Towards Hyper-Diversified European Cities

A Critical Literature Review

Tuna Tasan-Kok
Ronald van Kempen
Mike Raco
Gideon Bolt

Creating social cohesion, social mobility and economic performance in today’s hyper-diversified cities
Towards Hyper-Diversified European Cities
A Critical Literature Review

Tuna Tasan-Kok
Ronald van Kempen
Mike Raco
Gideon Bolt
DIVERCITIES is funded by the European Commission, 7th Framework Programme (Project No. 319970)


This report has been put together by the authors, and revised on the basis of the valuable comments, suggestions, and contributions of all DIVERCITIES partners.

The views expressed in this report are the sole responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of European Commission.

---

Project coordinator

Netherlands: Utrecht University
Prof. Ronald van Kempen
Department of Human Geography and Spatial Planning, Faculty of Geosciences

Participating partners

Belgium: University of Antwerp
Centre on Inequality, Poverty, Social Exclusion and the City (OASES)

Denmark: Aalborg University
Danish Building Research Institute (SBI)

Estonia: University of Tartu
Department of Geography, Centre for Migration and Urban Studies

France: University Paris-Est Créteil
Paris Institute of Urban Planning

Germany: Helmholtz Centre for Environmental Research – UFZ
Department Urban and Environmental Sociology

Greece: National Centre for Social Research (EKKE)

Hungary: University of Szeged
Department of Economic and Social Geography

Italy: University of Urbino Carlo Bo
Department of Economics, Society and Politics (DESP)

Netherlands: Delft University of Technology (TUDelft)
Faculty of Architecture and the Built Environment, Department OTB – Research for the Built Environment

Poland: Polish Academy of Sciences
Stanislaw Leszczynski Institute of Geography and Spatial Organization (IGSO PAS)

Switzerland: synergo Mobility-Politics-Space GmbH

Turkey: Middle East Technical University (METU)
City and Regional Planning Department, Faculty of Architecture

United Kingdom: University College London
Bartlett School of Planning

ISBN 978 90 6266 353 8

© 2014

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form, by print or photo print, microfilm or any other means, without written permission by the publishers.

Printed by: CPI Wohrmann, Zutphen, the Netherlands
Design & Layout: C&M, Faculty of Geosciences, Utrecht University

A digital version of this report is available on the DIVERCITIES website: http://www.urbandivercities.eu
# CONTENTS

1 INTRODUCTION
   1.1 Aim of the project 6
   1.2 The rest of the report 9

2 RE-THINKING DIVERSITY
   2.1 Working towards hyper-diversity 12
   2.2 Social polarisation and social inequality 19
   2.3 Divided cities and segregation 21
   2.4 Beyond globalisation 23
   2.5 An expanding world 27
   2.6 New mobilities 30
   2.7 Changing identities in cosmopolitan cities 31
   2.8 Migration policies in Europe 36
   2.9 Economic crisis, austerity and the changing political context of diversity 38
   2.10 Policy discourses on urban diversity 40

3 POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF DIVERSITY 47
   3.1 Diversity and social cohesion 47
   3.2 Diversity and social mobility 52
   3.3 Diversity and economic performance 55

4 MOVING FORWARD 61
   4.1 Understanding hyper-diversity in contemporary European cities 61
   4.2 How to proceed with the project: The most important theoretical and societal questions 64

REFERENCES 67
1 INTRODUCTION

Cities have always been diverse: with respect to function, to housing and to population groups. Economic activities and employment opportunities can be found concentrated in some areas of the city, whereas other areas are mainly residential or show a mix of economic activities and residential functions.

Urban neighbourhoods may be fairly homogeneous residential areas or may show a very mixed population with respect to income, ethnicity, age or household composition. Even in housing areas with a homogeneous housing stock (with respect to tenure, and housing type) the population may be quite diverse. Neighbourhoods may be monotonous and dull places to live in or very lively areas, with vivid shopping streets, markets, and all kinds of facilities to go out. Neighbourhoods with an expensive housing stock may show concentrations of native rich households or a mix of high-income native and foreign-born households. Neighbourhoods with a relatively cheap housing stock may house one type of poor people, or may be very mixed with respect to ethnicity, age and household types. People in such neighbourhoods may happily live together, living parallel lives or be in open conflict with each other.

In the last decades cities may have become more diverse than ever, especially as a consequence of immigration. They have been coined cities of super-diversity (Vertovec, 2007), referring specifically to their increasing ethnic diversity and to the demographic diversity between and within these ethnic groups.

We propose to go one step further. We will talk about cities of hyper-diversity. With this term we make clear that cities are not only diverse in socio-economic, social and ethnic terms, but that also many differences exist with respect to lifestyles, attitudes and activities. Increasing immigration, increasing diversity associated with this migration, different lifestyles within and between groups, spatial segregation in terms of ethnicity, and socio-economic variables, lead to a diversity of opportunities for different groups. People belonging to the same population or ethnic group may show quite different attitudes, for example with respect to school, work, parents and towards other groups; they may have very different daily and lifetime routines. Some adolescents and adults may exhibit extensive daily mobility patterns, while others may be basically locally oriented. While the sphere of daily interaction of a native resident may be restricted to his immediate surroundings, his foreign-born immigrant neighbour may be quite mobile both with respect to social and professional relations. Within a specific group, women may have very different attitudes and activities than men, and the same goes for example for age groups.
Hyper-diversity thus refers to an intense diversification of the population in socio-economic, social and ethnic terms, but also with respect to lifestyles, attitudes and activities. The term makes clear that we should look at urban diversity in a very open way. Hyper-diversity refers to a much more complex situation than super-diversity, not only because the term is defined on the basis of more variables, but also because of the possible complex interactions between these variables. The term hyper-diversity takes account of the fact that, for example, a group of young poor Indian-born men living in a London neighbourhood may on first sight be considered as a very homogeneous group. But at a closer sight they may in fact be very heterogeneous, for example because some men of this group like watching sports on television at home, another part of the group’s main activity may be a constant contact with the family in India (by email, Skype, Facebook, etc.), while a third section of the group likes to hang around on the neighbourhood square and mainly talks with native Londoners. This makes the, on first sight, rather homogeneous group with respect to age, ethnicity and socio-economic situation quite heterogeneous in activities and places where these activities take place.

The implications of such hyper-diversity may be immense, not only in the possibilities to live together in a space like a city or neighbourhood, but also in terms of urban policies and governance. Policies aimed at traditional categories such as ‘the’ poor or specific ethnic or age groups or policies focused on one specific area without taking account of the immense diversity in such an area are probably doomed to fail. Traditional policy frames often stick to stable and sharply delineated population categories or to specific neighbourhoods in a city and thus ignore the hyper-diversified social reality. There is a fundamental challenge here: How to develop successful policies for a population or neighbourhood that can hardly be classified in stable categories? How important are the ‘traditional’ population groups in a city? How important are neighbourhoods, when residents of such neighbourhoods have their social contacts and activities mainly outside this residential neighbourhood, elsewhere in the city or even with people living in a country far away?

Is diversity in general good or bad? Should we strive for it or should we fight against it? We think this is a useless question, because cities are by definition diverse and mixed. Diversity is an inherent characteristic of cities (see already Wirth, 1938) and the tendency is rather to more diversity than to less. What, to our opinion, is an important question is how to deal with diversity. Within our research project DIVERCITIES we do not approach diversity and the effects of diversity negatively, but we specifically focus on the opportunities diversity may offer. Highlighting the economic, social and cultural capital that (hyper-)diversity brings to city life, is the main motivation for carrying out this project.

1.1 AIM OF THE PROJECT

In the EU-FP-7 project DIVERCITIES our focus is on the effects of the hyper-diversity of cities. More specifically, we want to find out how people in a hyper-diversified urban society
live together and how urbanites, residents as well as entrepreneurs, can profit from such hyper-diversification. We will try to find out which positive aspects do or might occur as a consequence of urban hyper-diversity. This definitely does not mean that we close our eyes for possible negative implications of hyper-diversity, but the main aim is to find out which arrangements are needed and are successful in order to realise positive developments of diversity for specific urban groups, for areas within cities and for cities and metropolitan areas as a whole. Which arrangements are needed for turning diversity into a positive force and which have proven to be successful?

We specifically want to describe, document, and critically analyse policies, initiatives, and arrangements that take place in a hyper-diversified city. We will draw out the key factors that shape the success (or failure) of such arrangements, learn from it, and identify the barriers and opportunities to the implementation of successful urban policy programmes and arrangements in the cities that are part of our project and beyond. On the basis of this knowledge we will make clear how such policies and arrangements could be implemented in other cities. We thus want to define the circumstances under which successful initiatives in one city can be replicated in another city. This can never be a simple case of copying, because political, social, economic and spatial contexts may differ immensely. Specific attention to these contexts thus is crucial.

The wider significance of the DIVERCITIES project is related to our basic idea that urban hyper-diversity can be perceived as an asset: it can be used to create more cohesive and productive cities. Having this as the central background to our project and recognising the challenges of governing cohesion and diversity in urban contexts, this project will – hopefully, but as expected – result in innovative governance instruments to manage hyper-diversity and to steer it in the most promising directions possible.

The central research question of this project is formulated as follows:

*Under which conditions can urban hyper-diversity positively affect social cohesion, economic performance and social mobility of individuals and groups suffering from socio-economic deprivation?*

Thus, our focus will be on three aspects: social cohesion, economic performance and social mobility. Programmes aimed at improving those aspects will render cities (even) more liveable and more competitive. Especially in this period of long-term economic and societal crisis and increasing competition from countries elsewhere in the world (e.g. Brazil, China, India), it is important to find out how and under which circumstances Europe’s hyper-diversified urban communities can help, nurture and create social and economic advantages.

When we acknowledge the hyper-diversity of our urban societies, we also have to acknowledge that these societies cannot flourish from standard or general approaches aiming at, for example, economic growth or better housing or more liveable neighbourhoods. Increasingly, more diverse
and more tailored arrangements are needed; arrangements that have an eye for hyper-diversity and that are able to cope with the diverse needs of different groups in different local and urban settings.

**Brief definitions of the core concepts in the project**

While more detailed definitions of our central concepts will be given later in this report, we need some preliminary definitions from the start. *Diversity* is defined as the presence of a number of socio-economic, socio-demographic, and ethnic groups within a certain spatial entity, such as a city or a neighbourhood. As stated above, *hyper-diversity* refers to an intense diversification of the population, not only in socio-economic, socio-demographic and ethnic terms, but also with respect to lifestyles, attitudes and activities. *Social cohesion* can in a very general way be defined as the internal bonding of a social system (Schuyt, 1997). *Economic performance* is concerned with the way individuals and groups perform in the city as entrepreneurs, while *social mobility* refers to the opportunity of individuals or groups to move upwards or the risk of descending the ‘social ladder’, such as with respect to jobs, income, status and power. *Governance* is seen as shorthand for a diversity of partnerships at different spatial and policy levels, with the aim to better govern complex problems.

**Relations between the concepts**

Figure 1.1 sketches the relations that are central in this project. In a nutshell the project aims at finding out how urban hyper-diversity (as defined above) influences three core issues: social cohesion, economic performance and social mobility. Will a diverse city or neighbourhood, for example with respect to ethnicity, foster social contacts (an aspect of social cohesion; see later) between different groups, or is the notion of parallel societies a more appropriate description? Will an area with a mix of low- and middle-income households lead to viable economic shopping facilities in the neighbourhood or in adjacent areas? Will the same mix lead to possibilities for people to find better jobs (social mobility)?

![Figure 1.1 Main conceptual relations of the project](image-url)
Social cohesion, economic performance and social mobility are not deterministically affected by hyper-diversity. Whereas positive and negative effects of diversity are influenced by policies and governance arrangements, these arrangements also have an effect on diversity (e.g. by immigration regulations or social mixing policies) and play a role in mediating the effects of diversity, such as through social cohesion, economic performance and social mobility? These and other questions will be answered in this project, so as to provide evidence for the range of social and socio-economic outcomes that may emerge from urban hyper-diversity and to document and highlight the significant role that urban policy and local urban governance arrangements can play in developing and stimulating those positive outcomes.

1.2 THE REST OF THE REPORT

This report offers a review of the literature pertaining to urban diversity and especially with respect to the concepts and relations we outlined above. The next chapter (chapter 2) of this report elaborates on the concept of hyper-diversity. It seeks the relevance of the standard literature on divided cities in the present-day debate of the hyper-diversification of cities. The chapter will also take a look at the literature on social polarisation, social inequality and spatial segregation and will try to link those with our three central concepts of social cohesion, social mobility and economic performance. Finally, this chapter will focus on some relatively new developments: the effects of globalisation, the literature on new mobilities, changing identities and citizenship and the effects of the economic crisis. All in all it will become clear from this chapter that diversity and the possible effects of diversity are influenced by a large number of issues and developments. Chapter 3 will elaborate on our three central concepts. Chapter 4 will be a summarising and concluding chapter.
2 RE-THINKING DIVERSITY

This chapter is about the literature on urban diversity. It starts with a critical overview of concepts used to describe diversities in societies in general and cities in particular (section 2.1). This section makes clear that cities are more diversified than ever before. Our contention is that in Europe cities are more than super-diversified, they are hyper-diversified. The implications of this view are immense. They change the way we have to look at cities, their neighbourhoods and their inhabitants. They will have to lead to new policies and governance arrangements in order to cope with these diversities and its effects. While the purpose of section 2.1 is to elaborate on our approach to diversity, the remainder of the chapter focuses on the many drivers that have led to increasingly complex and diverse cities.

In section 2.2 we will focus on the literature on two central concepts: social polarisation and social inequality. We will show that an increase of polarisation or inequality might influence social relations: growing differences between people may prevent them from having contact with each other. It may also lead to worse opportunities for social mobility, especially when the gap between rich and poor becomes too big.

Do polarisation and inequality lead to spatial segregation between different urban groups? Not necessarily, as will be stated in section 2.3. The relation between the social and the spatial is not fixed, nor the same in every place on earth. In this section we will briefly focus on the extensive literature on urban spatial segregation. We will show that this literature is interesting and relevant for a research project on urban diversity.

Much of the literature on urban spatial segregation is almost by definition focused on cities. It is important to note that in today's world enormous developments are taking place beyond these cities. Globalisation is one of these developments. The implications of globalisation for the functioning of cities, neighbourhoods and its inhabitants are outlined in section 2.4.

Section 2.5 focuses on two tendencies that for a significant number of people in Western cities ‘make the world larger’: the increasing importance of ICT and the growing importance of transnationalism. As a consequence of this, the role of local communities changes. The literature on new forms of mobility (section 2.6) expands on this: it proves that there is more than the local place and space: people move between many places and all of these places, even the travel time and mode between these places, can be important for an individual’s social life. Realising these different opportunities for social contact may drastically alter the effectiveness of policies (for example: local policies aimed at mixing groups may not be very effective for social
cohesion if individuals have their social contacts mainly outside the neighbourhoods) and may call for new types of policies.

The trends described in the sections 2.2 to 2.6 have implications for identities and feelings of belonging in EU cities and societies. In section 2.7 it will be argued that the assumption that community identities are territorially-based is outdated. Furthermore, the new challenges of how to govern an increasingly cosmopolitan and diverse city are stressed. In section 2.8 we will focus more specifically of immigration policies in Europe. Developments within these policies can influence massively the ‘rate’ of diversity in countries and cities. In section 2.9 we will try to find out how the present economic crisis changes the political context of urban diversity.

In section 2.10 we want to give the reader a general idea on how urban diversity is treated in urban and national policies. Later in the project we will go deeper into these policies and try to find out the advantages, drawbacks, success and fail factors of these policies, but here we only mention them as a kind of illustration of what comes next.

---

2.1 WORKING TOWARDS HYPER-DIVERSITY

As mentioned in the introduction to this report, many differences exist in cities with respect to lifestyles, attitudes and activities on top of the socio-economic, social and ethnic differences in urban society. Moreover, urban society is growing more diverse today not only because of growing numbers of new identities but also because identities are more complex and fluid than ever, and it is recognised more and more that people do not belong to a single identity (‘gay’, ‘black’, ‘Asian’, ‘Jewish’ or ‘disabled’) (Nathan, 2011). Migration is a key driver of growing diversity but not the only one (Nathan, 2011). Diversity is also about changing dynamics and patterns of behaviour, lifestyles, and activities in the life cycle of individuals, e.g. young people change jobs more frequently than their fathers, and this adds diversified experiences. Urban society, from this point of view, may even be more complex and dynamic than we ever thought.

Trying to conceptualise this dynamism and complexity, this section aims to elaborate on the hyper-diversity concept. Hyper-diversity, according to our understanding, refers to an intense diversification of the population, not only in socio-economic, social and ethnic terms, but also with respect to lifestyles, attitudes and activities. Urban society becomes so dynamic that some of the most used concepts to describe growing urban diversity do not suffice anymore. On top of the growing ethnic and cultural diversity, and changing lifestyles, attitudes and activities, there is also increasing status discrepancy in the society. It means that compared to the times that a person’s statuses (like income, education, job, and social origin) usually were in accordance with one another before, today this connection is much looser. This may influence their relation with others (neighbours, colleagues, acquaintances, etc.), and the definition of their action spaces.

Thus, standardised views that look at the ethnic or cultural background of an individual as a primary reason of failure or success (with a standard expectation of ‘integration’) may not be realistic today. Instead, considering the complexities and dynamism in the city, an individual's
success or failure in a city (or an area) may be affected by the possibilities this area provides him or her to develop relationships, businesses, lifestyles, new activities, etc. However, it is not easy to describe this complexity and dynamism with an umbrella concept using the existing conceptualisations, as they tend to exclude the relationship and interaction between a growing diversity of people and their spaces of action (places where they work, live, and do activities) in the city.

A **hyper-diversified city** contains increasingly changing forms of diversities. New forms of diversity, according to the literature, have been resulting from many factors including increasing net migration and diversification of countries of origin (Vertovec, 2007); increased level of population mobility (Syrett and Sepulveda, 2011; 2012); dynamic nature of global migration, new social formations in the city, and changing conditions and positions of immigrant and ethnic minority groups in the urban society (Vertovec, 2010); transnationally connected, socio-economically differentiated and legally stratified immigrants (Vertovec, 2007); new power and political structures, and dynamic identities (Cantle, 2012); increasing heterogeneity of migration in terms of countries of origin, ethnic and national groups, religions, languages, migratory channels, and legal status (Faist, 2009), etc. However, the major source of differentiations, re-hierarchisation, and geographical mobilisation, can be found in neoliberal deregulation, which has been feeding diversity in particular ways (economic globalisation, increasing income inequality, polarisation, segregation, etc.) for the last 30 years, contributing to the increasing complexities of the urban society.

