c: Section 3.50).

Under Planning Gain agreements permission is granted only if developers agree to various social investments and the provision of affordable housing and/or the provision of specific ‘public’ spaces. There is little strategic overview of this process with the net result that local authorities in areas of strong demand are able to negotiate better social outcomes, whereas those in regeneration areas are often in a less powerful position to set terms and conditions. Developers have no compulsion to build on land they hold even with planning permission so that land is banked and this in turn increases its market value.

The provision of public spaces by private investors is also a controversial process with some research arguing that it has created open and inclusive spaces of encounter in London (see Carmona and Wunderlich, 2012; Norwood, 2013), whereas others point to the limited and selective activities that take place within such spaces (Minton, 2012). In many ‘mixed’ developments there is evidence of physical segregation between housing of different types in order to protect the marketability of more expensive housing (The Guardian, 2013; Kilburn, 2013). So whilst there is still a policy insistence on the provision of mixed communities, the reality is that micro-segregation is becoming entrenched in the physical layout of many urban developments. The tensions between the objectives of private developers, for whom mixed developments are seen as a threat to market returns, and public authorities, whose stated aims are to create such developments, are put to one side in city-wide and national discourses. Project outcomes are managed on a project-by-project basis with little strategic overview. Wider planning priorities for diversity, it is claimed, will emerge through local actions and decisions.

A second core strand in the politics of encounter relates to perceptions of urban order, in particular in the aftermath of the London riots which took place in August 2011 during five days. The riots were initially sparked by the fatal shooting by the police of a young Black man in Tottenham, North-East London. The riots spread to various parts of inner and outer London and to other cities in England, such as Manchester and Liverpool. More than 5,000 individual riot-related crimes - antipolice violence, looting and vandalism against shops and vehicles - were recorded across England, two-third of which in London. Over 4,000 arrests were made as a result of the riots; many people were injured and four were murdered in London and the West Midlands (Rogers, 2011).

The riots sparked intense media and public debates about their causes. The people arrested for riot-related activities were predominantly young and male; 33% of the adults had no qualification higher than GCSE level and only 5% said they had a degree. Whilst race was at time mentioned as an issue in the media, 33% of those appearing in the courts on riot-related charges were white,

---

7 Affordable housing in London is defined as housing of 80% of market value, either to buy or rent.
43% were black and 7% Asian (Rogers, 2011). Race actually played a limited role in most of the media discussion and policy responses to the riots when compared to earlier riots in 1981, 1985 and 2001 (Solomos, 2011), although the event that sparked the riots in Tottenham clearly had a ‘racialized’ nature, the geography of the riots escaped any simplistic correlation with poor areas or commercial centres, and took place instead in ordinary spaces of everyday diversity, socializing and encounter (Till, 2013). The Coalition government did not launch a formal inquiry into the causes of the riots but instead set up a Riots Communities and Victims Panel, whose final report (2012) ‘resonates with the Victorian values and underlying notions of the ‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’ poor’ (Bridges, 2012: p. 8). Commentators from the Left, community leaders and many researchers, by contrast, emphasized structural poverty and unemployment, social inequalities, lack of social mobility, the impacts of austerity measures on the poorest and a lack of empowerment of local communities (Dillon and Fanning, 2013; Lewis et al, 2011; Low, 2011; Phillips et al., 2013).

More generally, however, if one moves beyond the discourse surrounding the 2011 riots, the narratives of diversity that exist in London are very different to those of national government and its focus on gangs of young people and ‘extremism’ among the city’s Muslim population. Whilst the discourse of order is always evident, there is a more consensual approach in formal policy discourses in London and one that is less inclined to stereotype particular groups. This is even truer at the local level as boroughs have been keen to stress the inherent cohesiveness of local communities. Policies claim that a more secure public realm, in terms of design and policing, can break down barriers to diversity and promote greater cohesion. There has been a particular focus on tackling hate crimes against vulnerable communities and in making public spaces more secure, and less threatening, for diverse groups (GLA, 2012b). Safer spaces encourage greater social interaction as more vulnerable groups are able to use public spaces in a more open way.

However, the realities in terms of issues such as policing and anti-social behaviour are somewhat less positive. As with other diversity narratives, some of the more difficult questions over who wins and who loses from interventions are put to one side. Security policies target specific citizens, particularly the young, those from BAME groups, and those of particular faiths. The use of ‘stop and search powers’ by police forces in England and Wales has been shown to disproportionately target (young) black and Asian people (Eastwood et al., 2013), even if progress to reduce this profiling has been made in recent years (Equality and Human Rights Commission, 2013). Such practices have had toxic effects on relations between police and Britain’s minorities (Shiner and Delsol, 2013). In London, the GLA (2012a: p. 11) admits that ‘black people are four times more likely to be stopped and searched than white people’ and that ‘the Mayor believes that stop and search can be a useful tactic in the fight against crime, but that it must be applied and be seen to be applied in a fair, reasonable and professional manner at all times’.