Keeping this in mind, we want to highlight three dimensions of hyper-diversity: (1) it has a multi-layered character and goes beyond ethnicity and socio-economic differences (making concepts of multiculturalism or assimilation problematic); (2) it tackles the complexity of mutual interactions between the dimensions of diversity (such as intersectionality); (3) it relates to the action space of people (where they work, live and have diverse activities), not just to their residential space.

The current academic literature seems to tackle only partial aspects of increasing diversity in cities caused by migration; and usually disregard its relation to cities as Schiller and Caglar (2010) argue. This calls also for a greater attention for the social construction of hyper-diversity, which is largely missing in the literature. This section will flesh out some of the concepts that aim to tackle different dimensions of this complex urban diversity from different point of views, and compares their advantages and disadvantages in approaching urban diversity. The analysis is mainly founded on shortcomings of other conceptualisations of diversity – referring to some ethno-racial and policy-linked concepts – while the main argument here is that we conceive diversity in a broader sense, i.e. with more dimensions to cover the increasing diversity, complexity and dynamism in urban society. Hyper-diversity delves deeper than other concepts into socio-economic, socio-demographic, ethnic and cultural diversities.¹

---

¹ By socio-economic diversity we mean that rich and poor households, low-educated and high-educated persons live together in a city or neighborhood. Socio-demographic diversity means diversity in age and household composition. By ethnic diversity we refer to the mix between different ethnic (in many cases immigrant) groups and to the mix between minority ethnic groups and the host population. Cultural diversity refers to the coexistence of groups with different kinds of norms, values and goals.
Assimilation/neo-assimilation
Older notions of assimilation, as Faist (2009) reveals, emphasise the way in which migrants orient themselves to certain roles to fulfil the behavioural expectations of the ‘host society’. The classic assimilation approach makes a distinction between cultural and structural assimilation (Gordon, 1964). Cultural assimilation, or acculturation, refers to the adoption of the norms of values of the host society by the newcomers, while structural assimilation refers to the incorporation of migrants in the institutions of the host society (like labour market, politics, etc.). While the classic assimilation approach assumed that immigrant or ethnic groups become more similar to the host society over time in terms of norms, values, behaviours, and characteristics, the new assimilation approach, as Alba and Nee (2003) refine, stresses that the incorporation of immigrant groups also involves change and acceptance by the mainstream population (Brown and Bean, 2006). Thus, new assimilationism no longer assumes that there is a societal core to which migrants orient themselves (Faist, 2009). Yet, both versions of assimilation (a) approach diversity from a limited (ethnicity/immigration) perspective that aims to regulate the interaction between immigrants and hosts and (b) assume that cultural differences and networks of solidarity primordially cluster along ethnic lines. The advantage of the renewed neo-assimilation perspective is that diverse cultural backgrounds and needs of immigrants and other groups can be recognised by the national policy agenda.

The obvious disadvantage is that both assimilationism and neo-assimilationism require people to fulfil certain expectations, which increases ‘otherness’. Moreover, both concepts only highlight how the relationship between diverse groups should be systematised, but they cannot touch to other dimensions of a contemporary, complex and dynamic urban society (the multi-layered characteristics of individuals and groups, and their patterns of behaviour in their specific action space).

Multiculturalism/post-multiculturalism
The multiculturalism approach tries to ensure that cultural differences are dealt with by recognising them (Wieviorka, 2012), like in the case of Canada where multicultural differences are defined as a ‘vertical mosaic’ (Porter, 1965). In the words of Bellini et al. (2008), multiculturalism is ‘feel-good celebration of ethno-cultural diversity’, a policy discourse encouraging citizens to acknowledge and embrace each others’ multi-ethnic customs. The concept has however been criticised strongly not only because it stresses cultural differences without dealing with intercultural communication (Amin, 2002), but also because it ignores issues of economic and political inequality, reinforces power inequalities and cultural restrictions within minority groups and fosters accentuated or preserved cultural differences (Kymlicka, 2010). Some blame the term multiculturalism for entrenching social divisions and even for creating the breeding ground for extremism (see Meer and Modood, 2012; Vertovec, 2010). Thus a broad backlash against multiculturalism has emerged in the public discourse (Vertovec and Wessendorf, 2010), not only because of the challenge of emphasising differences in society, but also because older models of multiculturalism are challenged by the changing conditions such as the changing nature of global migration, new social formations spanning nation-states and persistently poor immigrant and ethnic minority groups (Vertovec, 2010).
Although some do not share the critique that multiculturalism ignores economic and political inequality (Kymlicka, 2010), others believe in post-multicultural policy models that will celebrate diversity, foster social capital, and reduce socio-economic inequality while limiting new immigration and promoting national identity to move away from the socially disintegrative effects of the multiculturalism discourse (Vertovec, 2010). Thus, post-multiculturalism emerges as a policy discourse that acknowledges diversity while keeping a strong national identity with policy measures to impose values of the ‘host country’ with integration courses, compulsory language courses, citizenship exams, etc. However, Vertovec (2010) emphasises that the post-multiculturalism approach involves high levels of respect for diversity in many places. Post-multiculturalism accommodates emergent migration trends leading towards conditions of ‘super-diversity’ (Vertovec, 2010). Thus, post-multiculturalism addresses characteristics of urban diversity that are based on ethnicity and cultural identities of mainly immigrants. Although recognition of diverse identities is perceived as a negative approach by some scholars, as this may emphasise the differences and cause further fragmentation of the society, Vertovec’s super-diversity approach (2007, 2010) brings a new dimension to the discussion as we will discuss later.

The advantage of the post-multiculturalism approach is that it brings the individual identities out of the broad and standard categories (black, Muslim, Asian, etc) defined by the public discourse and policy. The disadvantage of the concept is that it does not offer a variety of discourses to deal with new diversities in urban society. Post-multiculturalism highlights separate ethnic and cultural identities within immigrant groups, but only with a more positive attitude (i.e. celebrating diversity, fostering social capital, etc). Multiculturalism or post-multiculturalism are policy-linked concepts that deal with the multi-layered character of the urban society, and with the mutual interactions between diverse groups. However, they do not touch other kinds of urban diversities related to lifestyles, attitudes and activities, and do not touch the evidence of cleavages within groups, that are too often seen as ‘reified’. Another disadvantage is that the definition of ‘strong national identity’ seems to be unrealistic, as it neglects diversities within the ‘host society’ and creates a new set of policy discourses that assume to serve for an ideal national identity.

**Interculturality**

Different from multiculturalism and its versions, the term ‘intercultural’ is used to stress cultural dialogue (Amin, 2002, p. 967). Moreover, unlike the ‘static and bounded’ description of multiculturalism, interculturalism looks at identity as ‘dynamic and transitory’ (Nathan, 2011; Cantle, 2012). Interculturalism provides an inter-disciplinary (structural and relational) understanding of diversity by addressing conceptual issues like national and global/international drivers of difference; new power and political structures; identity as a dynamic concept; ‘race’ and recognition of all other forms of difference (Cantle, 2012). These, in combination with the cross-cultural interaction, are seen as essential characteristics of a conceptual framework to address greater diversity.

Meer and Moodod (2012) bring interculturalism upfront of the policy discourse especially concerning the international institutional approach to diversity by organisations like the
European Commission, the Council of Europe or UNESCO. They argue that interculturalism contrasts multiculturalism, which emphasises strong ethnic or cultural identities at the expense of wider cultural exchanges. Interculturalism is used here in relation to cultural diversity, with the argument that cultural diversity and social pluralism are of intrinsic value because they challenge people to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of their own cultures and ways of life.

Meer and Modood (2012) define four main characteristics of interculturalism: intercultural dialogue and communication; formation of interdependent personal identities that go beyond nations or simplified ethnicities or closed communities; stronger sense of national identity, and social cohesion; and the capacity to criticise and censure culture to emphasise the protection of individual rights. Having these capacities and abilities, the interculturalism approach is expected to give rise to diverse languages, ethnicities and religions to cut across each other and co-exist without creating isolated/segregated communities and groups. Thus, while the multiculturalism concept involves the idea of co-existence, interculturalism emphasises the importance of dialogue and interaction (Anthias, 2013).

Wieviorka (2012) criticises interculturalism for being vague and less policy orientated as, he argues, it only proposes to connect cultures with each other while multiculturalism is also concerned with setting up a legal and institutional framework enabling each culture. On the contrary, Cantle (2012) argues, interculturalism suggests that increasing cross-cultural interaction has to be facilitated and supported. According to Cantle (2012) interculturalism is likely to be much more readily accepted at a popular level due to its positive approach towards ‘inter-dependency’, ‘integration’ and ‘internationalism’. Interculturalism underlines the importance of interaction between diverse groups, which is a great advantage for social cohesion. Also the perception of ‘identity as a dynamic concept’ is an important aspect that contributes to the conceptualisation of hyper-diversity. However, the interculturalism approach is not clear about how the link between these diverse identities can be established and how cultural interchange can be motivated. Moreover, there is a lack of acknowledgement for the multi-layered characteristics of individuals.

Intersectionality
Different than multiculturalism and interculturalism, intersectionality deals with heterogeneity and inclusion by considering the ‘complex nature of belonging and social hierarchy’ (Anthias, 2013). Intersectionality has its roots in research on inequality (Crenshaw, 1989), and was first raised in the frame of the ‘black feminism’ in US, with an accent on domination and oppression cutting through race, gender and class (Collins, 2000).

Intersectionality tries to catch the relationships between socio-cultural categories and identities, and analyses how these categories intertwine (Knudsen, 2005). According to McCall (2005, p. 8) intersectionality has been “… enormously effective in challenging the singularity, separateness, and wholeness of a wide range of social categories”. So, it does not focus on the immigrant and ethnic ‘other’ unlike the other concepts, but looks at multiple social identities and relationships mutually influencing each other. The intersectionality theory studies how diverse categories such as gender, race, class, ability, sexual orientation, and other axes of identity interact on multiple and often simultaneous levels, contributing to systematic social inequality. Intersectionality
comprehends social diversity by looking at positions and locations of diverse groups who crosscut ethnic boundaries with dialogue and negotiation (Anthias, 2013).

**Intersectionality** is a useful term in relation to the *hyper-diversity* approach and quite close to what we want to underline by it, as it refuses to locate identities in terms of one parameter of difference and identity, but requires considering class and gender processes and those of other social categories and divisions such as sexuality, age and disability (Anthias, 2013). As a policy term, it recognises the global nature of social bonds and interests and the need to move away from an ethnocentric and national based lens for achieving inclusion and social justice. One of the advantages of this term is that dealing with a greater diversity it proposes to add other constructions of difference and identity, particularly around gender and class to the definition of diversities (Anthias, 2002). For the *hyper-diversity* approach it is a very interesting and relevant term to understand the complexity of intertwined identities in a complex urban society (Anthias, 2002).

**Superdiversity and beyond**

Super-diversity, without a doubt, opened new perspectives in understanding diversity. Vertovec was inspired by multi-ethnic arenas of interaction (Lamphere, 1992; Sanjek, 1998); by hyper-segregation or the simultaneous impact of numerous dimensions of ethnic residential concentration (Massey and Denton, 1989); by minorities’ ‘multilayered experience’ within unequal power structures and social locations (Harzig and Juteau, 2003); and by notions of pluralism that take into account differential rights and modes of incorporation among ethnic groups (Kuper and Smith, 1969). Vertovec (2010) listed the characteristics of super-diversity in the case of Britain as countries of origin, languages, religions, migration channels and immigration statuses, gender, and age. He also highlights the importance of characteristics such as ethnicity, religion, class and social status within any group of country of origin; cultural or political affiliations; immigrants’ channels of migration; transnational practices of immigrants; belonging, loyalty and sense of attachment; differential demands on public resources; multiple category identities; interactions between different migrant and ethnic minority groups; and smaller and less-organised groups. These are all indicators to show that there is diversity within a group of immigrants that may seem to belong to one category.

Vertovec (2007) defines two groups of challenges that the concept of super-diversity brings about. First are social scientific challenges such as the increasing need to understand some new areas such as new patterns of inequality and prejudice; new patterns of segregation; new experiences of space and contact; new forms of cosmopolitanism and creolisation; new bridgeheads of migration; secondary migration patterns; transnationalism (how migrants’ lives are lived with significant reference to places and people elsewhere, and to what extent they bring experiences across borders); integration; methodological innovation; and research-policy nexus. The second group of challenges are policy challenges such as the need to explore the impacts of super-diversity in community organisations, and public service delivery.

Vertovec’s description of super-diversity (Vertovec, 2007) gets somewhat closer to our understanding of hyper-diversity, but it also differs from it. The limitation of Vertovec’s super-diversity compared to the *hyper-diversity* concept is that it is based on the complex
contemporary immigrant-based urban diversity. Super-diversity can be distinguished by “... dynamic interplay of variables among an increased number of new, small and scattered, multiple-origin, transnationally connected, socio-economically differentiated and legally stratified immigrants who have arrived over the last decade” (Vertovec, 2007, p. 1024). He uses ‘super’ to refer to the dynamic interplay between these new, less-organised and dynamic immigrant groups. He emphasises the need to see diversity not only in terms of ethnicity and underlines additional variables that are brought by these new, less-organised immigrant communities on already diversified complex social environments. These variables include differential immigrant communities and their associated entitlements and restrictions of rights; divergent labour market experiences; discrete gender and age profiles; patterns of spatial distribution; and mixed local area responses by service providers and residents. These small, less-organised, non-citizen diversified groups, Vertovec argues, radically transformed the social landscape in Britain (p. 1028).

Vertovec's spatial emphasis in this social landscape is quite broad and limited to new patterns of segregation (spatial dispersion of new immigrant groups, new concentration patterns, etc.), and to new experiences of space and ‘contact’. Saunders (2011), who focuses also on new, less-organised immigrant communities, uses a more geographical conceptualisation of ‘super-diversity’ compared to Vertovec, by showing how these kinds of groups are being attracted to specific places where migrant communities can already be found; and how these places, despite their physical limitations and lack of infrastructure, allow diverse groups to socially and economically become part of the larger urban community. Saunders (2011) also highlights that success and failure of these people has to do with its physical form (layouts of streets and buildings, the transportation links to the economic and cultural core of the city, the direct access to the street from buildings, the proximity to the schools, health centres and social services, the availability of high density of housing, the presence of parks and neutral public spaces, the space availability to open a shop, etc).

In our study we aim to look into urban societies whose social landscape is being transformed by the new hyper-diversity of communities (and individuals). Like Vertovec, we are not only focusing on ethnicity; and we also consider multiple factors that have an impact on an increasingly complex urban diversity. However, unlike Vertovec, we are not only focusing on the new, less-organised immigrant communities but on a wider scope of a diversity that includes different lifestyles within and between groups, and spatial segregation in terms of ethnicity and socio-economic variables as well including trends in the native population, and their impact on the relationships with newcomers.

Key implications
We argue that we are in need of a new concept that is able to describe the new and growing diversity of cities. We argue that in present cities diversity is more than ethnic, socio-economic, age and gender differences and diversities of immigrants. People differ from each other not only because of these standard variables, but because they carry with them different values, norms, ideas and identities, which intersect in plural ways between and within groups and categories that are normally acknowledged in the public discourse.
Urban (residential/social) diversity is more than immigration and new dimensions should be added to comprehend the complex urban diversities. Moreover, we argue, diverse lifestyles, attitudes and activities and relationships between individuals and diverse groups should be taken into account when describing urban diversity.

Hyper-diversity acknowledges that people belonging to the same population or ethnic group may show quite different attitudes in the workplace, school, or at home towards other groups; and they may have very different daily and lifetime routines that should be taken into account. This altogether leads to people carrying out very different types of activities, some of them using the home as the main place to be, some using the street as their focal point, some using the city as the place to be and some using the whole world, by contacting their families and friends through the internet. We now live in societies in which the traditional categories only just explain a little of how people act and what people’s chances in society are. This hyper-diversity calls for new policy views, new arrangements, new thoughts on how and where to carry out which policies. Neighbourhood oriented policies will not work if people have a city-wide orientation, for example.

With our hyper-diversity concept we also include the diversification of lifestyles, attitudes and activities and we acknowledge that the different categories people belong to (e.g. in terms of class or immigrant groups) have less and less predictive power on these issues. In other words, people with the same characteristics, as post-multiculturalists argue, may have very different orientations, values, and activity patterns. As we explained in the previous chapter, the basic idea of the DIVERCITIES-project is that hyper-diversity can be perceived as an asset and that under the right circumstances it may positively affect social cohesion, economic performance and social mobility. In chapter 3 we will elaborate on the effects of diversity. In the remainder of this chapter, we will focus on the various drivers of the increasing diversity and complexity of urban society.

2.2 SOCIAL POLARISATION AND SOCIAL INEQUALITY

In this section the existing literature on social polarisation and inequality will be briefly reviewed. Both concepts can be seen as basic ingredients of the socio-economic dimension of urban diversity.

On a macro-level, economic developments may lead to social polarisation and social inequality. Social polarisation can be defined as an increase of people or households with a high income together with an increase of people with low incomes and a simultaneous decrease of the middle or median-income groups. The image of an hourglass is often associated with this development. Instead of income, also education can be used as a central variable. Social polarisation can then be seen as a process of growing numbers of higher and lower educated people. Social polarisation can also be defined in terms of the social class structure: an increase of upper
Towards Hyper-Diversified European Cities

and lower classes, at the expense of the middle classes, or as an increase in disparities in social protection. This ‘insider/outsider’ polarisation refers to the widening gap between those with a stable job and a good social protection, and those without a job or a very insecure one, which provides no or hardly social benefits in case one loses that job (Prattschke and Morlicchio, 2012). Studying the Paris Region, Preteceille (2012) shows a movement of ‘bipolarisation’: workers have decreased in numbers, but the less skilled, less paid and more unstable groups have increased.

Social inequality can simply be defined as a situation in which those with the highest incomes earn more and more money, while those with the lowest incomes earn less and less. However, the situation may also be more complex: people or households may even see their incomes rise, but at the same time they witness a higher rise of those with higher incomes. But also in such a situation there is a growing distance between low- and high-income groups. This is the key of inequality: a growing distance between groups.

Income inequality is increasing in Europe: “Socio-economic inequalities have increased in the EU and are higher today than in 1980. This increase has happened during a period of economic growth. Economic modernisation and labour market deregulation has resulted in employment polarisation and widening earnings inequalities that have not been offset by social transfers or other policies” (European Commission, 2010, p. 44). This increasing social inequality may have negative social outcomes. An overview of Wilkinson and Pickett (2007) shows that inequality is associated with mortality, mental illness, low trust, low social capital, hostility, and racism. This is, at least partly, due to the psychosocial stress of relative deprivation. Wilkinson and Pickett also show evidence that inequality is associated with a poor educational performance and a low social mobility. In other words, bigger income differences seem to solidify the social structure.

Not everybody is convinced that social polarisation and inequality can be seen as a logical result of present economic developments. The British urban geographer Chris Hamnett (1994) has shown that, in the Netherlands in the beginning of the 1990s, a process of polarisation could not be proven. He used the concept of professionalisation, meaning that a society is increasingly populated by people with a high level of education and relatively high incomes, while the middle-income and deprived groups become less important in terms of numbers. This is a kind of one-sided form of polarisation. Hamnett was however heavily criticised by the Dutch sociologist Jack Burgers, who asserted that Hamnett did not include people without a job in his calculations (Burgers, 1996).

The sociologist Loïc Wacquant has stated that an economic recession has many more negative effects on those with lower incomes than on the more prosperous. He also asserted that an economic boom would not always lead to positive effects for those at the bottom of society (Wacquant, 1996). Social polarisation and inequality are thus not automatically resolved by positive economic developments. The processes of international capital accumulation, social polarisation, and social exclusion are not mutually exclusive. On the contrary, they often come
Towards Hyper-Diversified European Cities

Together, as for example Oosterlynck and Swyngedouw (2010) recently described for the city of Brussels. On the basis of a research project with case studies in many British cities, Boddy and Parkinson (2004) also conclude that the competitive success of a city does not eliminate inequality and concentrated disadvantage. In this context, London is an interesting case. In terms of economic growth, it is the most successful region of the UK, but at the same time it is characterised by a high level of inequality and child poverty (Perrons, 2012). The same situation can also be noticed in the Paris Region where the whole county of Seine-Saint-Denis, an old industrial area in the North, is characterised by a high level of economic growth but also a high level of poor inhabitants and a concentration of disadvantaged neighbourhoods.

The thought that economic development or economic growth automatically resolves all social problems seems, therefore, to be a myth. There are no automatic relationships; economic growth is no guarantee of positive social developments. On the other hand, we should not forget that, without positive economic developments, problems in cities expressed in terms of unemployment and welfare dependency may easily increase. Conversely: economic growth still generates jobs and revenues for a city and social objectives are probably better served in a successful local economy.

Key implications

When investigating urban diversity, social polarisation and social inequality can be seen as two key concepts: they are essential ingredients of urban diversity. It should however also be noted that polarisation and inequality do not give more than a broad indication of the state of the nation or the city and that outcomes are always geographically variable. The relation between polarisation and inequality on the one hand and the way inhabitants of cities and neighbourhoods handle their lives on the other hand is never an automatic one and cannot be assumed to take on generalisable forms. In this project we will find out how polarised and unequal cities have become and how residents and entrepreneurs in these cities cope with these changing circumstances.

2.3 DIVIDED CITIES AND SEGREGATION

The concept of the divided city is at the heart of the discourse on urban diversity. Western cities have variously been described as divided cities (Fainstein et al., 1992), dual cities (Mollenkopf and Castells, 1991), polarised cities (Sassen, 1991), fragmented cities (Burgers, 2002) and partitioned cities (Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2002). All these concepts refer to the same basic issue: cities consist, almost by definition, of various neighbourhoods, each with their own

---

2 They quote the following figures: the region of Brussels (Brussels Hoofdstedelijk Gewest) is the third richest region of Europe in terms of gross regional product (GRP). This GRP is 2.48 percent higher than the European mean. Nevertheless, one fifth of the inhabitants of Brussels still lives in poverty, one fifth is unemployed, and 24 percent of the dwellings are in bad condition. Oosterlynck and Swyngedouw (2010) call Brussels a hot-spot of strong economic growth as well as one of bleak socio-economic deprivation.
functions, character, architectural styles, attractions, and advantages and disadvantages for various residents and visitors.

It might be obvious to make a clear connection between a polarised and unequal society on the one hand and a divided city on the other: if a society is divided, urban space must also be divided. However, this is not always the case. It is not necessarily so that social polarisation and social inequality will be translated in spatial separations. Rich and poor do not always live in separated neighbourhoods, they even might live in a quite mixed situation. In fact, this may even be a deliberate policy: creating mixed communities has been a popular policy in a number of European countries, such as the UK and the Netherlands. So we have to be careful: countries and cities with a large or increasing polarisation or inequality may not automatically show strong urban spatial segregation (Fujita and Hill, 2012; Domínguez et al., 2012).

However, spatial segregation does exist in European cities. Although European cities are in general spatially less segregated than American cities (Kazepov, 2005; Van Kempen, 2005), population groups are spatially unequally divided within many European cities: some neighbourhoods contain an overwhelming majority of a certain group (for example: almost only low-income households or only a certain minority ethnic group), while other neighbourhoods may show an enormous mix between groups in a social, socio-economic, ethnic and cultural sense.

Spatial segregation has been on the urban research agenda since the 1920s and it has never left it. For many cities in the Western world articles were written about segregation and concentration of incomes and minority ethnic groups were determined and charted. The classical works are well known to urban geographers and sociologists: Shevky and Bell (1955); Duncan and Duncan (1957); Taeuber and Taeuber (1965); Peach (1975); Lieberson (1981); Clark (1986); Massey and Denton (1989); etc.

A large Western European literature on segregation, concentration, and divided cities has developed in the last two decades or so (e.g. Giffinger and Reeger, 1997; Friedrichs, 1998; Phillips, 2007; Musterd, 2005; Musterd and Ostendorf, 1998; Preteceille, 2000; Bolt et al., 2002; Kazepov, 2005; Van Kempen, 2005; Stillwell and Phillips, 2006; Bolt et al., 2008; Musterd and Van Kempen, 2009; Pan Ke Shon, 2010; Maloutas and Fujita, 2012; Preteceille, 2012). Segregation research in the USA continued, with Logan et al. (2002); Ellis et al. (2007); and Massey et al. (2005) as a few examples. Compared with Western Europe and the United States, research into spatial segregation is less pervasive in Central and East European countries although, particularly after the political transformations of the early 1990s, some authors have produced interesting accounts of the changing patterns of segregation in those countries (e.g. Kovács (1998) and Ladanyi (2002) for Hungary; Šykora (1999) for the Czech Republic; Ruopilla (2005) for Estonia; and Marcińczak et al. (2012) for Poland). In the last decade, all over the world segregation research has focused also on gated communities and ethnic enclaves (e.g. Jałowiecki and Łukowski (2007) for Poland; Hirt (2012) for Bulgaria; Yip (2012) for Shanghai).
Studies that focus on urban spatial segregation are valuable because they draw attention to patterns of segregation and concentration of various groups and to the causes of these patterns. Typically, these publications include maps indicating the spatial concentrations of selected groups in certain neighbourhoods. Those maps allow comparisons between cities (we can for example see if a certain group is concentrated more in one city than another), and sometimes comparisons over time. In general these articles also some measures of segregation are presented, like the Index of Dissimilarity or the Isolation Index.

However, for a study on the hyper-diversity of cities, there are also some problems with the literature on divided cities and urban spatial segregation. Most of these studies are based on rather broad categories, such as low-income groups, Turks in Cologne or Brussels, Moroccans in Amsterdam or Rotterdam, Indians in London or Birmingham, etc. Most of these studies do not make further differentiations, with respect to for example age, gender and household composition. Moreover, and even more important, results of segregation studies are based on the place where people reside. This particular issue: that where people live is actually a very important issue in the lives of these people, can be challenged more and more, as will be shown later in this chapter. We do not state here that neighbourhoods are unimportant in the lives of people, but we do think that they may be less important than is implied in segregation studies.

Key implications
There are without doubt clear and interesting results emerging from research into the segregation and concentration of different groups. Such studies do give basic ideas about spatial divisions of particular urban groups. But there are some problems. These studies draw on broad categories, and pay insufficient attention to the further subdivision of groups. Moreover, because data in such studies are based on where people have their residence, they only give a limited view on the spatial diversity of the urban realm. While segregation patterns in themselves can tell us a great deal about the housing market and its differentiation and inequalities, more sophisticated research is needed to shed light on the social consequences of these patterns. Hyper-diversity, the crucial concept in the DIVERCITIES programme, is definitely not a central concept in segregation studies.

2.4 BEYOND GLOBALISATION

Globalisation is an important concept to understand the drivers of increasing urban diversity, and policy challenges like social polarisation, exclusion, inequality, and segregation in contemporary cities. A couple of statements should be made in this section about the possible effects of globalisation on diversity. On the one hand, it can strengthen diversity bringing all different sorts of people together, enhancing global mobility of people, etc. But, on the other hand, it also works against diversity with lifestyles becoming uniform (e.g. residential preferences of the affluent are increasingly dominated by the wish to live in gated communities).
This section explores some of the changing contexts of globalisation in which understandings of urban diversity and policy debates on divided cities are now being framed. It highlights some of the shifting understandings and processes of contemporary globalisation and their implications for urban change and urban policy interventions in EU cities. The section begins by exploring some of the key debates over globalisation and its impacts on political systems. It then points to some of the key implications for urban populations and some of the new challenges now faced by territorially-bounded institutions. At this point the question should be posed whether globalisation as a complex process has brought revolutionary change in the development of cities and city-regions and whether globalisation as a concept has provided a different point of reference to the way this development is perceived. As Massey (2005, p. 83) puts it: “Globalisation is not a single all-embracing movement … It is a making of space(s), an active reconfiguration and meeting-up through practices and relations of a multitude of trajectories”. The notion of global space provides an imaginative picture of barrier-less and open space, taking the place of modernity’s view of space which was divided-up and bound.

Processes of globalisation have intensified and changed markedly since the 1990s when academic and policy debates raged over the extent to which globalisation and the fall of the Berlin Wall represented an ‘end of history’ and a qualitatively ‘new epoch’ (see Scholte, 2003; Castells, 1998; Fukuyama, 1998; Friedmann, 1999; Hirst and Thompson, 1999). A growing number of sociological and political writers now see globalisation as a process that has brought about profound changes and ushered in a new era of modernity. It is argued that the contexts within which debates over urban diversity are framed have been subject to increasingly rapid social, political, cultural and economic changes and that commonly-held conceptions of post-WWII norms and certainties no longer hold true (see Urry, 2011). For Beck (2000) this can be characterised as a shift from a ‘first phase of modernity’ dominated by nation-state centred politics and industrial production to a ‘second phase’ founded on globalisation, post-industrial economic activity, and shifting and increasingly complex forms of identity politics (see also Appiah, 2005; Held, 2005). With the decline of manufacturing industry and the rise of new technologies, the political subjectivities of collective class politics on which Keynesian welfare systems were organised have undergone profound changes in most western countries. This is undermining some of the assumptions that have shaped political debates for decades.

Since the late 1990s, the situation has been further complicated by the rise of BRIC-economies and other countries across the Global South which has changed the dynamics of globalisation (Dicken, 2011; Gammeltoft et al., 2010; OECD, 1997; European Commission, 1999; ULB, 2008). Global demographics are changing with growing pressure for immigration and population flows into the EU. At the same time the creation of an integrated European economy and labour market under the Maastricht Treaty 1992 has enabled the free movement of EU citizens between Member States. This has effectively created a different regime for EU migrants and non-EU migrants, and established new boundaries between the included and the excluded. The former possess employment rights and in some cases entitlement to welfare. The latter often find themselves excluded from formal work and are often pushed to the margins of
legal status and residency. Furthermore, the EU itself has contributed significantly to increased globalisation; by doing away with national barriers it has reinforced or produced ‘globalisation’ in Europe; at the same time as it acts as it has established new barriers between EU nation-states and the rest of the world.

For Giddens (2004) there are also other effects. Globalisation, it is claimed, has brought about qualitatively new forms of collective risk in which societies and even the whole human species face the prospect of a deteriorating quality of life (see also Beck, 1992; 1998). New issues such as climate change, shifts in population demographics, and post-industrialisation, it is claimed, now require the mobilisation of very different political agendas in Europe and beyond (Giddens, 2009). These problems are not confined to specific bounded territories or places but are much more relational in form and require governance ‘solutions’ that go beyond territorial boundaries. Old-fashioned, territorial, and welfare-based modes of intervention are undermined by the fundamental shifts associated with the second phase of modernity and their overwhelming influence on the possibilities and limitations of traditionally-organised modes of government. A new post-politics, it is argued, is emerging in which old Left/Right distinctions have been put to one side and the emphasis has shifted to a more consensus-based, output-oriented politics. This has implications for thinking on urban policy and diversity, both of which may be increasingly focused on the perceived need to reduce sources of conflict over competing policy priorities and to limit discussions to what ‘works’ and what can be managed and delivered in a non-confrontational and ‘political’ way.

It is a mode of thinking that has had a profound effect on the politics of social change in the 1990s and 2000s. For those of the political left, it provided an opportunity to modernise political systems and governmentalities so that, in Giddens’ words, a new Third Way politics could be established that “… stands firmly in the traditions of social democracy – it is social democracy, brought up to date and made relevant to a rapidly changing world” (Giddens, 2002, p. 78; see also Blair and Schröder, 2000; Giddens, 2004). Politics becomes re-defined as a vehicle for overcoming, what Blair (2010) termed, the ‘forces of conservatism’ in society who want to preserve outdated class distinctions and ways of thinking. It should, instead, become output-centred and focused not on conflict but on new forms of agreed consensus that in Pangia’s (2003) terms represents “… a kind of censoring that limits the forms of sensible experiences in any given situation” (p. 2). It is a form of censoring that is inevitable and helps to create new forms of effective political intervention that is not weighed-down by ideological burdens and partial ways of viewing the world. A Third Way centred view of globalisation thereby involves “… a dismissal of politics as a polemical configuration of the common world (…) a good way of appeasing archaic conflicts by appeasing politics itself” (Rancière, 2006, paragraph 7). In Dean’s (2007, p. 6) terms, this is supposed to generate a “… flatter, more participatory kind of ordering of human existence in which new individuals and not social or national identity would matter”. Diversity in this context becomes equated with multiculturalism in which individuals identify with their own biographically-based identities and form multiple collectivities of interest (based on things such as sexuality, ethnicity and the like).
Towards Hyper-Diversified European Cities

Such views of rampant globalisation, or what Giddens (2002) terms a ‘runaway world’, have, however, increasingly been challenged by sceptical authors on both the Left and Right. For Bourdieu (2003, p. 85) this conception of globalisation represents a pseudo-concept or a way of thinking that is ‘at once descriptive and prescriptive’. It seems to describe social realities and provide ready-made explanations for the existence and reproduction of contemporary forms of politics and economics. Its focus on the ‘inevitability’ of change prescribes a coherent set of policy interventions that are necessary and unavoidable (see also: Latour, 2004; Paddison, 2010). For example, it is claimed that post-industrial labour markets have become dominated by a process of professionalisation as more and more workers now work in managerial jobs than was the case in the past.

From another point of view, as May et al.’s (2007) research in London so powerfully demonstrates, the existence of new creative and productive (middle) classes in the city has evolved alongside an expansion of low paid occupations, many of which are taken by new migrants. This, the authors contend, constitutes a new migrant division of labour in many cities in which migrants workers play a broad role in keeping the city’s economy working. These workers are often employed on so-called trash job contracts, endure relatively low wages and costs and their labour is vital to the maintenance of even the most complex and professional economic sectors. Such workers rarely, if ever, feature in contemporary discourses of ‘competitive places’ and ‘creative economies’, yet no city or society could function without them. Greater recognition of their role would focus more attention on their direct and indirect (but nonetheless vital) contributions to the economic base of even the most ‘globally-oriented’ cities. It would also draw attention to their wider needs, the neighbourhoods in they live, and broader questions over social cohesion and social and spatial justice. The danger of post-political discourses is that they can shift attention away from sources of conflict over diversity and downplay the links between ethnicity, identity, and the class-based politics of inequality. Whilst the emphasis of much post-political writing has been on the growing similarities of lived experiences, recent decades have also been characterised by reduced social mobility and growing income and life-chance inequalities.

This growing polarisation is having spatial effects on patterns of urban development. For Douglass (2012) we are seeing the rise of new forms of ‘enclave urbanism’ or ‘globopolises’ in which new powerful economic elites live in exclusive and increasingly gated and gentrified parts of cities. The global economy has created new super-elites consisting of a tiny number of staggeringly wealthy individuals at the same time as wages for the majority of workers in the Global North have either stagnated or fallen since the mid-1970s. The lives of these individuals are often disconnected from everyday life in the cities in which they live. Savage et al. (2005) show that few have deep social connections in their host cities. They live their lives in routines that are disconnected from other groups. Their gentrified housing developments become lucrative sources of wealth accumulation for property developers when then lobby for yet more developments in the name of urban ‘regeneration’ and ‘renewal’. The character of neighbourhoods is transformed, with poorer residents often priced out. These divisions have,
if anything, been exacerbated by the financial crisis with a new gulf appearing between the richest and poorest. Thus despite the credit crunch, exclusive, top-end property in many cities has continued to soar in value. Again London provides the EU’s most extreme example with research by Knight Frank (2013) showing that prime central London property has increased by 53% in value between March 2009-January 2013, fuelled by overseas investments in luxury property. Similar trends towards ‘enclave urbanism’ are happening in cities and countries across the world (see Douglass et al., 2012; Wu, 2012).