The figures for arrests show even starker divisions. In 2010 80% of all policy arrests in England and Wales were of ‘white’ citizens, 8% were of ‘black’ origin, and 6% Asian. In London, however, ‘white people accounted for around 50% of arrests, black people for 27% and Asian people for over 11%’ (GLA 2012: p. 11). Policing and security continue to act as a lightning rod for wider discontents in communities across the city and have at times undermined local attempts to promote greater cohesion. The policy response has been to implement new forms of mainstreaming, alongside relatively minor programmes. Rather than focusing on policing, new schemes have been launched by the Mayor to promote the mentoring of young people from BAME communities and an enhanced focus on educational attainment, individual aspirations, and projects that will equip ‘young people with tools for the future’ (GLA, 2012a: p. 12).

Third, it is argued that it is at the local level that the day-to-day encounters and interactions of modern cosmopolitanism life take place in a positive and progressive manner (see Bridge, 2005; Neal, 2013; Neal et al., 2013). Decision making structures, it is claimed, should reflect and
reproduce these ‘realities’, particularly in cities such as London where new forms of hyper-diversity have emerged that undermine attempts to simplify and categorise different communities. In that context, the new programme of Neighbourhood Planning currently being developed following the Localism Act 2011 is offering more challenges than opportunities in the London case, it may be argued. The Act (DCLG, 2011) created a new set of plans (Neighbourhood Plans) which can be prepared by Neighbourhood Forums of at least 21 members. These Forums are supposed to emanate from local communities themselves, which have to apply for recognition to their local authority and can then prepare a plan for their area.

While it is too early to assess the outcome of such new forms of neighbourhood planning, early evidence in London shows that, in certain circumstances, the process could divide rather than unite communities. In some cases, a dominant ‘community’ with common class, ethnic or religious characteristics can use neighbourhood planning to further its particular interests in ways that could be exclusionary to those of other groups, as is the case in Stamford Hill in North Hackney, where two competing neighbourhood forums submitted an application for the same area (Booth, 2013). One, strongly supported by the Hassidic Jewish community seeking to promote homes for large families, had been resisted by a separate neighbourhood group, with the consequence that Hackney Council had rejected both neighbourhood forum applications (Geoghegan, 2013). However, in other parts of London (e.g. Tottenham), there are a few emerging examples of lower and middle income groups with a diverse ethnic composition forming alliances to defend their neighbourhood against large-scale urban regeneration and property development activities which threaten areas with further gentrification.

Diversity and Redistribution

Whilst the politics of recognition and to some extent encounter have been relatively well developed in London, more challenging political questions over the efficacy and desirability of redistribution between diverse groups have been less clearly articulated. Objectives have tended to remain aspirational and implicit and focussed on the indirect economic dividends associated with diversity policy, rather than the mechanisms through which redistribution takes place. There are no formal narratives that argue that inequality can be tackled by sanctions and taxes on the better off in London and/or on super-wealthy immigrants who are attracted to London’s global property and asset markets. Redistribution will be facilitated, instead, by the promotion of individual aspirations, social capital, and responsibility, allied to voluntary legal requirements on businesses and public sector institutions. Whilst diversity is recognised and celebrated in official policy narratives, there is a growing movement within London and across England, towards an integrationist agenda and the language of ‘convergence’. In short, equality is elided with a levelling-up, not with a levelling-down of opportunities. It is a win-win-win policy in which it is imagined that there are no losers or costs to successful policy outcomes.

All policy interventions are being influenced by wider welfare reforms and expenditure cuts and the Coalition government’s stated desire to promote growth above all other considerations. The reductions are having a major impact on the ability of local authorities to develop and implement programmes of action in London. A Trust for London Report (2013, p. 1) notes that, ‘Central government funding for service provision in London’s thirty three boroughs, in total, fell by £2.7billion (€3.2billion) in real terms (33%) between 2009/10 and 2013/14, or 37% in per capita terms’. It also noted that there have been differentiated geographical impacts of these cuts across London so that:

‘not all London Boroughs have been affected to the same extent. Spending power reductions, per capita, over the period 2010/11 to 2013/4 range from 12% to 26% in real terms. In general more deprived boroughs, which had more income from central government and spent more to start with, have faced the biggest cuts’ (Trust for London, 2013: p. 1).
The most deprived Inner London Boroughs of Hackney, Newham, Islington, Southwark, and Tower Hamlets received cuts of between 8.9% in just one year (2011-2012) and these were amongst the biggest changes found anywhere in England (Trust for London, 2011). Between 2012-2013, the GLA’s revenues also fell by £31million (€37million) (8%), from a total of £403million (€483million) to £372million (€446million) (GLA, 2013a: p. 4).