And this raises a wider question: to what extent do economic developments influence the existence and the character of divided cities? Despite the dialectic linkages between the economic, spatial, and social developments, some relationships are fairly clear (see also van Kempen, 2006). The marked increase of transnational enterprises has sharpened competition on the housing markets of the cities in which these enterprises have located themselves. Higher prices of houses and premises, which in their turn caused a blow out (see Harvey, 1973) of low-income households, lead to a relocation of companies to lower-priced, more accessible areas outside the central city in suburbs, edge cities, and boomburbs (Knox and Pinch, 2006). Within many cities, areas have emerged which are the exclusive domain of the (super)rich. Marcuse (1997) refer to these areas as citadels: gated, protected, and isolated areas, which are only accessible to those who live there. Blakely and Snyder (1997) refer to gated communities. According to these authors, people choose to live here because they look for status, protection or privacy and for areas accommodating ‘people who are just like us’. These developments are not yet typical of European cities, but are of growing importance in countries such as the United States, South Africa, Brazil, India, and Thailand.

Key implications
The intensification of globalisation processes during the 1990s and 2000s has shifted the scale and character of socio-economic changes in cities and created new problems and challenges for policy-makers and citizens. The institutional tools and capacities of territorially-bounded urban and national state structures have been weakened by these processes, at the same time as new challenges have emerged, thus creating a ‘governance deficit’ in many cities. This is having a significant impact on urban policy with new forms of polarisation, segregation, and inequality emerging at the same time as policy-makers find themselves less and less able to take control of these developments.

2.5 AN EXPANDING WORLD

In this section we will pay attention to two specific issues that make the living world of urban residents larger. ICT-developments give people the opportunity to make contacts with people everywhere in the world, thereby possibly reducing the importance of local communities and neighbourhood. Transnationalism leads to the same: partly because of the ICT-developments, migrants are increasingly able to live in a number of worlds simultaneously: in the local
community where they presently live, but at the same time with strong bonds with their communities of origin.

The increasing importance of ICT

The influence of telecommunication is increasing in importance as a means of maintaining and making contacts. Many studies (e.g. Castells, 2000; Mokhtarian et al., 2006; Schwanen et al., 2006) have focused on this interrelationship. The Internet with all its communication possibilities and the development of various communication devices, like smartphones and tablets, allow people to maintain relationships with others at a distance quite easily, creating alternatives to social relationships with neighbours (Wellman, 2001). As Barney Warf puts it: “Electronic communications form a fundamental part of the growth of post-Fordist production regimes around the world and have contributed to a massive, planet-wide round of time-space compression that has reconfigured the structure of social relations and the rhythms of everyday life” (Warf, 2001, p. 319). Moreover, due to costless and unlimited opportunities social media do not only become the most widespread instrument of communication, but also a means for democratic society, especially when objective media resources are not available (like in the social resistance movements in Egypt, Syria and Turkey).

Thanks to information technology, people do not need to use the street, the shopping centre or the neighbourhood so much. The warning that the Internet damages communities seems to be supported by a few empirical studies that have shown that Internet use is negatively associated with the size of a social circle (Kraut et al., 1998) and the frequency of attending community events (Nie and Erbring, 2000). In short, the neighbourhood is becoming less important as a place of activity. At the same time, however, we should be careful with too quick conclusions. Stephen Graham warns us that the view that the relevance of places and spaces disappears as a consequence of ICT-developments is too limited. Rather he sees co-evolutionary processes, linking developments in information technologies to space, place and human territoriality. Because of the new technologies and the development of more and more interactive spaces many people do have the opportunity to be more open to de-localised experiences and contacts, at the same time these people continue to have physical and localised existences (Graham, 1998). People surf their networks online and offline (Wellman, 2001).

Transnationalism

Transnationalism can be defined as the process by which immigrants forge and sustain relationships that link together their societies of origin and present settlement (Glick-Schiller et al., 1995). These immigrants’ daily lives depend on multiple and constant interconnections across international borders (see also Basch et al., 1994). Deborah Phillips asserted recently that transnationalism is one of the big issues with respect to immigrant settlement in Western countries: “We can no longer assume that minority ethnic families are a localised unit, set on a trajectory of assimilation into the nation state in which they are living. Rather, families are increasingly likely to maintain transnational connections, which complicate the link between place of residence and ideas of local and national belonging” (Phillips, 2007, p. 1142).
The idea that a member of a minority ethnic family lives in a house, in a particular neighbourhood, and has no contact with anyone living further than one street away does not apply to many of these families. Usually, the family has friends in other streets and other neighbourhoods. Some members of the larger family circle may live in another city elsewhere in the country. Many friends and family members may still live in the (former) home country and intensive contacts may be held through phone calls, email, Skype, WhatsApp, and annual family visits exchanging experiences and ideas and having fun together.\(^3\) Ehrkamp and Leitner (referring also to Glick-Schiller et al., 1995; Ehrkamp and Leitner, 2003; Ehrkamp, 2005) state: “... contemporary migrants participate simultaneously in different spheres of life in the areas of both origin and destination at multiple geographical scales, and (that) they identify with and are able to hold multiple allegiances – to territories, ethnic religious communities, and families across national borders” (Ehrkamp and Leitner, 2006, p. 1593).

Many migrants and members of minority ethnic groups, even when they are born in the country where they now live, perform activities and develop orientations that link them with others who do not reside in the immediate living environment, but live in other countries (e.g. Vertovec, 2007). Faist (2000) talks about transnational social spaces. Here some tasks for city and district planning authorities may emerge aiming at building objects and creating institutions which may enhance social cohesion at the local level. Such initiatives may include for example: developing focal points for cultural, educational and sports-related activities, in order to counteract the trends towards social exclusion.

Aspects of transnationalism are not limited to minority ethnic groups. We can find transnational communities of managers and professionals over the whole world. The essence is almost always: many members of such communities engage in highly-localised practices, but at the same time they have contacts with many people outside these local communities, not only from their home country, but also people they meet from other countries through work. Beaverstock (2002; 2005), for example, sees this pattern among British expatriates in Singapore and New York.

### Key implications

The growth in ICT and transnationalism may work into the same direction: the importance of place-based local communities may decline. Transnationalism may lead to situations in which a variety of places (i.e. the community of origin, but also other places where friends and family members have migrated to) other than the place where one presently resides may remain or become more important. The possibility to divert one’s attention from the local community or neighbourhood can have large implications for life in the neighbourhood: when residents are more interested in places elsewhere the question

---

\(^3\) There are also, of course, more ominous, possibly international connections: terrorist organisations are probably also not very place-bound and can contact members all over the world (see Ehrkamp and Leitner 2006).
should be asked how important the residential neighbourhood still is and how policies aimed at neighbourhoods can be effective.

2.6 NEW MOBILITIES

Over the last decade or so, attention for the movement of people, goods and ideas has resulted in the development of a host of research into ‘mobilities’. John Urry (2007) states that seemingly the whole world is on the move: a predicted one billion air travellers by 2010, 31 million refugees around the globe, 552 million cars in 1998, an average of 50 kilometres travel distance a day in the USA, and travel and tourism as the largest industry in the world worth $6.5 trillion. Endless additional streams of goods and ideas travel the world everyday as well. And each of these statistics is projected to grow.

This world of flux sharply contrasts with dominant perspectives in the social sciences that for long have focused on durability and stasis (Urry, 2000; 2007; Sheller and Urry, 2007; Cresswell and Merriman, 2011). Researchers have usually worked with closed spatial categories, like societies, states, regions, cities and neighbourhoods. This only started to change in the 1970s, when a spatial turn in the social sciences resulted in attention for the spatiality of the social, and for the social in geography (Gregory and Urry, 1985).

The ‘new mobilities paradigm’ results from such criticism on a focus on fixed places and the disregard for mobility and the mobiles (Sheller and Urry, 2006; Hannam et al., 2006; Cresswell and Merriman, 2011). On the one hand, it argues against a ‘sedentarist’ view that treats stability, meaning and place as normal and distance, change and placelessness as abnormal. On the other hand, Sheller and Urry (2007) also criticise nomadic perspectives that suggest that everything is liquid. Instead, they argue that de-territorialisation is followed by re-territorialisation and new concentrations. As Urry (2011, p. 125) comments: “… mobilities connecting the local and the global always depend upon multiple stabilities. De-territorialisation presupposes re-territorialisation … the complex character of such systems stems from the multiple time-space fixities or moorings that enable the fluidities of liquid modernity to be realised … there is no linear increase in fluidity without extensive systems of immobilities”.

For Saunders (2011) these processes have a clear urban dimension with ‘arrival cities’ acting as key moorings in the global economy and helping to foster increasingly complex inter-relationships between people and places across the world. Arrival cities act as targets for migrants for a variety of reasons. Often this is a cumulative effect, with new migrants being attracted to those specific places where migrant communities can already be found. Other characteristics of places, such as their connectivity, labour market conditions and access rights, and cultural appeal also make them more or less attractive. Saunders notes, for example, that

---

4 See also Van Kempen and Wissink (forthcoming).
Towards Hyper-Diversified European Cities

London is a particularly easy city in which to start up a small business and that this appeal encourages further in-migration. Neighbourhoods in such cities become dominated by immigrant businesses “… devoted to transfer or cash, information, and people” (p. 29). Over time, however, arrival communities are also subject to change. A focus on initial moorings and the sending of remittances to ‘home’ countries tend to decline over time as individuals and communities become more embedded in everyday life. Second generation migrants in such neighbourhoods tend to become more embedded and engaged in economic, political, and social activities.

Key implications
The literature on new mobilities encourages researchers to look beyond bounded neighbourhoods and refrain from the long-running tendency to concentrate on fixed or closed spatial categories in general. As discussed in relation to ICT-developments and transnationalism above, it means that local community identifications and the category of the neighbourhood may be important in some respect, but that many residents will also have a lot of their physical and virtual activities somewhere else. Again this might have consequences for urban policies and governance arrangements that focus on specific places and territories. This does not mean that all area-based policies and arrangements are by definition ill-targeted. Some groups may live ‘more locally’ than others, not by choice but by necessity and the extent to which all groups are affected by these wider changes will depend on a variety of local circumstances and contexts.

2.7 Changing Identities in Cosmopolitan Cities

The changes discussed above have deep and wide implications for identities and feelings of belonging in EU cities and societies. This section is divided into two parts. The first discusses recent writings on cosmopolitanism and the emergence of cosmopolitan cities in an era of globalisation. The second then turns to questions of diversity and tolerance and highlights the writings of those who ask if there is now ‘too much’ diversity in EU cities.

The rise of cosmopolitan cities
Populations across the EU are changing rapidly. Eurostat (2013, p. 1) estimates that “… there were 33.0 million people born outside a country of the EU-27 on 1 January 2012 and there were 17.2 million persons who were born in a different EU-27 Member State from the country of residence”. For several decades, urban policies and mainstream planning practice in most countries did not explicitly engage with or acknowledge diversity. On the contrary, from the 1960s onwards, critical voices from research and practice started to question the ethos and impact of rational comprehensive planning policies and criticise ‘urban decision makers for imposing policies that exacerbated the disadvantages suffered by low-income, female, gay and minority residents’ (Fainstein, 2010, p. 3). Modernist planning became increasingly attacked for its “… anti-democratic, race and gender-blind, and culturally homogenizing practices” (Sandercock, 1998, p.
Towards Hyper-Diversified European Cities

4). Iveson (forthcoming) argues that urban planning and urban policies have engaged with diversity in three main ways: to manage social difference in situations where difference has been associated with disadvantage or interpreted as disorderly (e.g. through policies of tenure mixing or ethnic ‘deconcentration’ in deprived neighbourhoods), to commodify and use the multicultural features of some cities for urban tourism or urban regeneration purposes; to regulate public spaces and facilities in contexts of conflicts over their use between ethnic groups. Urban planning policies thus often simultaneously celebrate diversity and reinforce difference (by controlling forms of diversity that have been regarded as unruly in heavy-handed ways).

It is in this context that the foundations of traditional, nation-state centred social and urban research are being challenged by writers who argue for a new sociology of cosmopolitanism (see Beck, 2006; Held, 2010). One of the leading proponents of cosmopolitanism, David Held, argues that it is principally concerned with ways of thinking about how humankind can live in harmony, with allegiance to a moral realm of ‘all humanity’, rather than thinking about distinctive ‘communities’ and the differences between groups. The identities associated with diversity therefore carry relatively little meaning as citizens increasingly identify with what is common to all. Local forms of identity are eroding and in a more normative way this is a positive phenomenon as individual and collective actions become thought about in relation to the broader needs/concerns of wider humanity. For advocates, cosmopolitan thinking thus represents “… the political basis and political philosophy of living in a global age” (Held, 2005, p. 27) with humans rather than governments or states representing the “… ultimate units of moral concern – equal worth and dignity, active agency, personal responsibility and accountability, consent, collective decision-making about public matters through voting procedures, inclusiveness and subsidiarity, avoidance of serious harm, sustainability”.

Such ways of viewing change chime with those who see globalisation as a transformative process in which traditional nation-state centred “… politics and the state have become zombies – dead long ago but still haunting people’s minds” (Beck, 2000, p. 80). States, communities, and individuals are being challenged to re-think their relationships not only with ‘national’ political institutions but also with their class-based identities of earlier periods. For Beck (2000), this process is leading to one of sub-politics of ‘disembedded individualisation’, in which individuals are increasingly changing their identities, and identifying less with the national scale and more with other forms of lifestyle-based, local and global, identities. This calls for researchers to suspend “… the assumption of the nation-state … [in order to] make the empirical investigation of local-global phenomena possible” (Beck and Sznaider, 2006, p. 9; see also Caney, 2005; Held, 2005; Brock and Bridghouse, 2005; Sandercock, 1998). At the same time, some of this trend towards sub-politics and what Beck (2002) terms ‘individualisation’ are leading to new forms of identity-based politics, rather than place-based identities. Benhabib (2004) highlights some of the core political tensions at the heart of this shift: “… since every search for identity includes differentiating oneself from what one is not, identity politics is always, and necessarily, a politics of the creation of difference” (p. 3). Liberal democracies, she argues, are sufficiently complex to
allow for the expression of difference without fracturing the identity of the body politic but under conditions of globalisation.

And this has implications for the planning of urban neighbourhoods and diversity. Cosmopolitanism is not simply an abstract way of thinking about citizenship or broader shifts in global identities. It is also a key part of the ‘everyday’ experience of contemporary urbanism. In Gary Bridge’s (2005, p. 158) terms: “True cosmopolitanism is not confined to elite knowledge or separate transnational spaces … it emerges in the urban neighbourhood in which difference is a daily reality and a negotiation … this gives some prospect of a city that is not divided between cosmopolitan rationality of the global district and the practical rationality of the surrounding ‘provincial’ city. Rather it is a form of cosmopolitan rationality that comes from location, rather than transition”.

Consequently, it is in “the burgeoning transnational neighbourhoods of the global cities that the best prospects of cosmopolitanism are to be found: Cosmopolitanism as a form of reason lived daily in the city of difference” (p. 158). In empirical terms, it means that research needs to assess the ways in which the concepts of “society and political community change under conditions of cosmopolitanisation” (Beck, 2000, p. 88) at multiple scales from the global system to local/urban neighbourhoods of diversity. A more grounded view of cosmopolitan thinking thus “shifts the emphasis on to internal development processes within the social world rather than seeing globalisation as the primary mechanism of change” (Delanty, 2006, p. 27). Other writers on relational geographies, such as Massey (2007) and Amin (2007) have similarly critiqued fixed understandings of territorial identities and argued that the relationships between place and identity are much more fluid. Places represent nodes within these relational flows, rather than static, bounded objects containing definable identity ‘types’.

Key implications
The changes brought about by intensified globalisation in recent decades have challenged the assumption that citizen and community identities in cities are territorially-based. Cosmopolitan writers now claim that identities are more fluid, relational, and global in nature and that policy interventions that cling to territorially-based, collective understandings of citizenship are doomed to fail. At the same time policy-makers are faced with new challenges over how to govern and manage cities that are becoming increasingly cosmopolitan. In some cases city authorities may promote the idea of cosmopolitanism as a mark of modernisation, tolerance, and diversity. In others, its recognition may be seen as a threat to an imagined social order and it is this perception that is fuelling neo-assimilationist policies in many EU cities. Moreover, in light of the rather mixed assessment made by previous scholars, how can we then assess, in the DIVERCITIES project, what kind of policies and governance arrangements can be deemed to have successfully engaged with hyper-diversity in positive ways which foster social mobility, social cohesion and economic performance?
Too much diversity?
Recent years have also seen a growing challenge to some of the more utopian views of diversity and cosmopolitanism highlighted above that see it primarily as a ‘good thing’. Some have stressed that diversity constitutes a threat to an imagined social order and the legitimacy of welfare state systems across the EU. Authors on the political left such as David Goodhart (2004) for example and former Home Office Minister David Blunkett (2001), claim that there can be too much diversity. As countries and cities in the EU become demographically diverse, it is argued, a collective sense of politics, identity, and/or shared values become impossible (see Seabeck et al., 2007). Drawing on the example of Britain, Goodhart (2004, p. 1) claims that in the immediate post-war period it was a country, “… stratified by class and religion. But in most of its cities … there was a good chance of predicting the attitudes, even the behaviour, of the people living in your immediate neighbourhood …[but] the diversity, individualism and mobility that characterise developed economies in the era of globalisation, mean that more of our lives is spent amongst strangers”.

The net result of this is that there are new political tensions between ‘solidarity and diversity’ and the extent to which citizens any longer associate themselves with the collectivised governmentalities of shared risks and solidarities that underpinned the post-war Keynesian welfare state. In short, “… the logic of solidarity, with its tendency to draw boundaries, and the logic of diversity, with its tendency to cross them, do at times pull apart” (ibid., p. 3). It is a view reflected in government reports on urban riots in England in the early 2000s that talked openly about separate lives between different communities sharing the same urban areas (see Amin, 2002; Cantle, 2001).

It is a view that has increasingly found favour in mainstream political discourses across the EU. Angela Merkel, for example, in 2010 claimed that “… this multicultural approach, saying that we simply live side by side and happily with each other has failed, utterly failed” (Merkel, 2010, p. 1). Such statements echoes Thrift’s (2005) broader concern that the diversity of populations within cities can fuel and channel new modes of hatred and division. He argues that “… cities bring people and things together in manifold combinations. Indeed, that is probably the most basic definition of a city that is possible. But it is not the case that these combinations sit comfortably with one another. Indeed, they often sit uncomfortably together. Many urban experiences are the result of juxtapositions which are in some sense dysfunctional, which jar and scrape and rend” (Thrift, 2005, p. 140).