The changes have created structure problems for local authorities and the Mayor. Many of the responsibilities for the promotion of equality lie with the GLA but as one interviewee noted, “we are not really a service provider, or the lead policy makers, so we’re in that space between the local and the national and we feel that it is hard for us to achieve the goals of our integration policy”. Cuts to budgets have made this co-ordinating role more challenging and limited the capacity of policy programmes to meet wider objectives. Again as the interviewee noted, it is:

> “often the local level that has to pick up the pieces of national policy, so if national policy is open borders then…it puts a strain on local infrastructure…they have to pick up the tab with perhaps not such support from central government, so there’s that to think about”.

This will become even more acute as the GLA Directorate budget is due to fall further from £103.5million (€124million) in 2012/13 to £91.5million (€109million) in 2014/15 (GLA, 2013a).

In this context some of the discussions surrounding diversity have begun to mirror those at national level. Under Mayor Johnson a new language of ‘convergence’ has emerged in the wake of the London Olympics in 2012 and broader concerns with London’s competitiveness, resilience, and long term success. Poorer areas, and communities, particularly those found in East London in which relatively large numbers of migrants live, are to be targeted for support so that ‘over the next 20 years the residents of the Host Boroughs will come to enjoy the same life chances as other Londoners’ (GLA, 2010b: p. 1). The principle of convergence reflects broader discourses of equality and integration outlined earlier. It is a vision that equates policy success with the levelling out of differences and the creation of more balanced social and economic geographies across the city. The existence of diversity is, therefore, presented as a sign of failure that acts as a brake on social cohesion and economic competitiveness. Such sentiments were highlighted by a GLA member who interview noted that London’s citizens possess a:

> “commonality in their aspirations…[that] are the same as everybody else. If we all have the aspiration that our children go to schools, that we can get transport around town, that we’re safe, so in a way, I don’t see diversity as being an important factor in that because we want the best for our families and it doesn’t matter what our background is and that premise informs policy the most”.

So whilst formal policies appear to promote positive views of diversity, there is something of a counter-movement emerging amongst politicians that sees equality of treatment and a mainstreaming of identities and aspirations, as a more effective policy starting point.

In recent comments, the Mayor even went as far as to say that inequality represented a ‘natural’ sorting of differences between individuals with different capacities and that policies to increase social mobility were doomed to failure (The Guardian, 2013). There is little recognition that much of the growth taking place in London is sustained by low-paid work and individuals from migrant backgrounds are fundamental to this (see May et al., 2007). London’s welfare services also rely on migrants, some of whom undertake the low-paid functions that have been targeted by austerity cuts, with others filling more skilled positions that have also begun to see reductions in numbers. In this policy atmosphere it remains difficult to see how a more directly redistributive welfarist agenda can emerge.
The impacts of the Localism Act discussed earlier also have implications for redistribution as a number of ‘community rights’ (see http://mycommunityrights.org.uk/) have been granted to local groups to take control of local assets or buy community buildings and facilities. These might include pubs, libraries, or Community Centres (DCLG, 2013c). There are few examples of how these rights have been exercised in London, by whom, and the extent to which they have been utilised to improve access to resources of disadvantaged, deprived or excluded groups, including ethnic minorities or migrants. As pointed out by critics, weaker groups marginalised by the cuts in public services are less likely to benefit from those community rights (see NEF, 2010: p. 3). Localism has not been backed up by transfers of resources, meaning that the likely outcome will be greater inequalities between groups with different capacities.

Some of the most effective forms of redistribution are to be found in legal and regulatory changes and campaigns that push for more voluntary forms of action on the part of public and private sector employers. The Mayor, for instance, has championed the widespread adoption of higher salaries for low paid workers across London through the Living Wage campaign (see Living Wage, 2014). Employers are encouraged to adopt wages that will enable their workers to live at least a reasonable standard of living. In 2011 the Mayor increased the London minimum by 5% to £8.30 per hour for all employees of government bodies and it is estimated that over 10,000 low-paid workers have benefitted from the scheme (GLA, 2012a). An accreditation system has been established to support this and the Mayor has enthusiastically endorsed it and publicly stated that ‘Paying the London Living Wage is not only morally right, but makes good business sense too’ (Ibid, p. 1). It is exactly the type of policy that is now seen as effective as it encourages self-reliance, reduced welfare costs, and also supports a wider competitiveness agenda by improving the quality and diversity of skills within firms.

As discussed above, one of the main approaches to redistribution in the city is to convert the narrative of diversity into a marketable commodity that can facilitate economic growth. As one respondent noted, it can be used to “improve the quality of corporate governance, promote Foreign Direct Investments, and enable firms to understand markets better”. This ‘talent agenda’ has sparked off a series of voluntary initiatives to promote diversity in corporate ownership and working practices. Partnerships with voluntary organisations, such as Business in the Community, have been established to promote what one interviewee referred to as “action plans on how they [employers] can diversify” their senior management teams and workforces. The focus has shifted primarily onto gender diversity, as opposed to ethnic or other types. Voluntarism and the promotion of an agenda of corporate competitiveness through diversity and talent is seen as the most effective way of bringing about social mobility and economic growth. There is no discourse of regulatory compulsion or US-style ‘affirmative action’ programmes. In its place firms are encouraged to ‘benchmark’ their activities and to demonstrate to their shareholders and to NGOs that they are working to boost the employment of a diversity of groups, a topic returned to in Section 3.2. Other efforts are being made to change the ways in which public bodies procure the work of subcontractors and to use other contracts to encourage the employment of a diverse workforce. This reflects a wider set of changes in the public sector in England which is increasingly characterised by a state-led programme of privatisation (see Raco, 2014). A strategy published in 2010 named Unlocking Public Value: Leading London to Smarter Procurement (GLA, 2010a) sought to institutionalise this programme, along with a new database service named CompeteFor (2014) that is designed to help smaller businesses and those with diverse background to access state contracts.

Overall, the benefits of London’s rapid economic growth are not being felt by many of its residents. Policies relating to redistribution and the creation of more ‘just’ diversities remain underdeveloped. Despite the Mayor’s stated objective in the Economic Development Strategy 2010 to ‘give all Londoners the opportunity to take part in London’s economic success, access sustainable employment and progress in their careers’, unemployment rates for young black people were 47% in 2011, compared to
19% for young whites (GLA, 2012b). In fact only 24% Greater London Authority staff are from BAME backgrounds, despite such groups constituting more than half of London’s population.

3.2. Non-governmental views on diversity policy

In this section we consider the responses of non-governmental actors and their reflections on diversity policy and the openness of policy-making processes in London (interviewees listed in Appendix 2). Collectively, we show that there is much scepticism towards central government policy on diversity but also a recognition that some city-wide agendas are working well. Moreover, it is at the local scale where the most innovative interventions are being made.

Civil society and business respondents were generally critical of what they saw as the inconsistent approaches of central government to migration and the tendency of politicians and media at the national level to focus on its negative impacts on public services and social cohesion, despite a lack of substantive evidence. A TUC (Trade Union Congress) representative, for example, pointed to examples at the local level, such as in education, where he observed discussions of a good record of accommodating newly arrived Polish children who were occasionally being identified as strongly motivated and actually improving the performance of local schools, noting that negative opinions were more prevalent, that “very few [politicians] sing the praises of the local school which is doing well in terms of integrating immigrant kids into a bit of a structure”. Although he also noted that there were “huge differences between the capacities of different types of local areas to be able to manage immigration well”, the national focus had been too concerned with the creation of negative perceptions that justified wider policies promoting individual obligations.

There was a widely perceived recognition amongst all respondents that London was a ‘different’ or ‘special’ case that warranted its own policy narratives and understandings. As a TUC member noted in interview:

“there's a special agenda in London...because 60% of black and Asian people in the UK are living there...London's just so different to the rest of the UK that it's difficult to think you could write something that looked like a sensible and effective public policy for the whole of the UK and make it optimum for London”.

This was reinforced by a migrants’ rights campaigner who characterised London as an anomaly and described how “it's become semi-detached from the rest of the UK and therefore, if London has become a little easier, living with diversity... it can't be taken as a blueprint for the rest of the country”.

Believing the “issue of the importance of diversity to economic growth” was widely agreed upon from the London Mayor’s office to government departments, “particularly economic departments”, the biggest challenge for policy-makers for this interviewee was their ability to “translate that into a popular message that can be got across to the public”, to be able to ‘sell diversity’. In response to this disconnect between positive local success stories and national fears and concerns the migrants’ rights campaigner we interviewed was in favour of a more regional dimension to immigration policy with the advantage of encouraging more “locally based discussion” to develop more positive, locally-grounded, messages in response to the feeling that “everything to do with immigration policy comes from the big, economic departments in Whitehall, everybody else is marginal to the whole process and they just have to make do with whatever central government offers up to them”.

Other civil society groups were even more strident in their criticisms. One interviewee, for instance, criticised diversity as a term that meant “everything and nothing” and was used to present a more positive and consensual set of views in place of more challenging discourses:
“what ought to been seen as an everyday, banal issue that people are different from each other is used as shorthand for a discussion about race, where people are uncomfortable about talking about race so diversity is one of those kind of ‘weasel words’...[that] avoids talking about discrimination, injustice, power and just suggests that there’s an anodyne diversity, which masks white privilege really considerably”.