This ‘jarring’ is a consequence of a “… misanthropic thread that runs through the modern city, a distrust and avoidance of precisely the others many writers feel we ought to be welcoming in a world increasingly premised on the mixing which the city first brought into existence … this underside of everyday hatred and enmity may be one of mankind’s greatest pleasures” (ibid.).

Such sentiments are reflected in the writings of authors such as Richard Sennett (1970) who claim that disorder is one of the foundations of modern urban living and that more attention
needs to be given the things that divide citizens as well as those that unite them. Again in Thrift’s prescient terms, “… modern cities are criss-crossed by systems that channel and control anger and hatred in ways which are likely to produce random outbursts and occasional mayhem on a fairly regular basis amongst the citizenry which go beyond acts which are necessarily labelled as criminal” (ibid.).

It is in light of such debates that policy-makers and academics have increasingly discussed the value of tolerance to social cohesion and order. As we saw above for writers such as Florida the celebration of diversity goes hand-in-hand with a tolerance for the practices and ways of acting of different social, economic, and cultural groups. Tolerance is often bound up with political projects and ways of thinking about respect and positive social interaction (see Dean, 2007). A ‘tolerant attitude’ facilitates diversity and can act as a key interface between the wider objectives of social cohesion and economic competitiveness. And yet, the imagination that there exist tolerant ‘host’ populations, paradoxically, reflects a view of essential differences between groups and particular imaginations of Others. For critics such Žižek (2011, p. 46) there are inherent dangers in such a perspective as “… one tolerates something one does not approve of, but cannot abolish, either because one is not strong enough to do so or because one is benevolent enough to allow the Other to retain its illusions – in this way a secular liberal tolerates religion, a permissive parent tolerates his children’s excesses etc”.

Tolerance, for Žižek, can easily feed into a form of racism that becomes a clichéd and power-infused celebration of ‘exotic authenticity’. Moreover, in more Marxist terms, he also claims that a more positive political agenda would generate a perspective in which one does “… not simply respect others, but offers them a common struggle, since our most pressing problems today are problems we have in common” (2012, p. 46). This is, of course, a contested view (see for example Ahmed, 2008) but it does point to some of the potential limitations of utopian cosmopolitan accounts and simplified views of cosmopolitanism that see it as a way of thinking for living in the modern age.

It is perhaps unsurprising, therefore, that much of the discussion around globalisation and cosmopolitanism has been elided by some policy-makers with understandings of urban security and securitisation in a context of what Žižek (2012, p.11) terms ‘permanent instability’ exacerbated by austerity and the financial crisis. Multiculturalism has gone hand-in-hand with new efforts to make cities more ‘secure’ through a combination of hard policy interventions, such as the use of CCTV surveillance and softer interventions that seek to build ‘cohesive communities’ (see Graham, 2006). At the same time the fear of home-grown and imported terrorism has led to an ‘othering’ process in which diversity and flows have been elided with greater insecurity and risk. In many EU cities it has become increasingly difficult to separate out understandings of diversity from these broader concerns with what makes a society ‘safe’ and this is having an impact on the form and character of urban policy interventions (see Fauser, 2006; Gill, 2009).
Key implications

The question of ‘too much diversity’ is being raised in a number of cities and countries across the EU. For some on both the political left and right there has been a growing emphasis on promoting the negative aspects of diversity as something that undermines a sense of place and social cohesion. It is a view that has now reached the mainstream of political debates at the nation-state level and it forms the backdrop to many of the policy discourses and interventions that will be explored through this research project.

2.8 MIGRATION POLICIES IN EUROPE

When talking about an increasing diversification of European cities it is important to pay some attention to migration policies in Europe. Such policies can be very important for the outcome of a diversification process in a country or city. Restrictive policies generally lead to less diversification.

The 2000s witnessed the breaking down of migration boundaries within the EU and between countries across the world, most notably in the rolling out of the Schengen Agreement in 1995. This agreement enabled the free movement of persons between signature countries. Many nation-states saw the in-migration of labour as vital to their competitiveness and demographic future.

A review of the literature enables us to identify the groups for which cities may have a positive migration balance: international migrants, the ‘new’ middle class, young adults, elderly people and non-family households. Several authors have pointed out the importance of international migrants for the demographic dynamics of centres given several factors such as economic structure, employment opportunities and social and ethnic networks (Rérat, 2011).

But at the same time countries have become increasingly selective about the migrants that they are prepared to accept. A process of ‘managed migration’ now determines policy in many countries with broader concerns about illegal immigration and the ‘inability’ of welfare services to cope with new demands. Many nation-states, therefore, started to impose stronger rules on potential migrants, including the rolling out of points-based entry schemes that were explicitly designed to enhance the selectivity of immigration procedures. Boundaries became more selectively permeable. At its most extreme, the concept of a ‘Fortress Europe’ gained ascendancy amongst some political groups, or the idea that the EU should prevent all in-migration with the exception of key workers. As the publication of the EU’s Pact on Asylum

The Schengen Agreement was signed in 1985 by five EU members (Germany, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg) to allow the free movement of persons within the signatory States without disrupting law and order. It was subsequently adopted by all members of the EU during the 1990s, with the exception of the UK, Ireland and Denmark, and may be rolled out across the new Member States if they are able to meet certain governance criteria.
Towards Hyper-Diversified European Cities

and Immigration in October 2008 makes explicit: “... the EU does not have the resources to decently receive all the migrants who hope to find a better life here. Poorly managed immigration may disrupt the social cohesion of host countries. The organisation of immigration must consequently take account of Europe's reception capacity in terms of its labour market, housing, and health, education and social services” (Council of the European Union, 2008, p. 1).

The Pact claims that uncontrolled migration represents a direct threat to the “political and civilisational project that underlay the creation and deepening of the European Union” (ibid., p. 1). The focus is on the ‘receptive capacity’ of countries and cities, with the clear implication that the impacts of migration on cohesion can be identified, measured, and managed. Something of an ‘optimum level’ of migration can be reached that matches the receptive capacity of places and generates new forms of competitiveness, without impacting on social cohesion and a sense of ‘harmony’ and ‘balance’ within communities.

However, defining what constitutes an appropriate ‘receptive capacity’ of place is a politically-loaded process. Definitions will vary according to specific local circumstances and changing contexts (see Light, 2006). With the onset of the credit crunch, rising unemployment, and the added pressures placed on the welfare state, perceived capacities are likely to shrink with implications for the politics of cohesion-building. As Spencer (2003, p. 2) shows, during periods of crisis a process of ‘othering’ can emerge so that whilst “… labour migrants enhance competitiveness and boost economic growth, albeit to a modest degree ..., low skilled older workers are more likely to see their job security threatened by mobile, younger migrant competitors”. The same is particularly true for working-class communities employed in sectors that are particularly vulnerable to global competition and in-migration. Consequently, governments are often “… unwilling to lead an open debate on migration options for fear of provoking public hostility. The real decisions … are taken behind closed doors” (ibid., p. 5). Even during times of growth, in many countries “… immigrants are no longer perceived as wanted or even needed, despite the persistence of a demand for their services” (Massey et al., 2005, p. 6).

Key implications

Changing policies with respect to immigration form an important backdrop to a study of urban diversity and policy. There is a need to develop understandings of how national and local policy-makers are now coping with growing (and sometimes declining) inflows of in-migrants: do they, for example, think in terms of the ‘receptive capacities’ of places? Are there clearly defined differences between countries and cities and if so what patterns are emerging? It is likely that bigger cities, for example, are imagined to have greater capacities than smaller places but this has yet to be systematically interrogated in the academic and policy literature.
2.9 ECONOMIC CRISIS, AUSTERITY AND THE CHANGING POLITICAL CONTEXT OF DIVERSITY

The economic crisis generated by the credit crunch and the Eurozone financial crisis has brought into relief some of the tensions and opportunities presented by hyper-diversity in EU cities. As economic conditions deteriorate unemployment rises and pressures on welfare budgets increase. This, in turn, can raise fundamental political questions over migration, community, and place. This section highlights some of the impacts that recession may have on dominant discourses of diversity and urban policy. In some ways greater diversity may be seen as a potential solution to the economic problems afflicting cities. However, at the same time, it can act as a lighting-rod for wider discontents that may be fuelled by greater competition for jobs and resources. There is, of course, nothing new in such processes and it widely argued that economic developments may create deep divisions between areas that flourish and areas that seem to lose out in every respect and have no function in the new network society. We find this same dichotomy on various spatial scales: “Indeed, we observe the parallel unleashing of formidable productive forces of the informational revolution, and the consolidation of black holes of human misery in the global economy, be it Burkina Faso, South Bronx, Kamagasaki, Chiapas, or La Courneuve” (Castells, 2000, p. 2).

However, for critical writers such as Peck (2012) we have moved into a new era in which an ‘austerity urbanism’ now permeates policy thinking and practice. Across the EU and North America welfare states have been attacked in the name of fiscal prudence and the need to support financial industries and sustain corporate profits. He cites the work of Paul Krugman (2012) who fervently argues that “… the austerity drive isn’t really about debt and deficits at all; it’s about using deficit panic as an excuse to dismantle social programmes … economic recovery was never the point; the drive for austerity is about using the crisis not solving it”.

Similar points are made by Crouch (2011) who sees the aftermath of the credit crunch as a period in which politics has lurched to the right and the legitimacy of pro-migrant, pro-diversity policies have been increasingly undermined.

In this wider context it is possible to identify several principal ways in which austerity governance may impact on diversity and urban policy:

• New anti-immigrant agendas have surfaced in many countries, both through the formal political system and informally through the activities of political parties. For Žižek (2012) there is a clear ‘inter-connection between the rising tide of anti-immigrant feeling in western countries and the financial crisis’ (p. 35). This is increasingly reflected in mainstream political discourses that highlight the ‘tensions’ associated with multiculturalism and the challenges now faced by cities across the EU and beyond. As discussed earlier it is part of a wider trend towards restrictions on freedom of movement and even some discussion at EU level of new taxes and restrictions on capital mobility. There is a danger that in an urban context such sentiments could easily be translated into new forms of divisive politics and nationalism,
underpinned by xenophobic and anti-immigrant agendas. It is in cities that extreme political parties have found fertile ground for their campaigns. As Swyngedouw (2009) argues, the 2000s have witnessed the emergence of new forms of ‘populism’ or agendas that are designed to seek rapid solutions to complex problems by identifying problem groups that should be targeted for forceful intervention (see also Mouffe, 1993). The threat posed by such policies to social cohesion represents a significant danger, particularly when allied to measures such as the tightening of migration controls and a broader set of political discourses that focus on the ‘threat’ posed by the mobility and mooring of different groups. The impacts on cohesion in specific urban neighbourhoods could be particularly severe as they become flashpoints for these wider discontents.

• New geographies are also emerging. As Peck (2012) notes the deep cutbacks being made to state budgets across the EU and US are particularly hard on cities and regions that rely on welfare spending to support their economic well-being (Centre for Cities, 2012). This is a serious problem for areas of the EU in which public spending accounts for the largest share of employment and investment. Moreover, where immigrant communities are living in some of the poorest neighbourhoods and filling some of the lowest-paid sectors of the labour market, the impacts of austerity are likely to be disproportionately even greater.

The existence of employment opportunities to encourage social mobility represents one of the fundamental building blocks of social cohesion (Vranken, 2004). In their absence, the opportunities for migrant workers contract, leading in some cases to forms of reverse migration in which migrants return to their countries of origin as opportunities seem better there (The Economist, 2009; Raco and Tasan-Kok, 2010). However, the effects of austerity on people and places is uneven and takes on different forms in different contexts. In some cities and countries it is reducing levels of in-migration and in some cases even leading to out-migration. In cities whose economic base is supported by growth industries or high levels of welfare expenditure, the effects have been less pronounced.

• Existing migrant divisions of labour (cf. May et al., 2007) may become more acute as austerity and employment change impact on low-skilled work and workers. The impacts of austerity thus far have been most keenly felt in poorer communities that have faced a combination of shrinking welfare intervention, falling employment, and rising costs of living. Those migrants who work at the lowest points of the labour market face the greatest problems and it is likely that in many cities there will be a disproportionate impact on their standards of living relative to other groups. It is likely that inequalities between different groups will expand in an austere future.

• Austerity may be used to usher in new development discourses in which conceptions of diversity play a central role. Thus there is a growing trend for diversity to be elided with new discourses around place resilience. Resilient economies are increasingly equated with a diversity and balance of different activities and populations (see Raco and Street, 2012; Porter and Kramer, 2011). In some cities there have been efforts to promote diversity as a vehicle of recovery (see Mayor of London, 2011) and as a stepping stone towards the creation of more creative economies. At the same time if diversity is blamed for economic
crisis, then in some places we may see countervailing policies that promote enhanced resilience as an outcome of greater ‘self-sufficiency’ and reductions in the extent of diversity.

- One element of austerity changes that has thus far been under-researched is that of the impacts of changing economies and welfare regimes on the activities of migrants and entrepreneurs. Authors such as Collier (2000) argue that political changes in cities and societies have a major impact on the competitiveness and confidence of entrepreneurs. Where cities adopt more reactive forms of politics, entrepreneurs drawn from migrant communities tend to be less successful than in cities where there is greater openness and a more positive attitude towards migrant businesses. Relatively little is also known about processes of reverse migration and the impacts of employment loss on migration patterns. With the onset of recession in some parts of the EU long-running tendencies towards ‘return migration’ have been exacerbated. Return migration is a phenomenon that has grown with globalisation as migrant mobility has become increasingly flexible and multi-directional (see Agunias, 2006; OECD, 2008).

- Another implication which can be added, although it partly overlaps with some other implications, is the negative impact of austerity governance on collective services and collective goods, spaces of equal rights and interchange for very different ethnic and socio-economic groups, and the negative effects this has for vulnerable groups.

### Key implications

The social and political tensions generated by economic crisis will have their biggest impacts on the poorest people and places within EU cities. The presence of diversity in this context may act as a lightning rod for wider discontents and there may be a tendency for existing prejudices and tensions in cities to be seriously exacerbated. Its impact on different cities and countries has also been uneven and new geographies of austerity are emerging whose differential effects will be explored in the research. At the same time it is possible that austerity may encourage policy shifts towards more diversity as one way of enhancing future resilience and growth. The positive aspects of diversity may become more appealing to policy-makers.

### 2.10 POLICY DISCOURSES ON URBAN DIVERSITY

The European Commission (2011, p. 34) has formulated diversity as one of the main challenges for cities: “The challenge for the Cities of tomorrow lies in breaking the segregation and turning the diversity into a creative force for innovation, growth and well-being”. In the vision of the EC, diversity is not only about ethnic or geographic origin, but also about social diversity and different cultural expressions: “We need to work on strategies for mutual knowledge between all cultures present in the city: European and non-European cultures, middle-class and working-class culture (and poverty cultures, which are not necessarily ‘poor cultures’), ‘high’ and ‘low’ culture, and especially specific youth cultures” (ibid, p. 47).
Although the presence of immigrants is just one aspect of diversity, most policy discourses on urban diversity tend to be mainly about immigration and ethnic diversity. But not always. The policy discourse on economic growth and entrepreneurship is very much influenced by Richard Florida’s work. He does not focus on ethnic diversity, but makes strong links between diversity and creativity: “Diversity and creativity work together to power innovation and economic growth” (Florida, 2002, p. 577). In his (much praised, but also heavily criticised) book *The Rise of the Creative Class* Florida argues that the creative class is crucial for urban and regional growth and that creative people are attracted to places that are culturally diverse and tolerant. Although tolerance and diversity are two different concepts (Qian, 2013), they are used interchangeably in the work of Florida, as well as in the many urban policy documents that are inspired by his work. An example of that is the vision of the municipality of Copenhagen (as quoted by Bayliss, 2007, p. 899) on its future as ‘creative city’: “The city’s great diversity is a strength that means Copenhagen distinguishes itself as a tolerant city. Cultural diversity gives the city good possibilities to attract well-educated and creative workers, as well as entrepreneurs in future service industries and high technology sectors”.

Social mix and mixed neighbourhoods form another central theme in discourses on urban diversity. Especially in the last two decades, many policy-makers in Western countries have indicated the creation of mixed neighbourhoods as the solution to all kinds of evils that result from immigration. The increasing diversity of the urban population, combined with an increasing spatial separation of different population groups in many Western countries would threaten social integration and limit social cohesion and social mobility of especially those people living in concentrated poor and minority-rich areas. Many urban researchers have in the meantime found out (a) that it remains to be seen how important neighbourhoods and spatial concentrations are in the lives of individuals and (b) that the solution, more mixed neighbourhoods, definitely does not always generate the wished results. In chapter 3 of this report we will elaborate on this discussion, because it is at the heart of the discussion of urban diversity.

In the remainder of this section we will give some illustrations of policies and statements in which diversity plays a role. In this stage, these illustrations are given without too many comments. Later in the DIVERCITIES-project these examples will be treated in a more elaborate way.

**Belgium**

Belgium is a peculiar case since migration policy and the attribution of citizenship rights is a federal competency, whereas migrant integration policies are regional competencies (in case the Flemish, Walloon and Brussels Region). The role of regional governments in migrant integration policy leads to divergent diversity policies within Belgium. The Flemish Community pursues a post-multiculturalist strategy, which recognises cultural differences but puts a lot of stress on obligatory integration courses (for non-EU citizens) and Dutch language acquisition. The Walloon region pursues a policy which is closer to (French republican) assimilationism,
with less recognition of cultural difference and group rights but also less stress on obligation in its integration policy. The Brussels Capital Region’s policy is decided on by representatives of the Flemish and francophone community, but tends to be closer to the latter model. Recently, the Walloon Region and Brussels have started to discuss the adoption of obligatory integration courses and can hence be seen to shift towards the Flemish model.

Canada
“Canada has probably gone further than any other state to institutionalize and celebrate the diversity of its population” (Wood and Landry, 2008, p. 57). Toronto is one of the most hyper-diversified cities in the world and has the highest proportion of immigrant residents (46%) among all OECD metropolitan regions (OECD, 2008, p. 15), but that is not seen as a problem in the policy discourse. Toronto’s motto is: ‘Diversity is our Strength’ (Hulchanski, 2010).

Denmark
According to the Ministry of Social Affairs and Integration (2012), Denmark is a society where immigration trends will contribute positively to society and where all citizens present are met with respect and expectation. But there are also requirements for those who want to come to Denmark: newcomers meet with clear rights and responsibilities that come with it to become part of the Danish society. In practice this means that immigrants are expected to assimilate to norms and institutions already existing.

Estonia
Estonian minority ethnic groups mainly formed during the Soviet period (1944/1945-1991). Russians, the main minority group today, used to be the majority ethnic group in the former Soviet Union. There is very little new immigration, and immigration policy allows quota based entry, and targets skilled migrants (a salary threshold exists for third country nationals). Contemporary Estonia could be characterised as a dual language country. Minorities, about 100 different ethnic groups, form about a third of the population; 80% of them are ethnic Russians and 90% of them speak Russian as their mother tongue. Although Estonian is the only official state language, there are Estonian and Russian language schools and both Estonian and Russian are used in everyday life. In Tallinn, Estonian and Russian speakers form roughly about a half of the total population, with strong intra-urban variations. There are no urban policies aimed at combating residential segregation or stimulating mixing of ethnic or other population groups. But a general integration policy does exist in Estonia. This policy envisions integration as a long-term process that aims to lead towards an Estonian language based but culturally diverse society, a strong Estonian state identity and shared democratic values.

France
The French integration model is based on republican universalism, where citizenship is based on *jus soli* (Latin: right of the soil) and where adherence to the national norms and symbols are expected from both natives and immigrants. In the French political discourse there is a lot of doubt about the assimilation process of immigrants. In a famous 2009 Versailles speech former
French President Nicolas Sarkozy (as quoted by Reeskens and Wright, 2013) asked, “Who does not see that our integration model isn’t working anymore? Instead of producing equality, it produces inequality. Instead of producing cohesion, it creates resentment.” There is at the same time on the one hand an increasing recognition of ethnic discrimination and the need to act upon that on the political agenda (creation of ‘Halde’, a public authority for fighting discrimination in 2004) and on the other hand a refusal of specific attention for minority-ethnic groups, even in area-based policies.

Germany
In October 2010 Chancellor Angela Merkel gave a speech in which she stated that attempts to build a multicultural society in Germany have ‘utterly failed’ and that the so-called ‘multikulti’ concept – where people would ‘live side-by-side’ happily – did not work, and immigrants needed to do more to integrate – including learning German (Merkel, 2010).

Greece
Greece has come in contact with ethnic and racial diversity rather lately, since the important flows of immigration started as recently as the early 1990s. A strong nationalist identity has been the main contextual element that fuelled negative reflexes on the part of the local population. After an initial period of laissez-faire policies, when undocumented immigrants used to find niches in the labour and housing markets by filling gaps in the local growing economy, this ‘automatic’ integration became harder, and problems often turned to open conflict. The crisis did not improve things and immigration became a main issue on the political agenda. Extreme positions have been adopted by the current conservative Prime Minister (“we must re-conquer our cities” (March 2012 during the last electoral campaign)), parallel to the instauration of quasi-concentration camps for immigrants without documents and the openly hostile action of the growing extreme Right party (‘Golden Dawn’) – with its emblematic area-based anti-immigrant strategy in the densely populated quarter of Aghios Panteleimon in Athens – and the frequent incidents of violence against immigrants (beatings of Pakistanis in different areas; shooting of unpaid Bangladeshi strawberry collectors, etc.).

Hungary
In Hungary two interrelated fields of discourse can be identified on multiculturalism and diversity: the political and the public field. The political field seems to be quite a controversial one. On the one hand, Hungary emphasises the importance of multiculturalism and sees it as a source of economic growth and well-being. On the other hand, legislation processes do not reflect this attitude. There is no clear migration and integration policy in the country. Furthermore, the integration of Roma people (about 6-8 per cent of the population, most of them living in multiple deprivation and excluded from labour market) is an important and urgent task but Hungarian Governments have failed so far to provide any comprehensive strategy to that. In the public discourse, multiculturalism, ethnic groups and (possible) conflicts related to them appear as one of the most debated topics. Surveys show that despite the
relatively small number of foreigners living in Hungary the majority of the society has negative attitudes towards them.

**Italy**
In Italy, it is hard to identify a national model of integration. Notwithstanding more than 30 years of immigration, often the political discourse defines Italy as a ‘new’ immigration country, in this way justifying the weaknesses of a national model. To accept and legitimise immigration, policy-makers and stakeholders usually make reference to utilitarian arguments, an issue that proves to be problematic now, in the aftermath of crisis. At the same time, anti-immigration – if not overly racist arguments – permeated Italian politics. If an integration model does exist, it can be defined as, on the one hand, a ‘microregulation’ one, where the local dimension is very important; and, on the other hand, an ‘intercultural’ one, a via media between multiculturalism and assimilationism. This model allows a (formal) access to many social rights (education, health, etc.), though with serious problems in access and implementation, and also an exclusion from political rights (including a very difficult access to naturalisation). The model is more and more challenged by a need for clear rights and because of the rise of an active and visible second generation (known in the media as the ‘Balotelli generation’).

**The Netherlands**
Like the UK, the Netherlands is also known for its tradition of multiculturalism. However, there has been a sudden shift in the policy discourse towards a strong push for assimilation (Entzinger, 2006). Especially since 2001/2002 the presence of immigrants in the big cities was increasingly defined as a problem (Musterd and Ostendorf, 2008). Partly as a consequence of this, urban policies in the Netherlands have been directed at countering residential segregation and spatial concentration of low-income households and minority ethnic groups (Kleinhans, 2004; Musterd, 2003; Veldboer et al., 2002). The government believes that the concentration of ethnic minorities in certain urban neighbourhoods hampers their integration and participation in society. In the Yearly Memorandum on Integration Policy (Ministry of Justice, 2005, p. 19, own translation) it is stated that “Concentration is especially disadvantageous for integration because it results in an accumulation of social problems which may eventuate in a state of affairs that is very hard to handle … Concentration is also disadvantageous because it makes the ethnic dividing lines more visible in a more concentrated way. That harms the image of ethnic minorities … Finally, concentration is particularly disadvantageous for the possibilities for meeting and contacts between persons from different origin groups … the diminishing contacts with native Dutch indirectly influence the social chances of ethnic minorities”.

**Poland**
The discourse on the multicultural society and its role in development processes is relatively recent in Poland. This discourse has been triggered by the growing immigration flows and the expanding activism of ethnic and other social minorities, that started in the 1990s along with a systemic transformation of the state. Polish accession to the EU, making Poland more attractive for immigrants, has strengthened these processes. However, for most of them Poland
is still a transit country. The scale of immigration is still small and does not cause many conflicts. But the possible consequences of immigration find its place in documents on the future development of Poland since assimilation of immigrants is expected to come with some problems. The emphasis is put predominantly on the necessity of social integration of different minorities groups, on the protection of human rights, and on acting against economic exclusion (Boni, 2009). Active social integration is pointed out as the main goal of social policy. The Director of the National Office for Foreigners stated in April 2013 that Poland “is a friendly country for foreigners”, presenting planned changes in regulations concerning legalisation of stay or residence of foreigners in Poland.

Switzerland
With its four linguistic regions, Switzerland is often considered a multi-national state with different ethnic groups that live peacefully together. Although Switzerland is proud of its multi-cultural roots, it is also quite defensive regarding immigration and established a rather restrictive naturalisation policy. In comparison with other European countries, Switzerland has a relatively high resident foreign population of more than 20 per cent. Thereby, one of the most influential political discourses emphasises that excessive numbers of foreigners threaten Swiss identity (Riaño et al., 2006). With the ‘Agreement on the Free Movement of Persons’ between the European Union and Switzerland, however, immigration policies have changed and Switzerland imposed a stratified system of immigrant rights – differentiating between citizens of the EU and EFTA and citizens of other states (ibid., 2006). At the same time, right-wing parties started running anti-immigration campaigns and propagandised against the relaxation of conditions for the naturalisation of foreigners and especially fanning fears regarding the Muslim population in Switzerland.

Turkey
While Turkey can be seen as multi-ethnic and multi-cultural country, the nation-building process, starting from the beginning of the 20th century, has gone hand in hand with attempts to homogenise the nation by denying the diverse character of the population groups within the country. Although respect for diversity was one of the discourses adopted by most of the governments, practice was not supporting that discourse. In the last decade, especially after the Helsinki summit (1999), Turkey has gone through a process of change regarding the political recognition of ethno-cultural and religiously diverse groups. Partly because the EU provided an incentive for different groups to declare their ethnic, religious and other identities, people with cultural differences began to ask specific rights and freedom in many issues. The new discourse ‘togetherness in difference’ has become quite popular, although the practice is still far beyond.

UK
While the UK used to be known for its adherence to multiculturalism, there is a clear tendency to move away from valuing cultural diversity in favour of a policy that aims for assimilation (Flint, 2010). This tendency is reflected in a speech David Cameron gave in 2011: “Under the doctrine of state multiculturalism, we have encouraged different cultures to live separate lives, apart
from each other and apart from the mainstream. We’ve failed to provide a vision of society to which they feel they want to belong. We’ve even tolerated these segregated communities behaving in ways that run completely counter to our values.” That does not mean that multiculturalism is ‘dead’ in the UK. Taylor-Gooby and Waite (2013) argue that it is developing in a more pragmatic direction in which a top-down approach is replaced by an emphasis on the need to develop intercultural relationships.
POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF DIVERSITY

As we have seen in Chapter 2 of this report, a lot of research has been published on the issues of social polarisation and inequality and on divided and segregated cities. It has also been shown that crucial developments such as globalisation, increasing mobility, changing identities and economic developments, and in particular the economic crisis, can be crucial for the interpretation of social and spatial inequalities. As a consequence of the economic crisis, for example, social divisions between groups may become larger and poor neighbourhoods may become poorer. Especially when the neighbourhood loses attention from policy-makers, as we can see in an increasing number of European countries, people in low-income neighbourhoods may experience negative effects, such as a degrading housing stock, declining social cohesion and fewer opportunities to make a career or to start a successful enterprise.

In this chapter the focus is on three core concepts: social cohesion, social mobility and economic performance. In the DIVERCITIES project we want to focus on the effects of diversity on exactly these three issues. To our opinion, these three concepts are essential. With more cohesion, better mobility chances and economic opportunities living in a cosmopolitan city becomes an advantage for people. A growing social cohesion, more opportunities to make a career on the labour market and more and more opportunities to start a (large, middle-sized or small) firm, life generally becomes easier.

Section 3.1 will focus on the relation between urban diversity and social cohesion. We will first give a definition of social cohesion. This will be followed by the main issues in the present literature on social cohesion. Then we will make links between diversity and social cohesion. Section 3.2 will do the same for social mobility, while section 3.3 will focus on economic performance.

3.1 DIVERSITY AND SOCIAL COHESION

Social cohesion is a fuzzy term with a range of meanings (Novy et al., 2012). In its most general meaning it refers to the glue that holds a society together (Maloutas and Malouta, 2004). The concept of social cohesion is not only applicable to the society as a whole, but also to different scale levels (e.g. city, neighbourhood street) or different types of social systems, like a family, an organisation or a university (Schuyt, 1997). Kearns and Forrest (2000) identify five domains of social cohesion: common values and a civic culture; social order and social control; social solidarity and reduction in wealth disparities; place attachment and shared identity; and social
networks and social capital (we will return to the concept of social capital later in the next section). Chan et al. (2006, p. 290) propose a more overarching definition of social cohesion: “Social cohesion is a state of affairs concerning both the vertical and the horizontal interactions among members of society as characterized by a set of attitudes and norms that includes trust, a sense of belonging and the willingness to participate and help, as well as their behavioural manifestations.”

Empirical research shows that not all the dimensions of social cohesion are necessarily strongly interrelated and that, therefore, these dimensions cannot be considered to be interchangeable (e.g. Dekker and Bolt, 2005; Dekker and Rowlands, 2005; Almeida et al., 2009; Botterman et al., 2012). Social cohesion cannot be seen as a one-dimensional concept, but, as Friedkin (2004) points out, should be seen as a “… domain of causally interrelated phenomena or as a class of causal models, in which some of the major dimensions … occupy different theoretical positions with respect to one another as antecedent, intervening, or outcome variables” (Friedkin, 2004, p. 409). Such a complex conceptualisation should be taken into account when investigating social cohesion, but it does not make the operationalisation of the context easy.

Social cohesion is not only inclusive, but may also serve to exclude certain groups and individuals. Strong cohesion may exclude inhabitants from opportunities that may derive from connections outside the group (with other groups, outside the community, outside the neighbourhood) (Healey, 1997). Also, different kinds of cohesion may exist on different spatial levels: high levels of social cohesion within a neighbourhood (strong bonds between the residents of that neighbourhood) may lead to lower social cohesion on the city level (where the residents of one neighbourhood become less interested in those living in other neighbourhoods) (Vranken, 2004; Maloutsas and Malouta, 2004). This idea was also emphasised by Kearns and Forrest (2000) and Novy et al. (2012): the strong ties within communities may lead to social, racial, and religious conflicts between people who belong to these communities and those who are perceived as outsiders.

Social cohesion can thus easily breed intolerance. It means that if socially and ethnically diverse groups concentrate in certain areas, their internal cohesion certainly will be fostered but at the expense of their integration at a higher level, as it will also increase the risk of exclusion both for individuals from those highly cohesive communities and of these communities from the rest of society. However, if non-conflicting relations between these diverse groups could be structured at lower spatial levels (neighbourhood or district), a high social cohesion is possible in the urban system as a whole (Vranken, 2004). Starting from this point of view, we could argue that if we concentrate on these non-conflicting relationships between diverse groups, a high level of cohesion in urban society as a whole could come into the focus of policy-makers.

Social cohesion thus is a complex concept that is not easily operationalised. There seems to be some agreement on its constituent components, however. Social cohesion comprises the existence of social contacts and social networks, social solidarity, social control, shared values and norms, place attachment and a shared identity. These components form a good basis for
empirical research. Furthermore, it should be clear that social cohesion is not necessarily a positive feature for everyone, in all circumstances. As a result, we must specify the conditions according to which the including or the excluding mechanisms of social cohesion function, whether or not they keep each other in balance or operate in one of both ways.

The relation between diversity and social cohesion
There is fundamental disagreement among social scientists about the association between diversity and social cohesion. The common belief in significant parts of the social sciences is that despite internal differences, mixed communities can live together in harmony. Finding the balance between diversity and solidarity is not easy, but it is not necessarily an impossible nor undesirable mission (Amin, 2002). However, social scientists working in the communitarian tradition like Putnam (2007) tend to see diversity and heterogeneity as a challenge or even an obstacle for social cohesion and cultural homogeneity as a fundamental source of social cohesion. This perspective can be traced back to much older debates in sociology on the sources of solidarity (Stjerno, 2009). Durkheim conceived diversity as a problem for the generation of solidarity and argued that the organic solidarity rooted in the division of labour needed to be complemented by a strong collective consciousness to generate enough solidarity in modern societies (Vranken, 2004).

This distinction between optimists and pessimists is also reflected in the literature on social mixing policies (Van Kempen and Bolt, 2009). On the one hand, policy-makers in many European countries see the stimulation of greater mixing across income groups and between ethnic communities as a means to create more social cohesion (e.g. Graham et al., 2009). On the other hand, many academic researchers tend to emphasise that diversity is quite often negatively related to cohesion. This conclusion is based on two types of empirical research. First there are studies evaluating social mixing policies (either in a quantitative or a qualitative way), which usually focus on a small number of neighbourhoods and which conclude that social mixing is more likely to weaken than to strengthen social cohesion in a neighbourhood (e.g. Bolt and Van Kempen, 2013; Bond et al., 2011) and that there are hardly interactions between social groups (e.g. Bretherton and Pleace, 2011; Joseph et al., 2007). Secondly, there is a highly quantitative research tradition in which the compositional characteristics of neighbourhoods are related to social cohesion. For instance, Kearns and Mason (2007) found that a greater diversity of tenure (as proxy for social mix) is negatively related to social cohesion.

Although there are many different types of diversity, most attention has been focused on the effects of ethnic diversity since Putnam’s publication E pluribus unum (2007). There are divergent theories on the association between ethnic concentration and social cohesion (e.g. Gijsberts et al., 2011). According to the homogeneity theory, people prefer to associate with others who have similar characteristics. It is therefore expected that people in heterogeneous neighbourhoods tend to have fewer contacts with fellow residents than people in homogeneous neighbourhoods. According to group conflict theory, people feel threatened by the presence of
other groups. There is more distrust towards the out-groups, when the numerical presence of these groups is stronger.

Putnam’s (2007) ‘constrict theory’ partly overlaps with conflict theory. He found out that a higher ethnic diversity in the neighbourhood goes hand in hand with less trust in local politicians. Ethnic heterogeneity furthermore negatively affects the number of friends and acquaintances and the willingness to do something for the neighbourhood or to work with voluntary organisations. Diversity does not only lead to less trust in the so-called out-group, but also to distrust in the in-group. Putnam (2007, p. 140) concludes: “Diversity seems to trigger not in-group/out-group division, but anomie or social isolation. In colloquial language, people living in ethnically diverse settings appear to ‘hunker down’ – that is, to pull in like a turtle”.

Other researchers have stressed there has been too much emphasis on the role of ethnic diversity at the expense of other types of diversity, most notably income diversity, which might have a stronger effect on social cohesion (Letki, 2008; Portes and Vickstrom, 2011). Next to that, it has been found that the effect of ethnic diversity does not equally apply to each aspect of social cohesion. For instance, Völker et al. (2007) found a negative effect of ethnic heterogeneity on the number of neighbours, but no effect on sense of community (while the reverse is true for income heterogeneity). The effect of ethnic diversity on social cohesion may also depend on the political culture (Reeskens and Wright, 2013). In line with the work of Miller (1995), Putnam (2007) argues that diversity is less likely to negatively affect social cohesion in societies that are characterised by a civic and inclusive understanding of nationhood, as compared to societies where nationalism is based on blood and soil. On the basis of the European Values Study it has indeed been found that this latter form of (ethnic) nationalism exacerbates the negative impact of diversity (Reeskens and Wright, 2013).