Diversity was dismissed as an attempt to “avoid some of the more difficult challenges that we have”. Issues of racism, injustice, and equality of outcomes, it was claimed, are intentionally ignored in dominant policy narratives. The existence of inequalities is put down to a responsibilisation agenda in which it is clearly “their fault” with groups such as young black men “unemployed because they didn’t apply themselves harder at school, so you get into a kind of victim blaming”. Rather than fostering recognition, critics claimed that narratives of term diversity led to a narrowing of understandings and helped to legitimate inequalities, representing a policy of “benign neglect”.

There is also evidence that the term is creating intense discussions within civil society groups. The TUC representative we interviewed, for example, argued that, “some of the people in the trade union movement were a little more cautious because it [diversity] was so soft and ill-defined that it was a deliberate attempt to blur campaigns and struggle for equalities agendas”. In order to give recognition to the more politicised nature of diversity, it was argued by the same respondent that organisations now “use the phrase equality agendas...relayed back to our action plans and our demand[s], like equal pay audits and work or community as a happy place”. Formal policy narratives were too focused on issues that were “a bit less threatening...a bit like corporate social responsibility rather than making real change”. Or as another civil society representative argued, the existence of diversity discussions meant that “we don’t get a discussion about the core issues of unemployment, of access to education, to criminal justice”. In short it:

“removes the ability to name the problem, so unless you are prepared to identify patterns of racial injustice and name them as such it gets very difficult to address them because we’re not really sure what we’re talking about, hence my concern about the slippage of language into diversity”.

One response was for civil society groups to focus on specific policy areas, or what one termed “business-oriented things” such as helping migrant workers obtain their rights, rather than engaging with broader debates about the rights and wrongs of migration policy or broader concerns with gentrification, the costs of living, and rising inequalities in London.

Alongside workers’ representatives, employers’ groups have been amongst the most vociferous advocates of more open migration policies and diversity. There are three core narratives. First, there is an instrumental view of migration policy and the idea that managed migration is a precondition to the competitiveness of firms and the effectiveness of big employers in private and public sectors. The organisation London First (2014), for example, argues that a key priority for policy-makers should be a policy that enables ‘London’s employers to recruit the workforces they need at all levels’. This should be based on ‘maintaining an open migration regime’ that will allow firms to recruit the workers they require from different parts of the world. Direct connections are made between the competitiveness of firms and the availability of a diverse workforce. As an interviewee noted, “business tends to be pro open economies and in a truly open economy you need to have a premium of people”. This, it was claimed, was “a different view from the public on migration” as it sees migrants as an economic asset, both in terms of the skills they provide and the understandings of markets that they bring to businesses. It is still, however, a selective discourse that emphasises the importance of skilled workers that “are coming in to work and we should be encouraging that, embracing that and not putting up barriers towards it”. This instrumental rationale is put forward to challenge the ‘irrational’ discourses that view diversity as a threat to cultural and social cohesion. In utilitarian terms it is claimed that “money is a great leveller” and that employers’ interest in migration is ultimately a rational response to global opportunities and changing economies.
Second, diversity has also been used to promote new corporate governance agendas within the London business community. There has been a gradual shift toward the promotion of ‘talent’ and business ‘intelligence’ as discussed in Section 3.1. In the words of one interviewee:

“We would include diversity [in our core objectives for policy-makers] and certainly most of our clients would include that within skills and access to talent. So coming from the point of view that talent is distributed evenly across the population, if you don’t have policies in place that actively encourage diversity in the workplace then you’re not going to access talent”.

Firms that fail to include diversity thinking in their recruitment and governance practices, it is argued, will be less competitive as they will miss out on the most talented workers and fail to realise their full market potential. A lack of diversity limits business understanding and opportunity. As a charity representative commented in interview, “we want to work with employers to create action plans on how they can diversify”. This includes the promotion of leaders at the Board level of companies and encouraging firms to appoint senior managers to take responsibility for implementing diversity strategies. In reality this has primarily led to a focus on the voluntary promotion of gender diversity and programmes such as a Future Leaders strategy that is designed to support the mobility of talented individuals. It is also leading to new initiatives to promote a diversity of investors in London, such as Islamic sovereign debt funds that are looking to finance urban projects but are bound by strict rules over profiteering and ethical returns.

Third, and related to both of the above, there has also been an emphasis on diversity as a commodity that can be used to promote London as an attractive investment and visitor space. The London Olympics was put forward by respondents as an example of how images based on London’s hyper-diversity could be used to good effect in economic, social, and political terms. By presenting London as a diverse, welcoming city, the possibilities for growth are expanded in ways it is claimed that will lead to an improvement of the quality of life in London, its spaces of encounter, and the distribution of economic rewards across diverse populations.