A weak point of Putnam’s paper is the use of the Herfindahl-index as an indicator of ethnic heterogeneity. To give an example: if we would have just two ethnic groups in a city (Reds and Greens) the score on the Herfindahl-index would be exactly the same for neighbourhoods with 20% Reds and 80% Greens as for neighbourhoods with 80% Reds and 20% Greens. If ethnic composition is relevant for social cohesion, it seems however unlikely that Reds (and Greens) experience the same cohesion in both neighbourhoods. In other words, Putnam (2007) implicitly assumes that the effect of ethnic heterogeneity is the same for all ethnic groups. That is very implausible. Dutch researchers have for example shown that native Dutch evaluate ethnically concentrated neighbourhoods much more negatively than members of minority ethnic groups (Bolt et al., 2008; Van Ham and Feijten, 2008). On the basis of a research in Amsterdam, Bolt and Kleinhans (2011) conclude that there is a negative link between ethnic diversity and social cohesion, but that this only applies for native Dutch residents. In the same vein, Bailey et al. (2012) found that with an increasing ethnic mix neighbourhood attachment declines for whites. Similar results are found for socio-economic mix. For lower socio-economic status groups, levels of attachment vary very little with the level of socio-economic mix, but for the highest status group (professional/managerial) attachment falls with increasing deprivation.
Towards Hyper-Diversified European Cities

in the neighbourhood. Dominant groups (in terms of numbers) appear to be less tolerant of living with ‘others’ than other groups.

Although some of the academic literature tends to be pessimistic about the level of social cohesion in diverse areas, it should be stressed that there is no reason to assume that there is a mechanistic (negative) association between diversity and cohesion. Contextual differences play a large role in the effects of diversity. Delhay and Newton (2005) have shown that good governance at the regional and national level positively affects social cohesion and eliminates the (alleged) negative effects of diversity. The effects of diversity may also differ from society to society based on difference in ‘ethnic boundary making’. In the literature on ‘ethnic boundary making’ ethnicity is “… not preconceived as a matter of relations between pre-defined, fixed groups … but rather as a process of constituting and reconfiguring groups by defining boundaries between them” (Wimmer, 2013, p. 1027). This literature aims to offer a more precise analytic of how and why cultural or ethnic diversity matters in some societies or contexts but not in others and why it is sometimes associated with inequality and ‘thick identities’ and in other cases not. This is – among other things – dependent on the specific type of boundary making and the degree of ‘social closure’ along cultural-ethnic lines (e.g. Cornell and Hartmann, 1998; Wimmer, 2013).

The literature on social mix reveals what factors at the local level are relevant for disentangling the relation between diversity and cohesion. Cases where mixing at the neighbourhood level has led to a positive outcome are revealing in this respect (Camina and Wood, 2009; Joseph and Chaskin, 2010). What these cases have in common is that mixing policies were combined with investments in the physical and social environment. With regard to the physical aspect, it is not only relevant to focus on the quality of the dwellings and the environment, but also to shape the public space in such a way that informal interaction is fostered (Talen, 2002; Raman, 2010). Next to that, the spatial configuration of the different tenures may either block or stimulate social interaction between different categories of residents. Joseph and Chaskin (2010) describe the case of Westhaven (Chicago) where a ‘superblock’ of 200 units worked as a physical barrier between the different parts of the neighbourhood. The other extreme is ‘pepper-potting’ where owners and renters are brought close together and interaction (positive or negative) is almost inevitable (Kleinhans, 2004).

With regard to social aspects, investments in community development have led to positive results. Camina and Wood (2009) attribute the relative success of social mix in their case studies (partly) to the fact that residents were provided with help in getting activities going and in managing and running community halls. A case study on a mixed new housing development in Milan (Mugnano and Palvarini, 2013) showed that there was a high level of social cohesion due to initiatives that stimulated residents to participate, like the organisation of a community planning process to set up a multifunctional recreation centre. Moreover, a neighbourhood association was created to manage the common areas and to organise a wide range of events. A surprisingly high proportion of residents (more than 40 per cent) joined this association. However, the most active residents in the neighbourhood form a rather homogeneous group,
mainly pensioners, while others (like residents from minority ethnic groups) feel do not consider the neighbourhood association as being tailored to their needs and culture. Therefore, it is crucial to rethink approaches to community governance in such a way that divisions between different types of residents are not reinforced, but that fosters broader participation, including categories that lack influence and power (Chaskin and Joseph, 2010).

Key implications

All in all, we do know something about the relations between urban diversity and social cohesion, but it is by no means clear in which circumstances and contexts diversity has a positive effect on social cohesion. Nor do we know the extent to which urban policies and governance arrangements directly affect these relationships. In this project we will focus on the contextual factors that shape these dynamics. We will need to take into account that the effect of diversity may not be the same for each dimension of social cohesion. Next to that we will need to take into account that the (perception of) both diversity and social cohesion may differ between different scale levels (e.g. building block, neighbourhood, city).

3.2 DIVERSITY AND SOCIAL MOBILITY

Social mobility refers to the possibility of individuals or groups to move upwards or downwards in society, for example with respect to jobs and income (and status and power). Social mobility has been defined in many ways, in narrow as well as in broad senses. In almost all definitions the notion of the labour market career is mentioned. Individuals are socially mobile when they move from one job to another (better) job or from a situation of unemployment to a situation of having a job. Thus, social mobility is almost always about labour market transitions. The new job is often related to a higher income, which is also in many cases seen as an aspect of social mobility. Less often we see other aspects of the job, such as job satisfaction, appearing in the literature on social mobility. Social mobility can also be related to education: mobility can then be operationalised as obtaining a diploma from school. In some cases social mobility is used in a very general sense, terms like social outcome or social opportunities (Buck and Gordon, 2004; Musterd and Andersson, 2005) or even individual outcomes (e.g. Galster, 2008) have been used. In some studies the definition of social mobility is even broadened to aspects that have to do with housing careers and leisure time (VROM-Raad, 2006). In this research project we stick to a clear operationalisation: social mobility is the change over time in an individual’s socio-economic characteristics, such as labour market position and income (see also Pinkster, 2009). Individual scores can easily be aggregated to group scores.

In the context of social mobility it is important to pay some attention to the concept of social capital. In its most simple sense, social capital refers to the possible profit of social contacts (Kleinhans, 2005). It thus provides a link between social cohesion and social mobility. To Bourdieu, social capital is a resource or a power relation that agents achieve through social
Towards Hyper-Diversified European Cities

networks and connections: “Social capital is the sum of the resources, actual or virtual, that accrue to an individual or group by virtue of possessing a durable network of more or less institutionalised relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition” (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, p. 119). This definition focuses on the actual network resources that individuals or groups possess that help them to achieve a given goal, e.g. finding a job or a better home. Portes and Rumbaut (2001) draw on Bourdieu’s definition of social capital when they specifically talk about immigrants. They stress that social capital should not only be seen as positive but can also have negative effects. Capital is positive when the social network is enabling, for example when the network enables immigrants to achieve (better) job opportunities, education etc., but negative when the network becomes restraining, for example when cultural norms and values become repressing (see section 3.1 for a similar discussion around the concept of social cohesion).

The question of how individuals can profit from their social contacts is crucial here. With respect to these contacts we can think of practical knowledge, or important information. The literature makes an important distinction between bonding capital on the one hand and bridging capital on the other hand (Granovetter, 1973; Putnam, 2001). Bonding capital refers to strong ties within one’s social circle (often to similar others), while bridging capital is about relations outside one’s social circle (weak ties). The latter type of tie is much more likely to deliver important information about opportunities, such as jobs (Granovetter, 1973). In this research project we see social capital as a resource for social mobility. In other words: this resource can be used as a means to reach social mobility. Social capital is thus not seen as an equivalent of social mobility. The concept of social capital does have some overlap with the concept of social cohesion (see above), but while social cohesion can be seen as an outcome of social processes, social capital should be more interpreted as a means to reach something. Having a good social network can for example help to find a premise for starting a small firm.

The relation between diversity and social mobility

There is a quite abundant literature in which the relation between neighbourhood characteristics and social mobility is central. This is the literature on so-called neighbourhood effects (e.g. Wilson, 1987; Friedrichs, 2002). In many of these studies, the effects of segregation (usually in terms of income or ethnic background) on social mobility have been central, rather than the effects of diversity. Typical questions in such research are (Friedrichs, 1998): Does living in a neighbourhood with a specific type of population limit social mobility? Does living in an ethnic neighbourhood limit integration and assimilation? Do impoverished neighbourhoods have fewer job opportunities for their residents? The basic reasoning in much research can be traced back to the work by William Julius Wilson (1987) who stated that the out-migration of middle- and higher-income households from inner-city neighbourhoods caused the disappearance of positive role models for the poor, leaving them behind in social isolation, disconnected from the social and economic mainstream (see also Joseph, 2008).

The negative neighbourhood effects as described by Wilson apply to the ideal type of the (outcast) ghetto characterised by a lack of ties with the mainstream economy and a lack
of internal resources. Those areas are indeed ‘blind alleys’ (or ‘cul-de-sac’s) in terms of social mobility. Other deprived areas may however function as stepping stones in the social mobility process or as places of socialisation into the urban culture. The ideal type of those kind of areas is the immigrant enclave (Logan et al., 2002).

Do neighbourhoods and their population composition indeed affect social mobility of their residents? Many researchers have put this question central in their work, but there is no agreement on the effect of social and/or ethnic neighbourhood composition on social outcomes in general and social mobility in particular (see Galster, 2010; Van Kempen and Bolt, 2012; Van Ham et al., 2012; Sautkina et al., 2012 for recent overviews). Much of this research has been carried out in US cities (e.g. Galster and Zobel, 1998; Allard and Danziger, 2003; Joseph, 2006; Joseph et al., 2007; Galster, 2007; Chaskin and Joseph, 2011;) and in the UK (e.g. Atkinson and Kintrea, 2001; Clark and Drinkwater, 2002; Kearns, 2002). In Germany (e.g. Friedrichs, 2002), Sweden (Galster et al., 2008; Hedman, 2011; Brännström and Rojas, 2012) and the Netherlands (e.g. Musterd, 2003; Van der Klaauw and Van Ours, 2003; Kleinhans, 2004; Pinkster, 2009; Van Eijk, 2010; Vervoort, 2011) only a small number of researchers took these neighbourhood effects as a central issue in their research activities.

Some concrete examples of results of research into neighbourhood effects can be given. In a study in Sweden on the effects of income mix in neighbourhoods on adult earnings, Galster et al. (2008) showed that neighbourhood effects do exist, but that they are small. Urban (2009) finds only a small effect of the childhood neighbourhood on income and unemployment risks in Stockholm. Brännström and Rojas (2012) also found mixed results with respect to the effect of living in disadvantaged neighbourhoods and areas with a relatively large minority ethnic population on education outcomes. Gordon and Monastiriotis (2006) also found small neighbourhood effects on educational outcomes for disadvantaged groups. At the same time, they found more substantial positive effects of segregation for middle-class households.

The general outcome of such studies is always that personal characteristics are much more important for social mobility than the characteristics of the neighbourhood, at least in European cities.

Why are neighbourhood effects on various aspects of social mobility so small? A few explanations can be given:

- It could be hypothesised that contacts between different kinds of people lead to positive effects: for example contacts between an unemployed person and a working individual might stimulate the unemployed person to look for a job. The problem is, however, that such contacts only seldom take place: individuals generally look for people ‘like them’ and are less likely to contact those who are in a different socio-economic position (Rosenbaum et al., 1998). Residents of a mixed neighbourhood may purposively avoid contacts with others: owner-occupiers may avoid renters, low-income households may avoid those with higher incomes, blacks may avoid whites and the other way around. Diversity within a
neighbourhood may lead to “fairly extreme social distances” (Chaskin and Joseph, 2011, p. 232). And: “Indeed, there is evidence that the more diversity that exists in a community, the less trusting residents are of neighbours and the more they tend to isolate themselves from others, even from those of similar backgrounds” (Joseph and Chaskin, 2010, p. 2350).

- When contacts do take place they are often only of a very superficial nature and are not instrumental in finding a (better) job (Chaskin and Joseph, 2010).

- The residential neighbourhood can still be partly relevant, but the lives of people do not organise completely around the home and the neighbourhood of residence. With increased mobilities, better transport and almost unlimited contact possibilities through the Internet and mobile devices people now take part in multiple networks, visiting multiple places and meeting many people physically and virtually (Van Kempen and Wissink, forthcoming; see Chapter 2 of this report). Ethnic groups may form communities all over the world (Zelinsky and Lee, 1998), in the neighbourhood where they are residents, in their home countries where still large parts of their families may live, but also in other parts of the where other family members and friends have migrated to (Bolt and Van Kempen, 2013).

**Key implications**

In our research we will have to take care: when looking for the effects of urban diversity on social mobility, we should not only focus on neighbourhood effects, but also pay attention to personal characteristics like age, gender, ethnic origin. We need to find out the relative importance of personal characteristics on the one hand and variables that have to do with neighbourhood and urban diversity on the other hand. The importance of neighbourhoods for crucial outcomes like social mobility remains to be seen, because many people will probably have their activities in much wider areas than the residential neighbourhood.

### 3.3 DIVERSITY AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE

Neoliberal globalisation requires cities to be competitive. In this proposal economic competitiveness is one of the dependent variables. However, it is not always clear what competitiveness actually means (Boddy and Parkinson, 2004). First, competitiveness can be seen as the actual performance of cities (output or outcome). According to this definition competitiveness can be measured on the basis of, for example, the number of jobs created in a certain period, the number of new enterprises, innovativeness (for example measured as the number of patents), or the increase of labour productivity. A second definition of competitiveness does not focus on the actual output or outcome, but on the conditions a city offers for economic development. According to this definition we have to look at the presence of a technical infrastructure, of a productive labour force, a stable governance system, the presence of institutions such as banks and insurance companies, etc. Cities are competitive when they have good scores on such features or, in other words “… a better mix of attributes for businesses and business success than others over relatively extended periods of time” (Parkinson and Boddy, 2004, p. 3).
When we look at urban studies we mainly find literature that links advantages of urban diversity to the economic competitiveness of the city. Fainstein (2005, p. 4), for instance, argues that “… the competitive advantage of cities, and thus the most promising approach to attaining economic success, lies in enhancing diversity within the society, economic base, and built environment”. From this widely-accepted point of view urban diversity is seen as a vital resource for the prosperity of cities and a potential catalyst for socio-economic development by many others (Bodaar and Rath, 2005; Eraydin et al., 2010; Tasan-Kok and Vranken, 2008). Although some successful entrepreneurs may live in homogenous neighbourhoods on the contrary to this view, and some scholars even argue that diversity and economic performance are not positively connected (Angrist and Kugler, 2003; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005), the general opinion is that diversity has a positive influence on the economic development of cities. And for others diversity contributes to the attraction of knowledge workers and increases the creative capital of cities. Based on these ideas policy-makers have sought to establish ‘creative cities’, built around the now familiar arguments put forward by Richard Florida (Florida, 2002; 2005) who claims that competitiveness results from a combination of the co-presence of talent, technology, and tolerance. It focuses on the “… importance of diversity as a positive way to enhance economic growth and development” (Thomas and Darnton, 2006, p. 156), particularly the presence of gay couples, bohemians, and foreign-born populations. These theories are blamed for creating sterile uniformity in urban policy thinking across the world, thereby stifling innovative approaches (see Peck, 2005; McCann and Ward, 2011). Inspired by similar ideas, urban diversity is seen as a characteristic feature of many policy-makers to realise a so-called ‘diversity dividend’, which will increase the competitive advantage of the city Cully, 2009; Eraydin et al., 2010; Nicholas and Sammartino, 2001; Grodach and Loukaitou-Sideris, 2007).

All these overviews provide a good understanding of how diverse communities can contribute to the economic performance of cities. But what is less clear is the impact of living/working in a hyper-diversified city or an area in a city on the economic performance of the individuals and groups living in these areas. In this research we focus on the way individuals and groups perform in the city as entrepreneurs as we see the economic performance of people as an essential condition for the economic performance of a city. We aim to underline that diverse forms of entrepreneurship positively affect urban economic performance. Moreover, increasing possibilities of building successful businesses (entrepreneurship) also contributes to the chances of social mobility in the city for diverse groups of people.

The relation between economic performance and diversity
There has been considerable attention in the literature for the influence of diversity on economic performance. However not always pointing out positive correlations. Bellini et al. (2008) refer to the work of Easterly and Levine (1997), who provided evidence of the correlations between richer diversity and slower economic growth; work of Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) found out that a shift from homogeneity to heterogeneity would reduce yearly growth performance; Angrist and Kugler (2003) proved a negative impact of migration on employment levels in the EU; and Alesina and La Ferrara (2004) argued that higher levels of diversity might damage
the growth performance in the long run. Diversity, as some argue, may also fail in terms of collective action (Miguel and Gugerty, 2005) and generate potential costs, either due to the increasing conflicts arising from polarisation and racism (Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003; Alesina et al., 2004; Bellini et al., 2008; Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005) or due to the inability of diverse populations to agree on common public goods and public policies (Syrett and Sepulveda, 2011).

However, as Bellini et al. (2008) argue, research on the urban level indicates the existence of positive correlations between diversity and economic performance and sees cultural diversity as an economic asset (Nathan, 2011). Some of the positive impacts of diversity can be highlighted here:

- **Increasing productivity**: A study of Ottaviano and Peri (2006) shows that average US-born citizens are more productive (on the basis of wages and rents) in a culturally diversified environment. As Bellini et al. (2008) show, diversity is positively correlated with productivity as it may increase the variety of goods, services and skills available for consumption, production and innovation (Lazear, 1999; O’Reilly et al., 1998; Ottaviano and Peri, 2006; Berliant and Fujita, 2004). In the same vein, Syrett and Sepulveda (2011) provide an overview of how the urban economy benefits from a diversity of population. According to their analysis, individual preferences and individual strategies influence productivity. Thus, the potential benefits of diversity are most apparent in production gains achieved through the mix of skills, particularly within more advanced economies.

- **Increasing chances for networking**: Some scholars (Alesina et al., 2004; Demange and Wooders, 2005) point to the emerging literature on club formations, wherein ethnic networks grow from within. Alesina et al. (2004) have found strong evidence of a trade-off between economies of scale and racial heterogeneity in the USA. According to these researchers, a social mix brings about variety in abilities, experiences, and cultures, which may be productive and may lead to innovation and creativity. Saunders’ (2011) work on the arrival city concept is quite interesting in this vein. He argues that some areas with high levels of social mix in the city provide a better (easier) environment for starting small businesses for immigrants, especially to the newcomers, due to the easy access to information thanks to the well-developed networks.