Business voices in London are of course diverse. Attitudes to policy vary from sector to sector and between different types of businesses. But the approaches outlined above constitute a consistent discourse. Issues of diversity are recognised as being of critical importance to economic growth. And whilst there are strong disagreements with central government policy on migration, the overall emphasis on supply-side interventions in national agendas, and within London, is strongly supported. There is no desire to impose top-down forms of redistribution. State investment should be channeled into infrastructure projects that support economic growth. There is little criticism of international flows of money into property markets in the city that are boosting inequality and undermining the capacities of many groups, particularly poorer migrants, to access affordable housing.

There was a widespread perception amongst respondents that the political system was closing down opportunities for honest and open discussions of diversity, to the detriment of policy effectiveness and feelings of democratic inclusion. One issue which came up regularly was the contrast in approaches to policy-making since the Coalition government was formed in 2010. Reflecting on the effects of its localism agenda, one interviewee involved in campaigning for greater diversity in business commented that the:

“Labour [government] was very much into national programmes, so [it was] easy to pinpoint and share good practice, easier to co-ordinate – this government is very much devolved… the fact is you can’t find any good practice, it’s flawed”.

24
This interviewee echoed the sentiments of DCLG officers presented in Section 2 who described the government tendency to prefer to avoid negative narratives, stating that the former Government were:

“a bit more explicit around race…under their [Coalition Government’s] approach at the moment it is very much focused on gender… I think ethnicity’s seen as the complicated one that they don’t want to discuss at the moment, but we are working on that”.

This view that the government is avoiding addressing issues of inequality around race and ethnicity mirrors earlier comments from another civil society interviewee critical of the use of the concept of ‘diversity’ as a tool to do just that. Both interviewees point to statistics, such as the “59% employment rate for ethnic minority people and…71% for the wider white group”, to support their concern at the lack of attention these issues are being given. The race and gender-based campaigns this interviewee’s organisation is responsible for target greater representation of race and gender diversity at board and senior level, reducing disparities in rates of un(der)employment and increased flexibility in the workplace by working with employers using “benchmarking reports”, “good practice awards”, “workshops and roundtables”, “toolkits and research” as well as “mentoring” and “diversity advisors”. They also aim to make addressing issues of race and ethnicity “non-scary” for government by convincing them that publishing ethnicity data is “not a burden on business” as many businesses are already doing this and by applauding and commending those that do they believe others will be encouraged to follow suit.

It was felt, for example, that cohesion and mobility policies such as those relating to the promotion of English language had clear limitations because of their failure to think through the wider consequences of policy action. As one of our civil society interviewees highlights below, if the long-term aim is to dissolve the differences between citizens then the benefits of diversity outlined so stridently in city strategies will also be lost:

“What we have from government policy is this really bizarre notion that we should focus on what we’ve got, we should focus on our similarities, rather than our differences and therefore, if you are different, we don’t really want to interrogate a sense of what the same is [because] you’ll find it’s white, male and highly privileged, but if you are different to that, you’re told to tone down that difference. For example, language is another classic, you must speak English, you can never translate anything anymore and it’s for your own good, if that second generation grows up without those language links, do we lose the benefits of diversity? So, this ‘end of multiculturalism’ debate doesn’t sit very well with the notion of ... capitalising on the ‘world in one city’ concept”.

Such examples indicate the impacts of wider shifts in policy resourcing and narratives. Officers from DCLG, among others, reflected critically on what they described as the shift from evidence-based to value-based policy-making under the Coalition government. One migrants’ rights campaigner went further by problematizing the notion of evidence-based policy-making itself:

“I think the problem with politics is that basically people hear what they want to hear…and anything which contradicts it is excluded. The whole problem with what they used to call evidence-based policy is that it really only existed in areas where the politicians had no prior commitments to a policy outcome”.

He noted serious frustrations with the way that immigration policy is approached by central government in the UK and how this limited the ability of migrant organisations to be involved with and inform policy-making in a meaningful way:

“We sit down on numerous occasions for round table discussions with civil servants… and they’re already anticipating what the difficulties are going to be, and they are genuinely
interested in the conversation results, in order to see how they can tackle them. The problem is that that tends to be about making a policy fit, rather than changing it, sort of chipping away at a few rough edges, but the policy remains”.

While he remained open to the potential for the emergent grass-roots movement to reflect a more positive and progressive dialogue around equality and diversity he linked this to an interest in relating to the views of the population:

“there is evidence of that happening, you’ve got these new citizens organising movements, Citizens UK, London Citizens and so on, activism with faith communities, churches, the anti-poverty networks of one sort or another ... I think it’s strengthening that process. At the moment, it’s by no means clear that they have accepted a positive view of diversity, or immigration, they’re open to it, if they haven’t accepted it at the moment, it’s generally ‘cos they don’t know”.