- **Increasing competitive advantage**: Emphasising the rising levels of population diversity, Syrett and Sepulveda (2011) suggest using population diversity as a source of competitive advantage. Some other studies highlight diversity as an instrument for increasing the competitive advantage of cities, regions or places (Bellini et al., 2008; Blumenthal et al., 2009; Eraydin et al., 2010; Nathan, 2011; Sepulveda et al., 2011; Thomas and Darnton, 2006). The common argument of these studies is that areas that are open to diversity are able to attract a wider range of talent by nationality, race, ethnicity, and sexual orientation than those that are relatively closed. As a result, they are more likely to have a dynamic economy due to their creative, innovative and entrepreneurial capacities compared to more homogenous cities (see also Scott, 2006).
• *Increasing socio-economic well-being:* A number of studies pinpointed the positive contribution of urban diversity to the socio-economic well-being of mixed neighbourhoods (Kloosterman and van der Leun, 1999; Kloosterman and Rath, 2001). In fact, proximity to mixed neighbourhoods seems to be a locus for networking and fostering of social capital (Kloosterman and Rath, 2001). Moreover, ‘attractive’ and safe living environments, ‘good’ and attractive amenities, nice dwellings and a ‘nice’ population composition can be crucial factors to attract and bind entrepreneurs to a city or neighbourhood (Van Kempen et al., 2006).

Looking to these positive aspects the link between the *urban human capital stock* and productivity/economic performance can be easily established. From another perspective, Thomas and Darnton (2006) relate economic development to social diversity in terms of three different qualities that it conveys: social capital, human capital, and quality of place. Kemeny (2012) argues that the impact of urban diversity on *economic performance* of a city depends on the *quality of its institutions*. Focusing on a particular informal institution, generalised trust, he inserts that workers in highly diverse cities will earn more compared to workers in more culturally homogenous cities only when trust levels are high. Thus, according to Kemeny’s research results institutions moderate the positive correlation between diversity and wages. Although the idea is quite interesting, finding an adequate measure of informal institutions seem to be problematic. Kemeny (2012) combined secondary data on trust and civic participation which was based on measures of census mail-response rates, voter turnout in presidential elections, total not-for-profit organisations, total number of associations per 10,000 residents, and other measures in the USA.

And finally, the works of Syrett and Sepulveda (2011; 2012) connect urban diversity’s influence on the urban economic development by looking at *urban policy approaches*. According to this approach there are some themes that can be highlighted, namely: skills, knowledge, and labour migration; enterprise activity; creativity and innovation; and diaspora relations and business networks. This approach, quite rightly, criticises the works that partially and over-simplistically define the diversity dividend as a source of competitive advantage because: these approaches may perceive the city from a limited perspective focusing on the needs of high-skilled professionals, which fails to recognise the different types of connections between people and places. From a similar critical position Saunders suggests a focus on the places where poor (rural-immigrant) populations concentrate in cities (Saunders, 2011). Having constant ties with their place of origin, these people also link themselves to the established city, creating visible influences on the economic, cultural and spatial development of the city.

**How to measure economic performance in relation to urban diversity?**
Both *economic performance* and urban diversity are concepts that are open for interpretations. Economic performance can be measured in many different ways, most of which are based on econometric modelling and analysis based on statistical data sets. What defines the type of economic performance analysis is actually the approach to economic development. The classic
models of measuring economic development (based on factors of land, labour, and capital) have been altered by models of metropolitan economic development based on the analysis of social capital, human capital, and urban amenities (Thomas and Darnton, 2006).

Measuring the economic impact of diversity requires the identification of the diverse groups whose economic performance is going to be measured. These classification methods vary considerably on the basis of the available data, selected methods (ethnographic, anthropologic, etc), and selected ‘identity markers’ (like language, national origin, race, religion, etc.). In the study of Nathan (2011), who measured the economics of super-diversity in UK, diverse groups are distinguished by using cultural-ethnic-linguistic (CEL) classification data; while Bellini et al. (2008), who measured the economic performance of diverse cultural groups in European regions, suggest using a classification based on a process of self-categorisation, where people recognise the distinction of groups themselves, and on economic data including GDP, employment, unemployment, active population, hotel and restaurant prices.

Another important aspect of the measurement is the scale of the analysis. Nathan (2011) argues that the relation between diversity and economic performance can be measured at the individual, firm, or urban levels. From a different angle Bellini et al.’s (2008) analysis were based on regional Europe-wide data, and provides comparisons, based on dataset includes demographic, economic and geographical data over 900 European regions from 12 countries.

And finally, the selection of performance indicators plays an important role in the measurement. Different indicators can be used to measure economic performance, depending on the scale of analysis (individual, firm, urban, region, etc), and on the approach economic performance is linked to diversity. Some scholars followed an econometric path to measure the impact of diversity on economic performance at the regional level, like Bellini et al (2008), who constructed a synthetic index by adopting two mostly used indexes used in the economic literature: the share of foreigners in the whole resident population; and the fractionalisation index which measures the probability that two individuals randomly extracted belong to different groups.

**Key implications**

Literature shows that new ways of understanding the economic performance of individuals and groups are needed within the framework of increasing urban diversity. We argue in this research that diversity creates positive influences on economic performance of individuals and groups. Policy arrangements may play an important role in stimulating these circumstances. We will first of all pay attention to establish the link between the diversity and entrepreneurship in urban locations that: allow entrepreneurs to both develop mutual interactions amongst each other and with the other residents in the city; give them easier access to small businesses and private sector services; allow them to make use of their multi-layered backgrounds (not ethnic, which can also be of course, but socio-economic, gender related, age related, cultural, sexual orientation related, etc); and enable them to
link their activities, behaviours, and lifestyles to their action spaces (work, living or activity areas) to create better opportunities for themselves. Secondly, we will assess the influence of the policy arrangements on the performance of entrepreneurs in these areas.
4 MOVING FORWARD

4.1 UNDERSTANDING HYPER-DIVERSITY IN CONTEMPORARY EUROPEAN CITIES

In this report we have explored and assessed some of the key literatures on contemporary urban diversity and its relationships with the broader themes of governance, social cohesion, economic competitiveness, and social mobility. We have argued that European cities are entering a new era of hyper-diversity that goes beyond traditional understandings of urban and demographic change. Too much of the existing literature is wedded to simple conceptions of population difference, often characterised through binaries between ‘host’ and ‘migrant’ population groups. The reality in many EU cities is one of much greater forms of diversity as expressed through class, identities, social position, and structural economic changes. Academic and policy research, we argue, urgently needs to address emerging forms of hyper-diversity and its implications for governance, social change, and economic competitiveness.

This has become increasingly important as in recent years, there has been a resurgent interest in the intersection between notions of social justice, diversity, and planning and urban policies (Sandercock, 1998; Fincher and Iveson, 2008; Fainstein, 2005; 2010; Marcuse et al., 2009; Soja, 2010). These texts build upon the legacy of seminal geographical works on social justice and the city (Lefèbvre, 1968; Harvey, 1973), and integrate the arguments of post-structuralist political theory (inter alia Young, 1990; Fraser, 1996) about the rise to prominence of a ‘politics of recognition and difference’ in public policy in complex, increasingly diverse societies.

Too much of the writing on contemporary cities, we have shown, over-simplifies the activities, values, and norms of citizens and communities. People with the same characteristics, as post-multiculturalists argue, may have very different orientations, values, and activity patterns. Most of the ‘multicultural’ literature misses intra-group diversity that is related to one of their main – and untested – assumptions, namely that each ethnic group is characterised by a distinct culture, a different ‘vision of the good life’ (Kymlicka, 2010); in other words, they effectively assume that values and preferences are a matter of ethno-cultural difference rather than differences along the lines of factors such as class, gender, region, profession, and neighbourhood.

The concept of hyper-diversity, we contend, captures the quantitatively and qualitatively diverse forms of urban diversity that are now emerging. First of all, it suggests bringing the increasing population diversity beyond the ‘standard’ migration and ethnical dimensions. Secondly it proposes analysing multiple diversities in groups that ostensibly seem to be similar. Thirdly, it argues that diversity in cities should be approached as a case-sensitive concept within a specific context to address the issue in a clearer way. It means that specific contextual elements
for the comprehensive study of hyper-diversity should be considered and that in some cities the characteristics of diversity may be dominated by socio-economic factors, while in some others it may be dominated by cultural factors. An emphasis on hyper-diversity encourages researchers to look beyond bounded neighbourhoods and refrain from the long-running tendency to concentrate on fixed or closed spatial categories in general. This, as authors such as Fincher and Iveson (2008, p. 3) argue is important because, “… if planning is to craft more just cities in a context of diversity, then this cannot be simply a matter of ‘accommodating’ or ‘embracing’ diversity as such. Rather, it is a matter of disentangling the different kinds of diversity which characterize city life and distinguishing between those forms of diversity which are just and those that are unjust, in order to promote what we will refer to (…) as a ‘just diversity’.

(i) Globalisation, Changing Societies, and the Threats to Territorial Governance

We have argued throughout the report that the intensification of globalisation processes during the 1990s and 2000s has shifted the scale and character of socio-economic changes in cities and created new problems and challenges for policy-makers. New mobilities are emerging in which identities and territorially-based political allegiances are increasingly being questioned. The changes brought about by intensified globalisation in recent decades have challenged the assumption that citizen and community identities in cities are territorially-based. Cosmopolitan writers now claim that identities are more fluid, relational, and global in nature and that policy interventions that cling to territorially-based, collective understandings of citizenship are doomed to failure. At the same time policy-makers are faced with new challenges over how to govern and manage cities that are becoming increasingly cosmopolitan. The growth of ICTs and transnationalism may also be leading to the decline of place-based local communities as a greater variety of places (i.e. the community of origin, but also other places where friends and family members have migrated to) other than the place where one resides may remain or become more important. This, we have argued, can have major implications for the everyday life of neighbourhoods. If residents are more interested in places elsewhere the question should be asked how important the residential neighbourhood still is and how policies aimed at neighbourhoods can be effective. These more relational and fluid forms of political identification, we argue, represent one of the greatest governance challenges associated with hyper-diversity.

We have also argued that policy climates across and within the EU have been subject to policy shifts and a hardening of positions towards migrants and diversity, particularly in the wake of economic recession and the post-2008 financial crisis. Growing social and political tensions will have their biggest impacts on the poorest people and places within EU cities. We have shown that the presence of hyper-diversity in this context may act as a lightning rod for wider discontents and there may be a tendency for existing prejudices and tensions in cities to be seriously exacerbated. Its impact on different cities and countries has also been uneven and new geographies of austerity are emerging with differential effects. Many nation-states within the EU have now developed more robust policies towards diversity and migration in response to internal political pressures and concerns over the effects of austerity and economic crisis.
The question of ‘too much diversity’ is even being raised along with wider calls for the greater assimilation of diverse groups. For some on both the political left and right there has been a growing emphasis on promoting the negative aspects of diversity as something that undermines a ‘sense of place’ and social cohesion. It is a view that has now reached the mainstream of political debates at the nation-state level and it forms the backdrop to many of the policy discourses and interventions that will be explored through this research project.

However, as we have also noted, it is possible that austerity may encourage policy shifts towards more diversity as one way of enhancing future economic resilience and competitiveness. The positive economic aspects of diversity may become more appealing to policy-makers in such circumstances. In some cities across Europe, notably major urban centres such as London, local policy-makers have been particularly vociferous in their appeals for more diversity and the creation of hyper-diverse societies.

(ii) Social Capital, Social Polarisation and Inequality in Hyper-diverse Cities

Our review has also examined the relationships between hyper-diversity and social polarisation and the geographical variability of emerging patterns of inequality. It explores the importance of social capital as a resource and its relationships to hyper-diversity. We argue that this resource can be used as a means to reach social mobility of individuals or groups. The literature shows that the relationships between polarisation and inequality and the ways in which citizens and communities handle their day-to-day lives is never an automatic one and cannot be assumed to take on generalisable forms. Residents and entrepreneurs in cities face growing economic challenges and threats to social integration. However, much of the existing research is too broad-ranging and pays insufficient attention to subdivisions within basic categories or groups. Moreover, because data in such studies are based principally on residence, they only give a limited view on the spatial diversity of the urban realm. While segregation patterns in themselves can tell us a great deal about the housing market and its differentiation and inequalities, more sophisticated research is needed to shed light on the social consequences of these patterns have to be found. Hyper-diversity is definitely not a central concept in segregation studies.

All in all, we do know something about the relations between urban diversity and social cohesion, but it is by no means clear in which circumstances and contexts diversity has a positive effect on social cohesion. Social justice itself is a normative concept concerned with the question of ‘who gets what, where, and how’. The concept has a material dimension (i.e. distributive justice seeking to redress class inequalities) as well as a cultural/moral dimension which refers to the recognition and empowerment of marginalised individuals and groups, and to the elimination of what Young (1990) calls the five faces of oppression: exploitation, marginalisation, powerlessness, cultural dominance and violence. Geographers and planning theorists have added a territorial and spatial dimension to debates about social justice but in-depth studies on how mechanisms behind social mobility work, and on the specific role of urban or neighbourhood diversity on social mobility are scarce. Nor do we know the extent to
which urban policies and governance arrangements directly affect these relationships. Therefore, a renewed focus on this relation is important. It may for example be the case that in some urban areas (for example large-scale housing estates with a high population turnover), the relation between the population diversity of an area and social mobility is much less strong than in more stable residential neighbourhoods where contacts between people might be more intensive. The importance of neighbourhoods for crucial outcomes like social mobility is poorly understood, because many people will probably have their activities in much wider areas than the residential neighbourhood.

4.2 HOW TO PROCEED WITH THE PROJECT: THE MOST IMPORTANT THEORETICAL AND SOCIETAL QUESTIONS

The review has demonstrated that there is an urgent need to engage with issues of hyper-diversity and that existing research and knowledge on the topic is partial and limited. Events on the ground in European cities are changing so rapidly that many of the concepts and assumptions that framed earlier periods of writing now feel dated and inadequate. In this final section we highlight some key questions that will be interrogated in this project. Our core aim is to explore the conditions under which cities provide opportunities for hyper-diverse groups to develop, re-position, socially co-exist, mutually interact, and economically prosper; and to figure out the influence of their action spaces (working, living, and activity environments) in this evolution.

Our Work Packages are designed to explore these different dimensions and core questions and issues raised in this report. Some key questions that will be investigated include:

- How are urban policy agendas in relation to diversity changing across the EU and why? We will explore the degree to which policy-makers now think in terms of the ‘receptive capacities’ of the places they govern and whether there is a relationship between the size and degree of diversity within cities and the dominant policy agendas and discourses that are emerging.

- In light of the rather mixed assessments made by previous researchers on earlier rounds of diversity policies, how can we assess, in this project, what kind of policies and governance arrangements can be deemed to have successfully engaged with hyper-diversity in positive ways in order to foster social mobility, social cohesion and economic performance?

- To what extent are territorially-bounded ‘local’ community identifications and the category of the ‘neighbourhood’ still significant to citizens and policy-makers? Moreover, does this mean that area-based policies and arrangements are by definition ill-targeted and increasingly limited in their effectiveness? And what types of governance arrangements and policy interventions are now emerging?

- What are the effects of urban policy arrangements and interventions on social cohesion and social mobility? We will take into account that the effect of diversity may not be the same for each dimension of social cohesion and that perceptions of both diversity and social cohesion may differ between different scale levels such as the neighbourhood or the city.
• What is it like to live in hyper-diverse cities on a day-to-day basis? We will examine the experiences of urban citizens and the ways in which diversity shapes quality of life, identities, and views of place. The impacts of transnationalism on local community ties will also be researched.

• Under what conditions does hyper-diversity encourage and/or suppress local entrepreneurialism within cities? Our work will focus on the relationships between business competitiveness and diversity and explore the circumstances in which urban policy supports (or fails to support) the entrepreneurial activities of different groups.

• What factors influence attitudes towards cosmopolitanism and hyper-diversity in different cities? Is hyper-diversity seen as a mark of modernisation, tolerance, and global city status or as a threat to an imagined social order? To what extent do such attitudes fuel neo-assimilationist policies and/or outright hostility to globalisation and transnational mobility? Or are they used to create more positive forms of policy intervention that encourages more diversity and inclusion?

• Can conceptions of hyper-diversity be converted into broader conceptions of ‘planning for a just diversity’? Fincher and Iveson (2008, p. 3), for example, identify three social logics of such planning: redistribution, through which attempts are made to plan for the redress of disadvantage and inequality rooted in class; recognition, through which efforts are made to define the attributes of (diverse) groups of people so that their needs can be met; and encounter, through which the interaction of individuals are planned for in order to offer opportunities for increased sociality. We will explore these directly in later Work Packages and identify how and to what extent current policy agendas develop and implement more just outcomes.

• What are the geographies of these processes and how can comparative research be used to make sense of emerging contrasts and similarities? Across our case study cities we will be adopting direct comparative methods and framework of analysis as outlined through the sections above. This will allow partners to describe and explain common trends and themes, whilst also allowing sufficient flexibility for locally-based, geographical diversity to be documented and assessed. We will systematically engage in direct comparisons and contrasts to identify the causal and more contingent variables that shape the relationships between hyper-diversity and urban policy.


Burgers, J. (2002), *De Gefragmenteerde Stad* [The Fragmented City]. Amsterdam: Boom.


Towards Hyper-Diversified European Cities


Iveson, K. (forthcoming), Planning in the multicultural city: celebrating diversity or reinforcing difference? *Progress in Planning*.


Towards Hyper-Diversified European Cities


Prattschke, J. and E. Morlicchio (2012), Social polarization, the labour market and economic restructuring in Europe: an urban perspective. *Urban Studies*, 49 (9), pp. 1891-1907.


Raco, M. and T. Tasan-Kok (2010), Competitiveness, cohesion, and the credit crunch: reflections on the sustainability of urban policy. In: K. de Boyser, C. Dewilde, D. Dierckx, and J. Friedrichs (eds.), *Between the
Towards Hyper-Diversified European Cities


Wilson, W.J. (1987), The Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner City, the Underclass, and Public Policy. Chicago: Chicago University Press.


This report analyses some of the key literatures on contemporary urban diversity and its relationships with governance, social cohesion, social mobility and economic competitiveness. As European cities enter a new era of hyper-diversity that goes beyond traditional understandings of urban and demographic change, there is an urgency for academic research and policy to address emerging forms of hyper-diversity and its implications for the governance of cities.