This link between the views of the general public towards contentious issues like immigration and policy approaches to issues of equality and diversity was also made by another of our participants from a leading race equality organisation in describing what he termed ‘electoral logic’ as one way to understand the side-lining of equality agendas:

“So, the only discretion we get about racial equality and injustice is about whether the Tories can win the next election without getting better relationships with the minority community… so we get kind of a discussion about electoral logic… but we don’t get a discussion about the core issues of unemployment, of access to education, to criminal justice none of those seem to really be on government’s agenda”.

This view reflected our participant’s experience of central government reluctance to address issues of inequality, although he noted that some minor concessions had been achieved:

“They’ve been pushed by some good campaigning into doing some work on stop and search… to at least be cognisant of the different levels of employment in different ethnic groups, but there are no real answers coming out of any government department on any of these issues and the refusal to publish any strategy, which would suggest how to address some of these problems”.

The reluctance of central government to adopt a more overtly positive stance toward immigration is a major concern for members of the civil society groups. Interviewees highlighted the lack of overarching leadership and accountability at the national level and how this contrasted with examples of local leadership. As one noted:

“So, the levels are one in five young white people are unemployed, one in two young black men are unemployed, that to me is a big problem. It’s not clear who has any responsibility for that across government, is it DWP, is it BIS, is it DFE, or is it the Government Equalities Office? Communities and Local Government? Nobody’s really sure”.

The same interviewee contrasted this with “local leaders” who “are relatively in tune with what’s going on, so councillors pretty much know what’s going on in their wards, they can see what’s going on and what the pattern is”. This is particularly true of London where boroughs who have been particularly innovative.

Overall, then, despite the focus of policy-makers on diversity and equality, there is a general frustration that relatively little is being achieved and that the institutional avenues through which to influence decision-making are becoming increasingly opaque. Each of our respondents, in their own way, have sought to politicise discussions and raise fundamental questions about the structural relationships between migration and economic competitiveness and cohesion and between ethnicity/national origin and socio-economic inequality. There is also a perception that it is at the local (i.e. sub-metropolitan) level that innovative and more politically engaged forms of practice are
taking place in which issues of recognition, redistribution, and encounter are being planned for. It is at this level that the ‘everyday cosmopolitanism’ of encounters takes place and at which government bodies have to deal, directly, with citizens and the challenges of implementation.

4. Conclusions

In economic and demographic terms London is one of the most diverse cities in Europe. This diversity generates opportunities and challenges for policy-makers. In this chapter we have explored the key governance frameworks that shape urban policy in the city and the narratives and discourses of diversity contained within them. We have argued that London’s governance structures are complex and that despite possessing the most powerful elected Mayor in the UK, core decisions over migration policy are still framed at the national level. There are tensions in this relationship. London’s approach diversity differs markedly from the neo-assimilationist and integrationist thinking of the national Coalition government. Within London the Mayor, local authorities, business interests, and civil society groups argue strongly that policies towards migration and diversity should be more open and more pragmatic. There is a clear divergence emerging, a pattern repeated across the EU where, as a European Commission (2010, p. 13) report notes, ‘it is cities that have pushed for better policies and demanded greater responsibility and resources’.

Collectively, we argue that the discourse of diversity at the city level has become consensual in form. It is celebrated and characterised as a ‘good’ thing that has to be accepted and on which all can agree. Diversity in London is to be pragmatically embraced, tolerated, and accepted. It is, therefore, a discourse that serves to marginalise broader concerns and conflicts and directs attention towards more consensual narratives such as ‘cultural vibrancy’, a global city ‘brand’ and/or economic performance. Such policy fields are relatively safe in political terms. They are highly instrumental and focus on ‘collective benefits’ and the contributions that diversity makes to economic growth and cultural life. More difficult questions over the impacts of migration on housing, employment, and local politics remain firmly off the agenda within London. There is little discussion of what the European Commission terms the ‘reception capacity’ of neighbourhoods in the city (see Europa, 2009) and an unwillingness to engage with more radical critiques of diversity from the political left and right. This explains, in part, why London government bodies have adopted a managerialist approach to such questions. They are seeking to convert political debates into technical discussions about targets, objectives, and strategic priorities. In contrast to national government, policy is framed through an explicit emphasis on recognition and policy action. There is an attempt to make visible the types of diversity that exist in the city, the socio-economic characteristics of different population groups, and the way that targets and strategies can be used to generate new forms of equality. There is a positive view put forward of the ways in which integration and mainstreaming will foster social cohesion, the social mobility of individuals, and, in turn the economic competitiveness of individual businesses and London as whole.

However, despite a willingness to give greater recognition to a number of issues and problems surrounding diversity, more structural concerns are given little or no attention or presented as problems that will be tackled through voluntary actions and market-led solutions. Diversity has become synonymous with the term equality but only in the sense of expanding equalities of opportunity for individuals. There is a longer term objective to generate convergence in the life chances of individual citizens. The much more difficult and contested issues surrounding equality of outcomes and the existence of ingrained causes of inequality, such as racism and stigmatisation in the labour market, are not seen as problems that can any longer be directly addressed through urban policy. There is an assumption that they will melt away as the city becomes more diverse and tolerant in the longer term.
Existing strategies are therefore defined by high levels of voluntarism and the allocation of limited resources and budgets. The role of government is to reduce the role of government. Indirect legal mechanisms are used to regulate the practices of public bodies and a host of voluntary schemes exist within the private sector. As discussed in Section 3.1 some, such as the London Living Wage campaign have been successful and had a disproportionate (positive) impact on lower paid workers from London’s migrant communities. However, in general, policy interventions are not linked to significant forms of direct redistribution or compulsion. The emphasis of policy, instead, is on a responsibilisation agenda through which inequalities will be tackled through the actions of individuals from marginalised communities. Policy is designed to enable them to become active citizens, politically and economically. It is not up to state bodies and planners to intervene directly in shaping the life-chances of citizens. At the same time, London is also facing unprecedented cuts in its welfare budgets from national governance and spiralling costs of living. This combination may lead to less diversity in the socio-economic character of the city as poorer people are forced to move away; a process that has been happening for several decades under the process of gentrification in Inner London but which is now being speeded up and fuelling by the welfare and housing benefit reforms implemented by the Coalition government. Whilst there have been protests from the Mayor and others in London about the impacts of such policies, they are going ahead and could easily undermine broader efforts to support some of London’s poor, many of whom are migrants.

The research has also noted the growing importance given to the mainstreaming of diversity in broader welfare expenditure programmes and a significant reduction in the number of dedicated projects to promote social cohesion. This differs markedly from the approaches of the previous Mayor and the Labour governments of 1997-2010. A paradox is developing in which, on the one hand, positive narratives and discourses surrounding diversity are being promoted in London whilst on the other, an emphasis on mainstreaming hints at greater integrationism and gives less recognition to diversity. Recent pronouncements by the Mayor in which he highlighted the limitations of social mobility policies, owing to the natural differences of ability that exist within the population, point to the emergence of more regressive discourses and ways of thinking (The Guardian, 2013). It should also be noted that during the last decade positive narratives of diversity have gone hand-in-hand with an aggressive and globally-focused urban policy in London. Diversity and cohesion have often been undermined by this policy (see Imrie and Lees, 2014).

Similarly, the politics of encounter is framed in three principal ways. First, there is a focus in the planning system on the building and design of mixed communities. Regulations require that all development proposals should aim to create sustainable communities that are balanced, diverse and relatively harmonious. There is a spatial determinism within such proposals a belief in the capability of developers and planners to ensure that projects proceed in a balanced way, which is contradicted by evidence of recent development. Second, there is a growing reliance on private developers to provide ‘public’ spaces of encounter. To a greater extent than perhaps in any EU city, London’s new public spaces are provided, managed, and regulated by major developers. The narrative is one of corporate social responsibility and the power of market mechanisms to deliver social infrastructure that will facilitate positive forms of encounter. At the same time, there has been a growing reliance on harder forms of policing and secure design to establish urban order. Specific groups, particularly the young and those from ethnic minorities, have been targeted for selective action (displacement or control of behaviour) in the name of harmony and community balance. And third, there has been a movement towards localism in city governance, along with neighbourhood planning. This is based on a view that sees local encounters as the basis for political discussion. Whilst there is much potential in such reforms, the lack of a strong co-ordinating framework for policy and the lack of recognition of the structural inequalities which may impede the participation of specific groups and individuals in the process means that localism
will inevitably establish fragmented and diverse policy responses and enable coalitions of local interests to dominate local decision-making in ways that may or may not be progressive.
References

(References for policy documents and strategies are featured in Appendix 1)


### Appendix 1: List of policy documents and strategies reviewed for Work Package 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Policy/Strategy/Document</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>National Level</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reference</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Access Address</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Link</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
Appendix 2: Work Package 4 Interviewees

EU Level
1. Representative – European Commission, London Office
2. Representative – European Commission, London Office

Central Government
1. Research Representative – Department for Communities and Local Government
2. Policy Representative – Department for Communities and Local Government
3. Representative – Government Equalities Office

City/Metropolitan Government
1. Policy Representative (Diversity and Social Policy Team) – Greater London Authority
2. Policy Representative (Diversity and Social Policy Team) – Greater London Authority
3. Conservative Party London Assembly Member – Greater London Assembly
4. Policy Representative – London Councils
5. Policy Representative – London Councils

Non-governmental organisations
1. Policy Representative – London First
3. Policy Representative – Business in the Community (Race for Opportunity)
4. Research (Race) Representative – Business in the Community (Race for Opportunity)
5. Representative – Trade Union Congress (TUC)
6. Representative – Migrants’ Rights Network
7. Representative – Runnymede Trust